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2019
The necessity to remunerate the provision of electrical capacity is intensively dis-
cussed among stakeholders in the electricity sector, as concerns about generation
adequacy are growing due to an increasing share of intermittent renewable energies.
Around the world and most recently in particular in Europe, different capacity remu-
neration mechanisms have already been implemented or are about to be introduced.
These developments entail new challenges for regulators as well as market participants,
yet it is still disputed whether capacity remuneration mechanisms are indeed needed.
In this dissertation, it is examined to which extent the expansion of renewable
energies is linked to a decline in prices and restrained investments. It is shown that
the drop in wholesale electricity prices in European markets is partly attributable
to an increase in renewable production. However, the development of fuel prices,
emission allowances prices, and the decommissioning of power plants are equal or
even stronger factors. Notwithstanding, the profitable operation of state-of-the-art
thermal power plants, i.e., combined cycle gas-fired units, remains difficult with the
ongoing increase of renewable capacities, thus making it likely that the debate about
capacity remuneration mechanisms will further intensify. Against this backdrop,
an up-to-date overview of the debate on the necessity for capacity remuneration
mechanisms is provided, and initial experiences with real-world implementations are
discussed. In addition, the current state of research on capacity remuneration mecha-
nisms is analyzed. While most studies agree that capacity remuneration mechanisms
have certain advantages, for example, investment cycles can be dampened, and the
adverse effects of the abuse of market power can be mitigated, no consensus is found
on other issues, for example, the optimal design or cross-border effects.
iv
In a case study for Germany, several potential market designs options are evaluated.
The results show that an energy-only market has a short-term cost advantage, but
long-term scarcity prices lead to similar system costs as in a central capacity market.
Further, an energy-only market with a strategic reserve can incentivize investments,
and ensure generation adequacy in a market with a high share of renewable energies.
With a central capacity market, however, investment cycles are less likely to occur, and
a predefined adequacy rate is easier to achieve. In a subsequent analysis, Switzerland
is used as an illustrative case study for the assessment of cross-border effects of
capacity remuneration mechanisms. The findings indicate that neighboring capacity
remuneration mechanisms strongly influence domestic prices and investments. Due
to the large-scale hydropower capacities in Switzerland, however, this does not result
in a negative impact on generation adequacy. Thus, making the introduction of a
local capacity remuneration mechanism optional.
On this basis of the obtained results, it is recommended that policy makers wanting
to implement capacity remunerationmechanisms use considerable diligence. Capacity
remuneration mechanisms, even though effective in increasing generation adequacy,
are extremely difficult to design optimally, and a rash, poorly planned implementation
may lead tomore harm than good. In this context, further research is required to study
the efficiency of capacity remunerationmechanisms oriented on real-world conditions,
e.g., by integrating the behavior of learning, risk-averse market participants verified
through studies or experiments.
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Chapter¹Motivation and introduction
European electricitymarkets are currently undergoing a phase of transition, whichis characterized by three essential factors: first, the expansion of renewable en-
ergies, in particular, wind power and photovoltaics, second, a partial phase-out of
nuclear energy, and third, the European market integration. These developments pose
significant challenges that need to bemastered. In this process, three partly competing
goals serve as a guiding principle: security of supply, affordability and environmental
compatibility (BMWi, 2016a). Recently, a fourth goal has gained in importance: the
social acceptance (Droste-Franke et al., 2015). Balancing these objectives is the basis
for a country’s prosperity and competitiveness, however, represents a tetralemma
that includes complex links between public and private actors, governments and
regulators, economic and social factors, national resources, environmental concerns,
and individual behavior (World Energy Council, 2016).
Liberalization of the electricity market
Substantial structural changes have accompanied the development of electricity mar-
kets since the 1990s. At that time, markets in Europe underwent a profound transfor-
mation due to the incipient liberalization, whose process still continues until today.
The so-called energy packages of the EuropeanUnion formed the basis for this process,
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each a bundle of directives and sometimes also regulations that were subsequently
implemented into national law by member states.
The first package consisted of two parts: A directive for the internal electricity
market in 1996 (European Commission, 1997), which was followed by its counterpart
for the gas market in 1998 (European Commission, 1998). These directives established
rules for the third-party access in order to decouple the trading of electricity and
gas from the physical transport on a particular network; thus, enabling competition
despite existing network monopolies for the first time. Furthermore, large, industrial
end consumers were now able to negotiate the purchase and sales of electricity. In
2003, the second energy package was adopted (European Commission, 2003a). It
opened the gas and electricity market to new entrants. Also, all end-users includ-
ing households were now able to freely choose their suppliers from a wider range
of competitors. In 2009, the third energy package—consisting of three directives
and two regulations—was passed with the aim of further liberalizing the internal
electricity and gas market (European Commission, 2011c). The thereby newly opened
possibility of non-discriminatory cross-border trade can be seen as a cornerstone of
the implementation of the European internal energy market. In addition, the Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) was founded. Its task is to ensure
the harmonization of regulatory frameworks through effective cooperation between
national regulatory authorities, and if these are unable to reach an agreement, to take
legally binding decisions on cross-border issues.
Restructuring the electricity market from regulated monopolies to a competitive
market aims to improve system efficiency while simultaneously reducing system costs
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). However, competitive market structures could give rise
to the exertion of market power by large electricity suppliers (Borenstein, 2000),
and may not provide sufficient incentives for investment in new generation capacity
(Vries, 2007). Therefore, the latest package of the European Commission named
“Clean Energy for all Europeans” aims at the implementation of the Energy Union
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and includes, inter alia, the design of the electricity markets, the security of electricity
supply and governance rules for the Energy Union (European Commission, 2018a).
Market coupling
The liberalization of the European energy markets has the overarching goal of cre-
ating a single internal energy market that enables barrier-free cross-border trade
of electricity or primary energy sources such as oil or natural gas (European Com-
mission, 2010b). An important step for the integration of the European electricity
markets was the implementation of market coupling at the European electricity ex-
change (EPEX SPOT) for Central Western Europe (Benelux, France, and Germany)
on November 9, 2010 (EPEX SPOT, 2016). Only three years later, market coupling was
extended to Northwestern Europe. In this manner, generation capacities can be used
more efficiently across borders, and market participants benefit from the resulting
economic welfare gains (Weber, 2010). Whereas an identical price can be found in
a single market area at all times, for coupled markets, this only applies if sufficient
transmission capacity is available.
Nuclear phase-out
It is estimated thatmore than a third of the EU’s nuclear reactors currently in operation
reaches the end of their life cycle and are required to be shut down by 2025 (European
Commission, 2018b). In addition, several European countries, e.g., Belgium, Germany,
Spain, and Switzerland, have decided to phase out nuclear energy. Themost prominent
example, however, is Germany, where the phase-out was initially envisaged as early
as 2000 with the objective of replacing nuclear energy by 2022 (Bundesregierung,
2002). Nonetheless, in October 2010, due to concerns about rising electricity prices,
the phase-out date was postponed with the intention of using nuclear energy up
to 2036 (Bundesregierung, 2010). In an unexpected twist, only five months later,
the German government announced in reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
4 motivation and introduction
disaster a three-month moratorium for the eight oldest German nuclear power plants
(Atom-Moratorium) (Nestle, 2012). While, due to technical revisions, three of the
eight nuclear power plants had already been out of operation (Biblis B, Brunsbüttel,
Krümmel), the remaining five power plants (Biblis A, Isar 1, Neckarwestheim 1,
Philippsburg 1, Unterweser) were shut down temporarily. Finally, an amended version
of the Atomic Energy Act came into force in August 2011, which provided for the
definitive decommissioning of all eight plants and the gradual shutdown of all other
German nuclear power plants by the end of 2022 (Bundesregierung, 2011a).
Expansion of fluctuating renewable energies
The decarbonization is one of the greatest global challenges of the 21st century (BMU,
2014) and to overcome it, the expansion of renewable energies is an indispensable
part, which also brings about a profound change in the electricity system. Whereas
some countries, for example, Switzerland, due to the existing natural resources and
geographical conditions such as mountains, rivers or glaciers, renewable energies
already had a share of 56.6% in gross electricity consumption in 1990. At the same
time in Germany, the share was only 3.4%. Nonetheless, Germany has specified
national energy policy goals, which stipulate a minimum share of renewable energies
in electricity consumption of 40–45% until 2025 (BMWi, 2015b) and 65% until 2030
(BMWi, 2018a) in order to provide for a substantial reduction of national greenhouse
gas emissions. These national targets are embedded in the long-term objective of the
European Union (EU) of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050
compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 2011a).
To achieve national targets, renewable energies are subsidized through various
programs. The primary beneficiaries are photovoltaics and wind power, which already
play a major role in today’s electricity market and are expected to represent the
largest share of electricity generation in the future (Haas et al., 2013; Smith Stegen
and Seel, 2013). However, as the generation from photovoltaic and wind turbines
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is dependent on the stochastic nature of wind speed and solar radiation, deviations
between the actual and forecasted generation must be continuously compensated
by dispatchable generation capacities, storages, or interruptible loads to guarantee
grid stability. Furthermore, these technologies have a considerable influence on the
average residual load, i.e., the load that must be covered by conventional power plants.
However, due to, for example, seasonal fluctuations or rare weather conditions only a
weak influence on themaximum residual load can be observed. Photovoltaics and
wind power have marginal costs close to zero and, by displacing more expensive
thermal power plants, have a considerable influence on the hourly prices in the
wholesale electricity market (see Figure 1.1), so that the prices can even become
negative (Nicolosi, 2010) in case of an extreme feed-in of renewable energies.
Capacity remuneration mechanisms
As the continuous supply of electrical energy is critical for modern economies, se-
curity of supply has always been at the center of political attention. Despite its great
importance in politics, its underlying definition can be described as rather blurred
or elusive (Kruyt et al., 2009; Löschel et al., 2010).¹ Nonetheless, security of supply
can be subdivided into the following components when considering the different
temporal dimensions. In the short term, security of supply refers to the “ability of the
electrical system to support unexpected disturbances such as electrical short circuits
or unexpected loss of components of the system or sudden disconnection” (NERC,
1997). While in this context new serious challenges due to the transformations in the
electricity system emerge, these are not the focus of this work. Instead, the long-term
perspective is taken, which focuses on generation adequacy, i.e., “the ability of the
electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy requirements
of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably
¹ An overview of the different definitions including their conceptual dimensions and limitations can
be found in Winzer (2012).
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Figure 1.1 | Influence of the feed-in from fluctuating renewable energy sources on
the German day-ahead market price. OnMonday, November 23, 2015 at 5 p.m., the
demand in the German day-ahead market could only be met to a very limited extent
from fluctuating renewable energy sources. Therefore, the majority of the thermal ca-
pacities including the available peak load power plants were operated, which resulted
in a market price of 99.77 EUR/MWh. However, when a low demand for electricity
coincided with a high supply of wind turbines caused by a nationwide windstorm,
wholesale prices became negative during the night from Saturday to Sunday. Source:
EEX (2018a).
expected unscheduled outages of system elements” (North American Electric Relia-
bility Council [NERC], 2018). However, in the aftermath of the liberalization process,
generation adequacy is not the direct responsibility of a particular actor. Instead,
liberalized markets should provide sufficient incentives for market participants to
invest in technologies contributing to generation adequacy. In theory, even in the
absence of active demand response, energy-only markets² generate efficient prices
² Energy-only in the sense that the provided energy is remunerated but not the amount of firm
capacity a unit is able to supply. The latter could take place through different mechanisms, for example,
capacity markets.
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and, thus, lead to sufficient long-term investments guaranteeing the least-cost long-
term system if several key assumptions are met (Caramanis et al., 1982; Oren, 2005;
Schweppe et al., 1988; Stoft, 2002). However, in real-world markets, these assump-
tions do seldom hold, which can lead to underinvestment. Furthermore, there is a
substantial risk that market power is exerted resulting in high prices or investment
cycles occur in turn leading to inefficiency. To counteract this, the introduction of
mechanisms remunerating generation capacity is discussed extensively. In particular,
the rise of intermittent renewable energy sources or the market-related and political
uncertainties, such as the phase-out of specific technologies, have rekindled the debate
about capacity remuneration mechanisms and already led to their implementation in
various European countries.
Challenges and models needed
To comprehensively analyze the possible development of the future energy system
and to identify the most significant causal relations, the use of energy models has
proven to be extremely valuable (Jebaraj and Iniyan, 2006). First steps were already
taken following the oil price crises in the 1970s when the development of quantitative
energy models was commenced in view of an imminent oil shortage in order to
investigate possible effects on the security of energy supply and the increased use of
energy-saving technologies (Huntington et al., 1982). Due to the continually evolving
political and market economy environment, the requirements for energy modeling
have significantly changed, and, as a result, new research areas have emerged (Pfen-
ninger et al., 2014). In particular, due to market liberalization and the central role of
the various market players involved, methods must be developed to model a complex
system taking into account the perspective of the players, their decision-making
processes, and their interactions (Santos et al., 2015). In this way, for example, energy
policy measures do not have to be specified in the form of exogenous assumptions,
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but can be implemented as explicit instruments and thus researched under realistic
conditions.
1.1 Thesis structure
In order to contribute to a deeper understanding of the development of the elec-
tricity system and in particular the role of capacity remuneration mechanisms, the
central objective of this work is to develop and apply methodological approaches for
investigating the impact of renewable energies on the electricity market as well as the
effect and cross-border influence of capacity remunerationmechanisms. This requires
an explicit representation of techno-economic restrictions, existing marketplaces,
individual market players, available generation as well as transmission capacities.
Throughout this work, a focus is placed on the German electricity market, the
largest electricity market in Europe. Germany shows by far the largest expansion
of wind energy and photovoltaics in Europe (EurObserv’ER, 2017; European Wind
Energy Association [EWEA], 2017) and, in combination with the phase-out of nuclear
power, is undergoing a dynamic transition phase, which is still to come for many other
countries. As a result, the German market is particularly suitable for investigating the
effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms both domestically and across borders,
e.g., in Switzerland. To address the economic concepts of capacity remuneration
mechanisms as well as the required techno-economic models and the framework of
the German electricity sector, this work is divided into the following chapters.
In Chapter 2, the main techno-economic framework conditions of the German
electricity sector are described, whereby the results of this work can be interpreted
in an overarching context. To this end, the first sections of the chapter deal with the
characteristics of the German electricity market, the different long-term and short-
term wholesale electricity markets and their interrelationship. In the next sections,
the most significant economic and regulatory developments in the electricity sector
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of the last years, e.g., the promotion and expansion of renewable energies or plans for
implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms are analyzed and discussed.
In Chapter 3, light is shed on techno-economic electricity market models, which
allow a deeper understanding of the interrelationships in electricity markets. First, a
description of the various possible model classifications, including their fundamental
characteristics, is given. Subsequently, a comparison of the individual model types is
carried out where model-specific strengths and shortcomings are discussed. In a next
step, for each model type, the suitability for the analysis in this work is examined, and
finally, the need for further research efforts in view of the ongoing transformation of
electricity systems is addressed.
In Chapter 4, a common rationale for capacity remuneration mechanisms is ex-
amined in which the expansion of renewable energies is directly associated with a
decline in electricity prices and insufficient investment. For this purpose, the largest
electricity market in Europe, i.e., the German electricity market, is a suitable example,
as it shows a remarkable expansion of renewable energies parallel to a progressive
price decline from about 51 to 31 EUR/MWh in the period from 2011 to 2015. By ap-
plying an agent-based model as well as a regression approach with either static or
separate time-varying coefficients, the contribution of the different price drivers, e.g.,
fuel prices, emission allowances prices, or decommissions of power plants, is broken
down.
In Chapter 5, an up-to-date overview of the debate on the necessity for capacity
remuneration mechanisms is provided. This survey also covers the underlying pecu-
liarities of electricity markets that form the basis for the unique regulatory framework
in place inmost markets. Furthermore, the status of the implementation of capacity re-
muneration mechanisms in Europe is presented, and initial experiences are discussed.
In addition, the current state of research on capacity remuneration mechanisms is
analyzed, e.g., with regard to cross-border effects, investment cycles or a high share
of intermittent renewables. Finally, shortcomings of the existing research works are
identified, and unresolved issues are highlighted.
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In Chapter 6, an agent-based model for the German wholesale electricity market
is presented that accounts for short-time uncertainty factors, such as power plant
outages or fluctuating renewable energy sources. In this model, generation companies
are represented by agents that submit bids into the market based on variable costs,
start-up costs and ramping restrictions of their generation capacities. In order to
validate the model, an assessment is carried out in which historical market results are
compared with simulated results.
InChapter 7, it is analyzedwhether inGermany capacity remunerationmechanisms
are required or whether the current market design is able to incentivize sufficient
investments in dispatchable capacity. Furthermore, the role of demand-side manage-
ment in increasing generation adequacy is examined, whose effect is twofold: In the
short term, demand fluctuations can be reduced by dispatching flexible loads with
relatively low marginal costs often below the generation costs of existing thermal
capacities. In the long term, sheddable loads can enhance generation adequacy in
extreme situations while simultaneously triggering price peaks at several hundred
EUR/MWh allowing investors to refinance investments in the presence of a relatively
flat merit-order curve dominated by renewable energy sources with marginal costs
close to zero.
In Chapter 8, in accordance with the current European market framework, market
coupling is implemented for different market areas with limited interconnection
capacities. First, market participants submit their bids to the local power exchanges.
Then, a central market operator takes over all processes related to the coupling. For
that purpose, the operator receives all day-ahead bids from the local power exchanges.
The market coupling itself can be formulated as an optimization problem with the
objective to maximize social welfare. In a case study, results for the market coupling
of the German and French wholesale electricity market are presented.
In Chapter 9, Switzerland is chosen for a real-world case study on cross-border
effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms. As the Swiss electricity market is
tightly connected to the large neighboring markets of France, Germany, and Italy, it
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is well suited to illustrate the impact of large neighboring markets on a small national
electricity market. Moreover, in the neighboring countries, the implementation of
capacity remuneration mechanisms has already been completed or is expected in the
near future, so that close-to-reality results can be attained and studied.

Chapter²Framework of theGerman electricity sector
In this chapter, the main techno-economic and regulatory framework conditionsof the German electricity sector are described. First, the characteristics of the Ger-
man electricity market, the different long-term and short-term wholesale electricity
markets and their interrelationship are examined. Subsequently, the most significant
economic and regulatory developments in the electricity sector of the last years are
analyzed and discussed, which have driven the debate on generation adequacy and
capacity remuneration mechanisms either directly—e.g., the implementation of the
German capacity reserve—or indirectly by strongly influencing market prices or the
profitability of dispatchable generation capacity, such as the expansion of renewable
energy or the development of fuel prices.
2.1 The German wholesale electricity market
Due to its central location on the European continent and in combination with
its size as Europe’s largest electricity market, the German electricity market is of
particular significance, which is reflected in its considerable cross-border influence,
especially on its smaller neighbors. This section provides a brief overview of the
current state of the German electricity market, examining among other things the
various market segments, i.e., the derivatives, day-ahead, and intraday market, with
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Figure 2.1 | Chronological sequence of energy and reserve markets. In Germany, elec-
tricity can be traded years in advance on the derivatives market and until shortly before
physical delivery on the intraday market. For the latter, the physical gate closure is the
limiting factor that for trades within a control zone and across control zones occurs
5 and 30 minutes before physical delivery. Alongside the ongoing electricity trading,
transmission grid operators cover their demand for balancing power via weekly or
daily auctions. Sources: 50Hertz Transmission et al. (2017); EEX (2018a).
their characteristic features, marketplaces, products, and participants. An overview
of the chronological sequence and the interaction of the individual elements of the
German electricity market can be found in Figure 2.1.
2.1.1 Marketplaces
An important milestone after the liberalization of the electricity sector in Europe was
the creation of energy exchanges. The most important trading center for Germany is
the Leipzig-based European Energy ExchangeAG (EEX), which was established in late
2001 by the merger of the Leipzig Power Exchange (LPX) and the former European
Energy Exchange based in Frankfurt (EEX, 2018a). Since then, it has developed from
a national electricity exchange to a multi-commodity trading platform, where energy
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and energy-related products such as electricity, natural gas, hard coal, and emission
allowances are traded on different European derivatives and spot markets. Due to its
high liquidity, the EEX is widely considered as the reference point for the German
electricity market (Viehmann, 2011).
Similar to financial products, electricity can be traded either in organized markets
or over-the-counter (OTC). The main difference between exchange-traded and OTC
contracts is that the former are standardized and their regulation is approved by a
competent body (Cartea andVillaplana, 2014). In the case of over-the-counter trading,
the terms of a transaction are only bilaterally agreed upon by the trading partners
without the involvement of a central authority. Even though off-exchange transactions
can be performed directly between two parties, it is still possible to register them on
a stock exchange, e.g., to be protected against counterparty risk.
Central trading on a power exchange has the advantages of increasing market
transparency, providing valuable price information for other market participants and
thus reducing transaction costs (Weidlich, 2008). OTC trading, on the other side,
offers a high degree of flexibility allowing, for example, custom defined load profiles
to be hedged. Typically, the specific contractual obligations are kept confidential, and
only the over-the-counter trading volume registered on a stock exchange is publicly
known.
2.1.2 Derivatives market
On the derivatives market, products are traded for which a period of several days but
often weeks, months or years lies between the signing and settlement of a contract.
These contracts can be categorized into conditional and unconditional transactions
(Deng and Oren, 2006). In the case of a conditional transaction, e.g., an option, a
contracting party has the right, but not the obligation, to enforce the fulfillment of
the contract. In the case of an unconditional transaction, e.g., a futures contract, both
contracting parties have entered a binding obligation. Thus, the contract is always
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Sources: EEX (2018a); EPEX SPOT (2015).
executed. The contract can usually be fulfilled physically, i.e., by supplying electricity,
or financially by making a compensation payment.
In order to avoid a lack of liquidity for individual products, selected derivatives
contracts are available on the market. At the EEX, for example, annual contracts,
i.e., contracts with a delivery period of one year, can be traded for the next 6 years.
Contracts with a shorter delivery period, e.g., quarterly, monthly or weekly contracts,
can be traded for the next 11 quarters, next 9 months or next 4 weeks (EEX, 2018a). For
each product traded, usually different characteristics exist, e.g., the Base Week Future
or the Peak Week Future (Figure 2.2). The most prominent product for the German
market is the Phelix Future¹, whose underlying is the average electricity price of the
German/Austrian or since recently only the German day-ahead market determined
by the EEX (EEX, 2015).
First and foremost, the derivatives market can be considered as an instrument for
hedging against price risks of which extensive use is made (Cartea and Villaplana,
0 The churn rate in a specific market area is defined as the ratio of the volume of all trades to the total
demand, i.e., electricity consumption. This figure can be used to draw conclusions about the liquidity
of a market and the quality of its price signals (European Commission, 2014a). However, there is no
consensus on the level at which sufficient market liquidity exists.
¹ Phelix refers to Physical Electricity Index as the underlying values for the index are linked to a
physical supply of electricity, a difference to financial contracts where only a cash settlement is made.
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Figure 2.3 | Annual trading volumes of derivatives contracts for the German/Austrian
market area. The annual trading volume remained relatively constant from 2006–
2011. Afterward, mainly due to the increase in trading of standardized contracts,
the volume has been rising steadily. The by far most frequently traded standardized
contract is the “Phelix Base Year Future.” The large trading volumes result in the fact
that for the entire period shown the churn rate2 is greater than one, i.e., more than
the total electricity consumption is traded per year. Sources: AG Energiebilanzen e. V.
(2018); E-Control (2016); EEX (2018a).
2014). This can be demonstrated by the fact that the derivatives market at the EEX
has significantly larger trading volumes than the day-ahead and intraday market
combined (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Most notably, electricity suppliers are enabled to
optimize their medium- to long-term portfolio by selling the future power generation
of their power plants in advance to arbitrage traders, speculators or other electricity
suppliers.
As electrical energy cannot be stored economically in large quantities, the price of
an electricity futures transaction cannot be expressed—as it is otherwise common
with physical commodities (cost of carry)—by the current spot price and the storage
costs (Weron, 2000). Rather, the price of an electricity forward contract reflects
the expected spot price within the delivery period plus or minus a risk premium
(Huisman and Kilic, 2012).
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Figure 2.4 | Annual trading volumes of the day-ahead and intraday market for the
German/Austrian market area. The intraday market, which was introduced in 2006,
is steadily gaining in importance due to the increase in fluctuating renewable energies.
By contrast, developments in the day-ahead market are more volatile; however, the
most striking feature is the sharp increase in volume in 2010, which is related to the
fact that by the amendment of the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), transmission
system operators were obligated to offer the electricity generation from renewable
energies in the day-ahead or intraday market (Bundesregierung, 2009; EEX, 2010).
Despite the growth in the day-ahead and intraday market, which is also visible in
the increased churn rate, the total trading volume of both markets is still slightly less
than half of the combined annual electricity consumption in Austria and Germany.
Sources: AG Energiebilanzen e. V. (2018); E-Control (2016); EEX (2018a).
2.1.3 Day-ahead market
The day-ahead market refers to the market, on which short-term orders with delivery
on the following day can be placed, e.g., the EPEX SPOT in Paris, where trading takes
place within the framework of a single auction or, in rare cases, a second uniform
price auction. On the day-ahead market, not only peak load or base load products
but also individual hours can be traded. Currently, around 200 different companies
are registered for trading on the German/Austrian day-ahead market (EPEX SPOT,
2018a), which together provide for a high level of liquidity (Figure 2.4). A large part
of the market participants are utilities who optimize their portfolio, which consists of
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their available generation capacities and the supply contracts with their customers.
Other participants are larger industrial companies, who try to purchase electricity at
the best price, and pure traders, e.g., banks and financial service providers, that seek
to exploit price differences and take speculative positions. Furthermore, to offer the
expected electricity feed-in from renewable energy sources or to compensate their
grid losses, transmission system operators are participating in the market. Although
the number of participants is comparable to the derivatives market, the total volumes
traded on the day-ahead market are significantly lower.
First and second auction
Until 12:00 a.m. on the day before physical delivery, bids can be submitted to the
EPEX SPOT electronic trading platform for every 24 hours of the next day³. At this
point, most of the information required to optimize the power plant dispatch for the
next day is already available (Ströbele et al., 2012). To all submitted bids, the follow-
ing restrictions apply: The offered price must be within the price range of −500 to
3000 EUR/MWh, whereby the minimum price increment equals 0.10 EUR/MWh. In
addition, the traded volume must be equal to or greater than 0.10MWh (EPEX SPOT,
2017b).
After all bids have been placed, the outcome is calculated by a market clearing
algorithm commonly known as the Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integra-
tion Algorithm (EUPHEMIA), and for each hour an identical price is assigned to all
accepted bids in each market (EPEX SPOT, 2016). The result of this uniform-price auc-
tion is not only relevant for the market participants at the day-ahead market, but also
for derivatives traders as the base or peak day-ahead price is the underlying asset price
of a large number of derivatives contracts (Frontier Economics, 2011). Furthermore,
the day-ahead price is used to calculate the market premium for renewable energies
(Bundesregierung, 2014). Several statistical key figures of the historical electricity
³ During the transition from summertime to wintertime, 25, vice versa, 23 hours are traded.
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Table 2.1 | Statistical figures of the day-ahead auction results at
the EEX for the German/Austrian market area. Between 2005
and 2016, electricity prices show a wide range and considerable
deviations from the annual average. At first, the price develop-
ment does not indicate a long-term trend, but prices have been
steadily decreasing from 2011 to 2016. Whereas extreme max-
imum values of more than 500.00 EUR/MWh were observed in
the first years, the market stabilized thereafter. This is also re-
flected in the standard deviation, which from 2009 stayed below
20.00 EUR/MWh. Source: EEX (2018a).
Year Arith.
mean*
Standard
deviation
Skew Minimum Maximum
[EUR/
MWh]
[EUR/
MWh]
[–] [EUR/
MWh]
[EUR/
MWh]
2005 45.98 27.22 4.88 0.00† 500.04
2006 50.79 49.42 25.05 0.00† 2436.63
2007 37.99 30.35 6.88 0.00† 821.90
2008 65.76 28.65 1.17 −101.52 494.26
2009 38.85 19.41 −3.23 −500.02 182.05
2010 44.49 13.97 −0.07 −20.45 131.79
2011 51.12 13.60 −0.64 −36.82 117.49
2012 42.60 18.68 −2.64 −221.99 210.00
2013 37.78 16.46 0.09 −100.03 130.27
2014 32.76 12.77 −0.27 −65.03 87.97
2015 31.63 12.66 −0.31 −79.94 99.77
2016 28.98 12.48 −0.47 −130.09 104.96
2017 34.19 17.66 0.02 −83.06 163.52
* The arithmetic mean refers to the non-weighted hourly prices.
† At the EEX, negative electricity prices were introduced in
September 2008 at the request of the market participants; pre-
viously, the lower price limit was 0 EUR/MWh (EEX, 2008).
prices at the day-ahead-market for the German/Austrian market area can be found
in Table 2.1.
According to the current rules of the EPEX SPOT, a second auction can be held if
the market is in imbalance or if the first auction leads to a price that can be considered
abnormal in view of the current market situation, i.e., the price of one or more hours
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is significantly different from the results of a similar day or the other hours of the
current day (EPEX SPOT, 2017b). Whether such a case is present, is investigated if the
price falls below −150 EUR/MWh or exceeds 1500 EUR/MWh for at least one hour. If
a second auction is called, it will take place immediately after the first so that the final
auction results can be published from 12:42 p.m. onward.
In addition to hourly bids, also block bids can be submitted (Biskas et al., 2014).
A block bid—i.e., a bid for a certain number of consecutive hours within a day—is
subject to an all-or-nothing condition,meaning that it either is accepted for all hours or
rejected altogether. Thereby, market participants can better express their preferences
for the complementary characteristics of electricity generation in successive periods,
which among other things are due to the once occurring start-up costs of power plants
(Reguant, 2014). Therefore, block bids can be seen as a specific pairing of hourly bids,
which make it possible to deliver an average price over a pre-defined period of time.
As this ensures that all incurred costs are covered—whereas hourly bids are subject
to the risk that individual bids might be rejected and therefore partial costs are not
covered—a lower average price for the delivery in consecutive hours can be offered.
In addition to plain block bids, also two types of smart block bids can be traded:
linked and exclusive block bids (EPEX SPOT, 2015). Linked block bids allow to take
into account the financial and technical constraints of market participants by offering,
for example, start-up costs of a power plant in the first block and fuel costs in a further
block. In addition, energy storages can profit from linked block bids, e.g., by only
submitting a sell bid for a peak load hour if previously an ask bid has been accepted
in an off-peak phase. Exclusive block bids, on the other hand, can be used to pursue
different trading strategies for a power plant for the same delivery day (EPEX SPOT,
2014a). For example, a base load generation profile may be offered at a lower price,
and a peak load profile at a higher price, but only one of the offers is allowed to be
executed.
Although block bids offer market participants a wide range of possibilities to better
reflect their financial and technical constraints, their use is currently still restricted.
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Figure 2.5 | Welfare effect of negative prices. The admission of negative prices in-
creases economic welfare, as an efficient allocation is possible, and the welfare loss
caused by the price limit p0 in the pro rata allocation characterized by the area S’ can
be avoided. In addition, the ratio of consumer and producer surplus is changing. Al-
though in the considered hour the consumer surplus rises from D to D*, in the same
period, the producer surplus decreases from S to S*. Nevertheless, the allowance of
negative prices also brings advantages for producers, as the welfare gain, which is
generated in the following hours—however not depicted here—must be accounted
for in the evaluation of the total effects. Source: Viehmann and Sämisch (2009).
For example at the EPEX SPOT, the maximum volume per block bid is 600MWh, and
for each day a maximum of 100 block bids per trading account can be submitted
(EPEX SPOT, 2015). This is related to the fact that block bids substantially increase
the complexity of market clearing algorithms (Madani and van Vyve, 2015). If, for
example, only block bids with a static bid quantity were submitted, due to the all-or-
nothing condition, there would only be a market equilibrium when the accumulated
ask and sell volumes exactly match.
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Negative prices
Since September 4, 2008, it has been possible to place bids with negative prices for
the day-ahead market at the EEX. Prior to this, in the event of an oversupply, a pro
rata allocation was made, in which each supplier could sell only part of its bid volume,
which led to inefficiencies (see Figure 2.5). In addition to avoiding inefficient auction
results, negative prices have the benefit of providing an incentive to invest in flexible
system components and storage options (Brandstätt et al., 2011).
Although negative prices seem counterintuitive at first glance, due to the special
properties of the good electricity, negative prices are economically reasonable (Brand-
stätt et al., 2011). For technical reasons, electricity can only be stored in limited
quantities and, in order not to compromise grid stability, injections and withdrawals
must always be in equilibrium. However, the demand is comparatively inelastic in
the short term—only parts of the energy-intensive industry react to price signals,
whereas the majority of household consumers do not adjust their behavior (Andor
et al., 2010). Thus, in the event of an oversupply, the electricity generation must be
reduced, which becomes increasingly complicated in particular in the case of a low
demand.
Under current German law, transmission system operators are obliged to prioritize
the feed-in of renewable energy sources and sell them directly, e.g., via energy ex-
changes, regardless of the current market prices (Bundesregierung, 2000). Recently
built capacities must be marketed directly by the owner or an intermediary (Bun-
desregierung, 2014). These capacities, as well as all the capacities that deliberately
opted for direct marketing, have an income depending on the price at which they
sold their energy and receive an individual market premium retroactively. However,
this market premium is suspended for all periods during which prices remain con-
tinuously negative for at least 6 hours. Thus, in contrast to capacities that receive
a fixed feed-in tariff, all directly marketed capacities have an incentive to react to
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Table 2.2 | Negative historical electricity prices on the day-ahead market
for the German/Austrian market area. For the years 2010–2017, the corre-
sponding two hours, in which the lowest prices were observed, are shown.
Up to and including 2012, negative price peaks were often found during
winter nights. However, due to the expansion of photovoltaics, in the fol-
lowing years, extreme negative prices increasingly occurred in warmer sea-
sons when photovoltaics and wind power plants generated large quantities
of electricity simultaneously. Sources: EEX (2018a); ENTSO-E (2018b).
Date Time Day Day-ahead
price
PV Wind Load Residual
load*
[EUR/MWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh]
03/01/2010 03:00 Mon −18.1 0.0 13.9 49.4 35.5
12/12/2010 02:00 Sun −20.5 0.0 19.4 51.5 32.1
01/01/2011 07:00 Sat −34.2 0.0 12.3 37.1 24.8
02/04/2011 23:00 Fri −36.8 0.0 22.6 56.7 34.1
12/25/2012 02:00 Tue −222.0 0.0 18.6 30.6 12.0
12/25/2012 03:00 Tue −221.9 0.0 17.8 30.4 12.6
06/16/2013 14:00 Sun −100.0 20.0 8.7 41.8 13.1
06/16/2013 15:00 Sun −100.0 18.3 8.0 40.6 14.3
05/11/2014 14:00 Sun −65.0 14.0 20.5 49.8 15.3
05/11/2014 15:00 Sun −65.0 12.9 20.0 48.5 15.6
04/12/2015 13:00 Sun −65.1 21.1 12.0 49.6 16.5
04/12/2015 14:00 Sun −79.9 20.1 12.9 47.8 14.8
05/08/2016 13:00 Sun −100.1 26.8 18.0 46.9 2.1
05/08/2016 14:00 Sun −130.1 25.3 18.5 44.4 0.7
10/29/2017 02:00 Sun −83.0 0.0 35.9 51.2 15.3
10/29/2017 04:00 Sun −83.0 0.0 34.7 52.1 17.4
* To calculate the residual load, the feed-in of photovoltaics and wind energy
was subtracted from the total load, but other factors, such as run-of-river
hydroelectricity, were not included.
persistent negative or to extreme negative prices that exceed their market premium4.
The prioritization of renewable energies is a decisive factor for the occurrence of
negative prices and ensures that primarily thermal power plants have to adapt their
4 Even if in theory the plant operators of directly marketed renewable energies should react flexibly
to negative prices, according to Energy Brainpool (2016) in a single hour on May 8, 2016, a cost saving
of up to 800 000 EUR could have been achieved if renewable plant operators had simply reduced their
feed-in.
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generation. An examination of the most negative prices of recent years reveals that
these occurred in combination with a high feed-in from photovoltaic and wind power
plants (Table 2.2).
For technical or economic reasons power plants want to avoid to lower their gener-
ation and are willing to accept low or even negative prices (Genoese et al., 2010; Vos,
2015). Technical restrictions such as a slow load change speed or minimal downtimes
prevent a power plant from only running in those hours in which a positive contribu-
tion margin can be achieved. For example, after a power plant is partially or fully shut
down, it cannot immediately be operated at full capacity, even if a high market price
is expected in the following hours. Therefore, its operator is willing to accept losses
on a temporary basis, which, however, will be offset by subsequent earnings. Further-
more, some power plants must remain in operation due to contractual obligations
(must-run capacities), for example, capacities that provide negative balancing power
or run-of-river power plants (Böttger et al., 2015). Furthermore, in some combined
heat and power plants, the electricity generated is regarded as a by-product, and the
supply of heat for industrial processes or the heating of buildings is the main source
of income, and financial penalties are imposed if the heat supply is interrupted (Mitra
et al., 2013).
2.1.4 Intraday market
The intraday market can be defined as the market that operates between the day-
ahead market and the physical gate closure, i.e., the point in time after which a change
to the schedules submitted to the system operator is no longer permitted (Weber,
2010). Above all, the market is used by market participants to adapt their schedule
to deviations that were not foreseeable when submitting their bids at 12:00 a.m. on
the previous day. Whereas the volumes traded on the intraday market are quite
small compared to, e.g., the day-ahead or derivatives markets, trading has grown in
importance in recent years (Figure 2.4). Due to the short time interval between the
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day-ahead and intraday market, market prices closely resemble each other (Tables 2.1
and 2.3).
Trading on the intraday market is possible until the schedules transmitted to the
transmission system operator can no longer be changed. In 2011, the lead time between
the closure of the intraday market and physical delivery was reduced from 75 minutes
to 45 minutes (EPEX SPOT, 2011b). In 2015, technical changes allowed for a further
reduction to 30 minutes5. Since 2017, trading within an individual control area is
permitted up to 5 minutes before delivery (EPEX SPOT, 2017c), providing market
participants with the ability to facilitate their portfolio management by responding to
short-term changes in electricity production—particularly as a result of the growing
share of renewable energies—or consumption.
At the intraday market, continuous trading takes place. This means new orders
can be submitted from 4:00 p.m. of the previous day until gate closure. Whenever a
corresponding counterpart is found, a trade is carried out. Thereby, market partici-
pants are able to constantly obtain new information (Selasinsky, 2016). In addition
to single hours, also standardized blocks are traded in the intraday market. The
trading of quarter-hourly contracts started in December 2011, which, for example, is
particularly advantageous to market the generation from photovoltaics, which has
strong hourly but often also well-predictable variations. Furthermore, orders can be
subject to an execution condition, such as “fill or kill,” which ensures that a bid is
either executed immediately or entirely canceled. The minimum contract size for
each bid is 0.10MW and the minimum price increment 0.10 EUR/MWh. Compared
to the day-ahead market, the price range of orders with −9999 to −9999 EUR/MWh
is noticeably wider (EPEX SPOT, 2017a).
In December 2014, in addition to continuous trading, a uniform price auction was
introduced to increase the liquidity of the market (EPEX SPOT, 2014b), in which all
quarter hours of the next day are eligible for trading. The auction opens the intraday
5 The lead time of 30 minutes refers only to trades within Germany, whereas the lead time for
cross-border trade, for example, between Germany and France, is still 60 minutes.
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Figure 2.6 | Chronological sequence of the usage of the operating reserves and in-
terruptible loads. Transmission system operators have three different reserves at their
disposal, which can be utilized successively if a power imbalance occurs. Additionally,
since the amendment to the Energy Industry Act of 20 December 2012, quickly or im-
mediately interruptible loads can be accessed if negative balancing power is required.
market6 for trading on the following day as it takes place daily at 3:00 p.m. and
provides an initial price signal for the continuous trading that commences one hour
later at 4:00 p.m. The market clearing is also carried out by the EUPHEMIA algorithm.
However, as the auction is only conducted for the German market area, no market
coupling occurs.
2.1.5 Markets for control reserve
Although there is only one single market area in Germany, it is divided into four
different control areas, each of which falls under the responsibility of one of the
four transmission system operators: 50Hertz Transmission GmbH (50Hertz), Am-
prion GmbH (Amprion), TransnetBW GmbH (TransnetBW) and TenneT TSO GmbH
(TenneT). The primary purpose of a transmission system operator is to ensure a safe
network operation at all times (Bundesregierung, 2005). However, this may be at risk
6 The term intraday market may lead to confusion as transactions with delivery on the current day
and the next day are permitted on this market. In addition, the distinction to the day-ahead market
seems arbitrary as the daily auctions at 12.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. both with the delivery on the next day
belong once to the day-ahead market and once to the intraday market.
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Table 2.3 | Statistical figures of the continuous intraday prices
at the EEX for the German/Austrian market area. The volume-
weighted average hourly prices of the intraday market show a
similar development to the day-ahead market, which can be at-
tributed to the short time lag between these two markets. How-
ever, it is noticeable that the average prices on the intradaymarket
show a higher deviation and the annual minimum and maximum
reaches extremer values. For individual transactions, the extremes
are even considerably higher, and occasionally prices reach four-
digit values. One explanation is that the continuous trading in
the intraday market sometimes requires very short lead times and
only few capacities possess the necessary flexibility. Source: EEX
(2018a).
Year Arith.
mean*
Standard
deviation
Skew Minimum Maximum
[EUR/
MWh]
[EUR/
MWh]
[–] [EUR/
MWh]
[EUR/
MWh]
2006† 51.53 19.94 0.13 0.50 150.64
2007 41.26 29.65 4.34 0.00 601.14
2008 65.14 28.32 0.90 −22.65 389.79
2009 39.04 24.96 −6.32 −648.62 173.72
2010 45.62 16.56 0.16 −62.62 180.07
2011 51.22 15.47 −1.23 −139.07 156.22
2012 43.78 19.39 −0.41 −254.09 265.30
2013 38.58 17.48 0.34 −83.25 155.61
2014‡ 33.14 13.39 0.10 −53.65 125.12
2015‡ 31.71 14.55 −0.70 −89.14 167.27
2016‡ 29.25 13.69 −0.88 −184.89 134.01
2017‡ 35.54 23.21 0.43 −70.10 179.69
* The arithmetic mean refers to the volume-weighted hourly
prices.
† As the intraday market at the EEX was opened on September 25,
2006, the results for the year 2006 are only partially comparable
with the later years for which all hourly prices are available.
‡ The results of the 15-minute auction introduced in December
2014 are not included in the statistical figures.
if deviations occur between the expected and actual generation or consumption. This
can be caused, for example, by the unexpected non-usability of thermal power plants
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or forecast errors for the electrical load as well as the generation from renewable
energy sources (Müsgens et al., 2014). In order to respond to these deviations, a
transmission system operator has various options at its disposal: the primary control,
the secondary control, the tertiary control reserve, and more recently immediately
and quickly interruptible loads (50Hertz Transmission et al., 2017). To keep the system
frequency always near its target of 50Hz and to eliminate regional deviations, the use
of the various operating reserves must be coordinated in terms of both the extent and
timing (Figure 2.6). Since 2010, the use of balancing power has also been coordinated
across the control areas by first settling the differences between the individual control
areas and only balancing the remaining difference (Ströbele et al., 2012). Thereby,
inefficiencies can be avoided and costs reduced.
Deviations from the declared schedules can be caused both by the supply and
demand side. If these deviations result in a low supply of electrical energy or vice
versa in an oversupply, the target frequency of 50Hertz is undercut or exceeded
respectively (Erdmann and Zweifel, 2008). If an unexpectedly high supply meets
a low demand, negative balancing power is needed, i.e., the feed-in of the active
power generation units must be reduced. Vice versa, if a negative imbalance occurs,
positive balancing power is required, i.e., a power plant has to increase its generation
or, alternatively, immediately and quickly interruptible loads have to be activated.
In order to participate as a provider in a tender for balancing power, a framework
contract must first be signed with the responsible transmission system operator.
For this, it is necessary that the provider has proven by means of a successfully
completed prequalification that he fulfills all necessary technical requirements and
that his disposable capacity exceeds the respective minimum bid size for the different
operating reserves. The three different operating reserves are described in more detail
in the following sections, and a comparative overview can be found in Table 2.4.
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Primary control reserve
The first measure to achieve a prompt stabilization of the system frequency after a
disturbance event is the activation of the primary control reserve, which is carried
out automatically by the decentralized control devices of the units involved, mainly
the speed controllers of power plants. This can be accomplished almost without any
time delay, and the system frequency is stabilized within a few seconds (Galiana et al.,
2005).
The necessary size of the primary control reserve is determined annually in consul-
tation with the European transmission system operators, whereby a total quantity of
3000MW is currently being provided for continental Europe (ENTSO-E, 2009). This
capacity is then distributed among the transmission system operators in relation to
the annual electricity feed-in (Fleer and Stenzel, 2016). In the last years, the total ca-
pacity required for the German control areas varied between 500 to 800MW (50Hertz
Transmission et al., 2017). Between 2010 and 2015, the annual costs for the provision
of primary control power amounted to approximately 100million EUR (BNetzA, 2014,
2015, 2016b).
The primary control reserve is tendered weekly, whereby each provider must pro-
vide positive and negative capacity simultaneously. As a result, primarily power plants
that are used to cover the base load also provide primary control power. However,
the market for primary control power has recently become attractive for large battery
storages, whose prices have fallen sharply. Battery storages also have the advantage
of higher dynamics and a more precise response without representing a must-run7
capacity (Stenzel, 2016). In contrast to the day-ahead market, the price for primary
control power is based on the submitted offer (pay-as-bid auction). As a detailed
billing of the provided balancing energy would lead to considerable transaction costs
7 Unlike conventional power plants, batteries do not have to be in operation generating electricity, but
can directly provide positive and negative balancing power, which, in turn, can lead to more flexibility
and a lower number of negative prices.
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(Swider and Ellersdorfer, 2005), all contracted capacities are compensated only for
the capacity provided for the tender period.
Secondary control reserve
All four German transmission system operators jointly estimate the need for negative
and positive secondary control power using a probabilistic model. In recent years, the
demand for both negative and positive secondary control power has typically varied
between 1800 to 2200MW (50Hertz Transmission et al., 2017).
In contrast to the primary control reserve, suppliers must specify both a capacity
as well as an energy price. The capacity price is paid for the provision of capacity
in advance. However, the energy price is only paid for the energy requested by the
transmission system operator. In theory, the capacity price, therefore, reflects the
opportunity costs8 of a supplier, who can no longer use this capacity for other purposes,
such as participating in the day-ahead or intraday market (Singh and Papalexopoulos,
1999). The energy price, on the other hand, is based on marginal costs.
Since July 12, 2018, the secondary control capacity is tendered daily for standardized
time slices with a length of four hours. Starting with the lowest capacity price, all
bids are accepted until the required amount is reached. The capacities are then sorted
in ascending order in a Germany-wide list based on the energy price. In the case
secondary control power is requested, capacities are selected based on this list. As
of October 15, 2018, a new mixed-price method is applied, also taking into account
the weighted energy price (BNetzA, 2018b; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2018).
The corresponding weighting factor corresponds to the probability with which a
control energy type was activated in the last 12 months. This rule is a response to
the occurrence of an energy price peak of 77 777 EUR/MWh, on October 17, 2017, and
8 In reality, the opportunity costs are not always decisive as strategic behavior on the German
secondary reserve market can be observed, which leads to a price level that is in some cases far above
the competitive level (Ocker and Ehrhart, 2017).
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Table 2.4 | Overview of the different types of operating reserves. The three
operating reserves differ, for example, in the respective auction dates or lead
times. In addition, positive and negative capacities are sometimes auctioned
apart from each other. In addition, the remuneration is paid either exclusively
for the provision of capacity or also for the energy requested. Sources: BNetzA
(2011a,b,c, 2017a,b).
Primary control
reserve
Secondary control
reserve
Tertiary control
reserve
Tender Weekly Daily Daily
Time Tuesdays
03:00 p.m.
Previous day
08:00 a.m.
Previous day
10:00 a.m.
Complete
Activation
≤ 30 s ≤ 5min ≤ 15min
Activation time < 15min – > 15min
Capacity positive and
negative
positive or
negative
positive or
negative
Time slices 1 6 6
Time slice
length
7 d 4 h 4 h
Minimum
lot size
+/– 1MW +/– 1MW +/– 1MW
Increment 1MW 1MW 1MW
Bid selection Capacity price Capacity price* Capacity price
Reimbursement Pay-as-bid
(capacity price)
Pay-as-bid
(capacity and
energy price)
Pay-as-bid
(capacity and
energy price)
* On October 15, 2018, a new mixed price method was introduced, which
takes into account the capacity price and the weighted energy price.
aims to increase competitive pressure in the procurement of secondary control energy
and thus to increase the efficiency of the procurement system (BNetzA, 2017b).
Between 2010 and 2015, the costs for providing and utilizing secondary control
power have fallen considerably from 505 to 155million EUR (BNetzA, 2014, 2015,
2016b). In 2014 and 2015, the total amount of negative and positive energy used
reached 2.8 and 2.5 TWh respectively.
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Tertiary control reserve
The required amount of daily tertiary control power is determined by the transmission
system operators. Similar to the secondary control power, the demand for negative
and positive control power is determined separately. Between 2010 and 2015, the
average volume of the negative and positive tertiary reserve was usually greater than
2000MW, in some cases almost equal to 3000MW. Since 2016, the amount has fallen.
In 2017, it was typically below 2000MW for both the negative as well as the positive
tertiary reserve. This is partly attributable to the fact that since 2017 trading in the
intraday market in Germany is possible up to 30 minutes before delivery for the
entire market area or up to 5 minutes before delivery for each individual control area
(EPEX SPOT, 2017c). Thereby, deviations can be compensated in advance, and less
balancing power is required.
Similar to the secondary control reserve, providers must specify a capacity and an
energy price. Bidders have to submit their offers for standardized time slices with a
length of four hours. In particular, flexible gas power plants or pumped-storage power
plants offer their services in the tertiary control reserve due to their rapid availability
and comparatively low opportunity costs. The low opportunity costs are reflected in
the capacity price, which often amounts to only a few Euro perMWh, particularly for
the positive tertiary control reserve.
In the period from 2010 to 2015, the cost of procuring and providing the tertiary
control reserve fluctuated between 49 and 156million EUR (BNetzA, 2014, 2015, 2016b).
In 2014 and 2015, the total usage of positive and negative tertiary control energy
amounted up to 361 and 340GWh and was several times less than the energy required
for the secondary control reserve.
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Figure 2.7 | Renewable electricity generation in Germany. Since the introduction
of the EEG in 2000, the generation from renewable energies has increased strongly.
Biogas, photovoltaics and wind power plants account for the largest share of this
development. As the potential of hydropower in Germany has already been widely
exploited early on, its generation has remained comparatively constant. Source: BMWi
(2018c).
2.2 Regulatory and market developments
The German electricity sector has undergone considerable changes in recent years—
such as the broad expansion of renewable energies or the European market coupling.
Thus, the following sections aim to provide an overview of the most prominent
regulatory and market developments in the energy sector as well as to highlight their
main consequences, thereby allowing for a more profound understanding of the
analyses carried out in this work.
2.2.1 Promotion and expansion of renewable energies
In most European states, various subsidy programs for renewable energies have been
implemented to achieve national expansion targets. Germany, one of the pioneering
countries in the promotion of renewable energies, introduced the first renewable feed-
in law (“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz”) already in 1991 (Heinrichs and Michelsen, 2014),
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which marked the beginning of a tremendous rise of renewable energies (Figure 2.8).
The law obliges public utility companies to purchase electricity from renewable energy
sources (hydropower, wind power, solar energy, landfill gas, sewage gas or biomass)
and to pay a premium calculated as a percentage of the average electricity price
to end customers (Bundesregierung, 1990). In this system, the feed-in tariff varied
depending on the current electricity tariff, exposing investors tomarket developments.
In times of the monopolistic market, this seemed to be an appropriate solution as
prices were both high and comparatively stable. However, after the liberalization of
the market in 1998, electricity tariffs decreased and premiums fell. Thus, renewable
electricity generators were subject to greater economic pressure (Mitchell et al., 2006).
As most renewable technologies could not undercut the electricity generation costs
of conventional power plants, technology-specific feed-in tariffs were introduced
in 2000 (German Renewable Energy Sources Act, Bundesregierung, 2000). These
tariffs guaranteed a fixed purchasing price for the entire electricity produced over a
predetermined period, usually 20 years. The payment to the producers is made by
the transmission system operators, who then pass the costs on to the final consumers
(“Wälzungsmechanismus”).
In 2012, the so-called "direct marketing" of electricity from renewable sources was
introduced, initially on a voluntary basis (Bundesregierung, 2011b). As a result, it was
possible, to market electricity from renewable sources either directly by the owner
or via a third party instead of selling it to the responsible transmission grid operator.
One aim of direct marketing is to ensure that the electricity generated by renewable
energies is demand oriented. Further, it is intended to improve the forecastability,
i.e., which renewable energy plant delivers which quantity of electricity at what time,
and thereby reduce the use of balancing energy (BMWi, 2017b). Since 1 January 2016,
direct marketing has been mandatory for all newly installed renewable energy plants
above a size of 100 kW; however, older renewable energy plans can voluntarily choose
direct marketing (Bundesregierung, 2016). As the income generated from the sale of
the electricity is often not sufficient to refinance an investment, for a period of 20 years,
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investors receive a so-called floating market premium, which is determined monthly
for each technology, such as photovoltaics, wind-onshore or wind-offshore. The
value of the market premium corresponds to the difference between a plant-specific
reference tariff and the average market value of the specific technology.
In 2017, the subsidy system for renewable energies was changed from feed-in tariffs
to recurring auctions (Bundesregierung, 2016). Thus, the remuneration for electricity
from renewable energies is no longer fixed but is determined within in pay-as-bid
auctions. The Federal Network Agency organizes tenders for onshore wind, offshore
wind or photovoltaics. In addition, between 2018 and 2020, joint auctions for onshore
wind and solar power plants are carried out. In the first two joint tenders, however,
only bids for photovoltaic were accepted, as the bid price for onshore wind was not
competitive. Auctions are regarded as a suitable mechanism for the procurement
of renewable energy sources; however, whether they meet expectations depends
on their design (Kreiss et al., 2017). For example, due to the long-term horizon,
there is a risk for the auctioneer that the commissioned bidders may not realize their
projects. Financial and physical prequalifications or penalties are discussed as possible
countermeasures (Haufe and Ehrhart, 2018).
Limited availability
Many renewable energy sources—photovoltaics, wind or tidal power—are only inter-
mittently available, i.e., unlike conventional capacities, they are not fully dispatchable9
and cannot produce electrical energy without interruptions (Hirth, 2013). The electric-
ity generated from these intermittent energy sources depends on different local factors
such as wind speed, cloud cover or other weather conditions and can vary from day
to day, hour to hour, or even minute to minute depending on the installed technology
9 Even though it is not possible to implement a flexible technical control system for these renewable
energy sources, an upper limit for the energy produced can be imposed. In the case of wind turbines,
this is achieved through pitch control, which is required, for example, if due to excessive wind speeds
the material stress limits of the rotor blades are exceeded.
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Figure 2.8 | Capacity expansion of renewable energies in Germany. The increase in
the installed electrical capacity of renewable energies is evident in the development
of wind power and photovoltaics, which in 2017 had a share of 49.9% and 37.9%
in renewable capacity. In comparison with photovoltaics, the load factor of wind is
significantly higher. Thus, wind power had a similar share of 48.9% in the electric-
ity generation from renewable energies, whereas photovoltaics only accounted for
18.3% (Figure 2.7). Source: BMWi (2018c).
and its attributes, e.g., the hub height for wind power stations or the orientation of
photovoltaic modules (Joskow, 2011). As the generated electricity from renewable
energy sources must be directly consumed, the responsible grid operator has to react
using dispatchable capacity to balance supply and demand continuously. Photovoltaic
systems, for example, only generate electricity during the hours of daylight, whereby
the production usually reaches its daily maximum at noon and yearly maximum
during the summer months (Figure 2.9).
In Germany, renewable energies contributed 217.9 TWh to the gross electricity
generation in the year 2017, which represents an increase of 144.47% compared to the
year 2007 and is primarily attributable to the expansion of wind, biomass, and pho-
tovoltaics (AG Energiebilanzen e. V., 2018). From a European perspective, however,
hydropower still has the largest share among renewable energies in 2016, which is ex-
plained by the hydro-dominated electricity generation in the Alpine and Scandinavian
countries (Eurostat, 2017).
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Figure 2.9 | Relative daily photovoltaic and wind feed-in. Over the observed pe-
riod in the German market, there exist substantial seasonal differences in the relative
feed-in10 from photovoltaic and wind power plants. Whereas photovoltaic modules
generate electricity mainly in spring and summer, the most productive months of wind
energy lie in autumn and winter. Nevertheless, extreme situations lasting several hours
can still occur in which the feed-in of these technologies is either simultaneously ex-
tremely low or high. Source: EEX (2018a).
2.2.2 European market coupling
The liberalization of the European energy markets is an ongoing process that began in
1996 with the adoption of various legislative packages (European Commission, 1997,
1998), with the aim of creating a fully-integrated internal energy market that would
allow barrier-free cross-border trade in electricity and primary energy sources such
as oil or natural gas (European Commission, 2010b). The integration of the existing
national markets and the resulting increase in competition are intended to reduce
electricity costs for consumers (Domanico, 2007; Sadler, 1992). At the same time,
security of supply in the participating countries is expected to increase through the
further expansion and the better utilization of transmission capacity (Jamasb and
Pollitt, 2005).
While market coupling between individual European countries started already
early on, e.g., Sweden/Norway (1996) or Belgium/Netherlands/France (2006), the
¹0 The relative feed-in is calculated as a quotient of the average daily feed-in and the installed capacity.
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connection of the German electricity market to neighboring national markets took
considerably longer. On November 9, 2009, for the first time, the German day-ahead
market was linked to the Danish market by the Interim Tight Volume Coupling
(ITVC)¹¹. Shortly afterward, on May 10, 2010, the market coupling with the Nordic
regions was established by the already existing Baltic Cable (Böttcher, 2011). An-
other milestone was the market coupling in Central Western Europe (CWE) at the
EPEX SPOT via the implicit auctioning of transmission capacities, which started on
November 9, 2010, and covered the following countries: Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (EPEX SPOT, 2016). Slightly more than three years
later, on February 4, 2014, the market coupling was extended to northwestern Europe
(NWE) consisting of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany/Austria,
Great Britain, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and
Sweden.
For cross-border trading, explicit auctions were initially used in which the trade of
transmission capacities and electrical energy occurs separately. In order to operate
in neighboring markets, market participants had to obtain transmission rights in
advance via long-term or short-term auctions. However, explicit auctions have the
disadvantage that transmission capacities are not always used efficiently, for example,
due to a dominant domestic market participant who under certain circumstances has
an incentive to withhold transmission rights or intentionally trade against the price
differential (Bunn and Zachmann, 2010).
In order to be able to use the transmission capacities more efficiently, implicit
auctions are used nowadays, at which the market participants only place their bids
without having to acquire capacities for the transmission of energy in the neighboring
countries separately (Oggioni and Smeers, 2013). Subsequently, an algorithm maxi-
¹¹ As the name suggests, the Interim Tight Volume Coupling was developed as a transitional solution
that was later replaced by a more advanced, price-based approach (price coupling). Tight Volume
Coupling includes all relevant information (market data and rules) so that the quality of the achieved
results could be further improved compared to the earlier in place Loose Volume Coupling.
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mizes the economic welfare in all participating market areas, taking into account the
available transmission capacities between the different market areas (Böckers and
Heimeshoff, 2014). Within the national market areas, however, it is assumed that
there will be no transmission bottlenecks. This approach may result in a situation
where the calculated flows in the national power grid are not physically possible. In
order to eliminate bottlenecks and ensure the operation of the grid in such cases,
network operators must intervene by purchasing additional injection or withdrawal
at different nodes of the electricity grid (Oggioni et al., 2012).
As long as sufficient transmission capacities are available between neighboring
countries, wholesale prices converge, for example, in 2017, market prices have been
identical in Germany and France about 35% percent of the time. Even if the transmis-
sion capacities are not sufficient to achieve a uniform price, the market coupling still
affects the prices and the traded volumes in the connected countries.
The accurate assessment of all effects caused by market coupling is a complex prob-
lem. Theoretical analyses mostly depend on restrictive assumptions, e.g., complete
information, perfect competition, and no uncertainties, which are rarely encountered
in practice (Creti et al., 2010). The evaluation under more realistic assumptions, for
example, the consideration of existing grids restrictions, requires extensive empirical
models in most cases. In an analysis for the year 2012, Newbery et al. (2016) estimate
a welfare gain of 3.80 billion EUR from coupling all electricity markets in the EU.
This would result from the coupling of the day-ahead market (1.01 billion EUR) as
well as the coupling of the intraday market (37million EUR), from shared balancing
(1.34 billion EUR), from the minimization of unscheduled flows (1.36 billion EUR) and
from less curtailed renewable energy (130million EUR).
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Figure 2.10 | Development of the free allocation of emission allowances and emis-
sions covered by the EU-ETS. In the first two trading periods, participating companies
were able to cover their demand almost entirely by freely allocated allowances, but,
in the third period, free allocation was substantially reduced. In this phase, electricity
generators no longer receive free allowances, except in eight member states where
free allowances can be granted for the modernization of power plants or investments
in clean technologies. Sources: European Commission (2007, 2010a,b); EEA (2018).
2.2.3 European Union Emission Trading Scheme
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) is the first international
and one of the world’s largest trading system for emission allowances. It is a central
instrument of European climate policy facilitating an efficient reduction of Euro-
pean greenhouse gas emissions (Eugenia Sanin et al., 2015). In 2003, the Directive
2003/87/EC established the legal basis for the EU-ETS, which came into force on
January 01, 2005 (European Commission, 2003b). The EU-ETS represents a cap-and-
trade system, in which an upper limit of greenhouse gas emissions (Cap) is defined
that cannot be exceeded. Each installation covered by the scheme needs an equivalent
amount of allowances for its emissions; otherwise, a penalty is imposed.
Allowances can either be freely allocated (grandfathering) or auctioned by a reg-
ulatory body (Cramton and Kerr, 2002). Once allowances are in circulation, trade
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Figure 2.11 | Historical prices of EUA futures. The price development of emission
allowances shows significant volatility, especially in the first phase. The oversupply
of allowances and the ban on banking between the first and second phase resulted
in a sharp price drop from 30 to 0 EUR/EUA within only 12 months (Hintermann,
2010). In the third phase, the price has been at a comparatively low level of less
than 10 EUR/EUA, prompting the European Commission to intervene in the market.
First, the auctioning of 900 million allowances was postponed by several years (back-
loading). Subsequently, these allowances were transferred to a market stability re-
serve, which was implemented to address the surplus and improve the resilience of
the system to extreme shocks affecting market supply. Source: EEX (2018a).
between the individual market players is opened. In this manner, the marginal re-
duction costs of all participating entities are leveled, and an economically efficient
solution can be achieved (Montgomery, 1972). Profit-maximizing companies reduce
their emissions as long as it is less expensive than acquiring allowances on the market.
At the same time, companies with low-cost options for emission reductions have
an incentive to sell unneeded allowances to market participants with higher savings
costs. The resulting market price is equal to the costs of reducing the emissions to
one unit below the cap, often referred to as the market’s marginal abatement cost
(Hintermann et al., 2016).
The EU-ETS covers the energy sector and the energy-intensive industry, which in
total includes over 12 000 installations within the European Union that account for
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about 45% of total greenhouse gas emissions of all participating countries (European
Commission, 2017a). To date, trade in the EU-ETS can be divided into three periods.
The first trading period lasted from 2005 to 2007 and served as a trial period. The
second trading period has already benefited from initial experiences and ran from
2008 to 2012. The third trading period began in January 2013 andwill end inDecember
2020.
In the first and second period, the majority of the allowances were freely allocated
(Figure 2.10). However, as the allowances possess a value, the electricity price in-
creased leading to so-called “windfall profits” in the energy sector as for the affected
companies no costs incurred¹².
The electricity sector plays an essential role in the reduction of emissions within
the EU-ETS. In the short term, electricity producers have the opportunity to reduce
their emissions without additional measures through a fuel switch, usually from hard
coal to natural gas (Hintermann et al., 2016). The EU-ETS also has a central influence
on investments in the electricity sector. A severe difficulty for investors is to estimate
the future development of the price of emission allowances, whose course partly
shows highly volatile developments (Figure 2.11). This and the uncertainty about the
future conditions of the EU-ETS have undermined the potential of the EU-ETS to
stimulate substantial investments required for the decarbonization of the electricity
sector (Laing et al., 2014). Therefore, targeted measures—in particular the promotion
of renewable energies—are still necessary.
Although, in theory, the market price for allowances equals the marginal reduction
costs, in practice, the formation of prices is much more complex. An essential factor
for the low price in the second phase seemed to be the world economic crisis, which
temporarily reduced the production of many companies and, in turn, led to a surplus
of allowances (Bel and Joseph, 2015). The cumulative surplus was estimated to be ap-
proximately 1.80 billion EUA in 2012, which approximately corresponds to emissions
¹² For a detailed discussion see, for example, Sijm et al. (2006) and Laing et al. (2014).
44 framework of the german electricity sector
of one whole year (Ellerman et al., 2014). However, it is still debated which factors
drive the price formation. For example, Koch et al. (2014) argue that abatement-related
fundamental factors only explain 10% of the changes of the allowance price.
2.2.4 Climate contribution and climate reserve
Since the early 1990s, CO2 emissions in Germany have fallen significantly, but recently
this development has stagnated. One reason for this is the low price for CO2 emission
allowances, which has been in the range of 5 to 10 EUR/EUA since 2011 (Figure 2.11).
This offers only a limited incentive to implement CO2 abatement measures. As almost
half of the national CO2 emissions stem from the energy sector (UBA, 2017), the
developments in this sector, especially the low coal price, also have a significant
influence (Figure 2.12). As a result, the marginal costs of emission-intensive coal-fired
power plants are comparatively low, and low-emission gas-fired power plants are
rarely operated. If the underlying conditions remain unchanged, there is a risk that
the climate target for 2020 set by the German government of achieving a reduction of
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 40% compared to 1990 might not be achieved
(BMWi, 2015a). To prevent this, various countermeasures have been proposed to
reduce emissions from all sectors by additional 59million t CO2 compared to 2014.
Original climate contribution (March 2015)
The national policy instrument proposed under the term “climate contribution”
aimed at reducing carbon emissions by 22million t CO2 and at the same time causing
only low transaction costs and a slight increase in the wholesale electricity price.
For this purpose, all conventional power plants—except for units younger than 20
years¹³—would have to acquire additional allowances for emissions that exceeded an
age-dependent and performance-specific amount of allowances. Subsequently, these
¹³ The age referred to the year of commissioning, provided that no major retrofitting measures, such
as boiler replacement, had been carried out. Otherwise, the age was determined depending on the
date of the measures taken.
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Figure 2.12 | Development of natural gas, hard coal, and oil prices. Fuel prices can
be subject to extreme fluctuations within short periods of time. For example, in 2008,
the Brent crude oil price first rose strongly and then dropped from 144 to 34USD/bbl.
Similarly, the price of the monthly API-2-Coal Future fell from 224 to 74USD/t. In
2011, the coal price started to decline, whereas the gas and oil prices began to fall
in 2014—in the case of oil even sharply—a trend that continued until 2016. There-
after, the price of natural gas and coal recovered and, at the end of 2017, reached
20 EUR/MWh and 100USD/t, while at the same time the oil price is still at a compar-
atively low level of 50USD/bbl. Sources: EEX (2018a); EIA (2016).
allowances would be canceled, i.e., finally withdrawn from the EU-ETS (BMWi, 2015a).
The number of allowances to be submitted should depend on the current market price
in order to ensure that the reduction target is achieved even in the scenario of a low
allowance price. The value of the required allowances should be in the range of 18 to
20 EURCO2/t in 2020, with the plan to steadily increase the value by 1 EURCO2/t per
year starting in 2017 (Öko-Institut and Prognos, 2015).
Although the first version of the climate contribution was predominantly positively
evaluated by experts, public utilities as well as political parties, criticismwas expressed
by the Mining, Chemical, and Energy Industries Union (IG BCE) and by energy
suppliers, which operate large capacities of lignite-fired power plants (DIW, 2015).
Both of the latter warned of a possible structural change, whichwould be accompanied
by several decommissions of lignite-fired power plants and closures of opencast lignite
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Figure 2.13 | Exemption thresholds for the climate contribution. Power plants re-
ceived different exemption thresholds, depending on the number of years since
commissioning. Newer power plants (age ≤ 20 years) were excluded from the cli-
mate contribution. From the age of 20 years, the exemption threshold equaled
7million t CO2/GW and decreased linearly with each subsequent year until it reached
a base amount of 3million t CO2/GW in the initial proposal. In the modified proposal,
the base amount was raised to 3.80million t CO2/GW, in particular, to improve the
profitability of older lignite-fired power plants and to avoid economically induced de-
commissions. Source: BMWi (2015d).
mines (Frontier Economics, 2015). As a result, the Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy (BMWi) saw a need for action and shortly afterward drafted a
revised version, in which the points of criticism were addressed.
Modified climate contribution (May 2015)
Whereas in the original version of the climate contribution aimed at an additional
reduction of 22million t CO2, the modified version foresaw only a reduction of
16million t CO2 in order not to unduly impair the profitability of the national power
plants. The difference of 6million t CO2 was supposed to be compensated by further
measures, i.e., an increase in combined heat and power (CHP) funding, pilot projects
in the transport sector for electric trucks, and increased efforts in the rail sector
(BMWi, 2015d). The adjustments took place on several levels. On the one hand, the
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Table 2.5 | Indexed climate contribution. In the modified ver-
sion of the climate contribution, the value of the additionally
required allowances depended on the prices of the “Phelix
Base Year Futures” and the EUA futures of the next year or,
if necessary, the year after next. Source: BMWi (2015d).
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28 3† 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
30 6† 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
32 14‡ 5† 0* 0* 0* 0*
34 15‡ 8† 4† 0* 0* 0*
36 16‡ 14‡ 7† 0† 0* 0*
38 18‡ 15‡ 12‡ 6† 0† 0*
40 19‡ 17‡ 14‡ 11‡ 5† 0†
42 20‡ 18‡ 15‡ 13‡ 10‡ 0†
44 20‡ 19‡ 16‡ 14‡ 11‡ 6†
* According to the BMWi, the high allowance price already
led to coal-to-gas fuel switching, but the comparatively low
electricity price only caused isolated decommissions. There-
fore, the emission reduction target of 16million t CO2 could
be reached without additional measures.
† To avoid additional decommissions due to low contribution
margins, the value of the climate contribution was adjusted
downwards, at the risk that the reduction target may not be
fully achieved.
‡ In these cases, which were considered likely by the BMWi,
the climate contribution was required in order to achieve the
targeted reduction, as the low allowance price by itself would
not achieve any or only marginal emission reductions. Never-
theless, the power plant operators could generate sufficient
contribution margins.
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Table 2.6 | Power plant units for backup purposes. The listed lignite-fired power
plant units have already been or will soon bemothballed and onwards will be used
for backup purposes only. The units remain in standby mode for a maximum
of four years and will then be permanently decommissioned. Sources: BMWi
(2015c); BNetzA (2016a).
Admission
date
Power plant Unit Net capac-
ity [MW]
Initial opera-
tion
10/01/2016 Buschhaus D 352 1985
10/01/2017 Frimmersdorf P 284 1966
10/01/2017 Frimmersdorf Q 278 1970
10/01/2018 Niederaußem E 295 1970
10/01/2018 Niederaußem F 299 1971
10/01/2018 Jänschwalde F 465 1989
10/01/2019 Neurath C 292 1973
10/01/2019 Jänschwalde E 465 1987
base amount, i.e., the amount of carbon each power plant was permitted to emit with-
out further restrictions, should be increased (Figure 2.13). In addition, the value of the
additional allowances—which operators had to acquire through the EU-ETS—should
be linked to the electricity and allowance prices for a dynamic adaptation to market
developments.
Standby mode for backup purposes of lignite-fired plants
Instead of the climate contribution, Frontier Economics (2015) proposed to gradually
implement a “reserve for security of supply and climate protection” consisting of coal
and lignite power plants to reduce the emissions by a total of 11 to 16million t CO2 by
2019. However, this measure was considered to be inefficient and costly by the BMWi.
As a result, a joint compromise proposal was drawn up, which, among other things,
provided for the exclusion of 2.7GW of lignite-fired power plants from regular market
operation, for which the operators were granted a financial compensation (Oei et al.,
2015). Thereby, emissions are expected to be reduced by 11 to 12.5million t CO2, at the
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same time the total reduction target for the electricity sector was lowered and is now
set to 14million t CO2 (BMWi, 2015a).
The selected lignite-fired power plants, which were determined in a non-public
process, are mainly older power plants (Table 2.6) with an efficiency of less than 40%
(Open Power System Data, 2017). These units are located in different lignite mining
region (Lusatian district in Brandenburg, Rhenish district in North Rhine-Westphalia,
and Helmstedt district in Lower Saxony) in order to avoid possible regional structural
breaks. However, this line of argumentation was subject to criticism as the likelihood
of these structural breaks was classified as low by the DIW (2015). The annual costs for
the standby mode of the lignite-fired plants amount to around 230Mio. EUR, which
corresponds to an increase in network charges of approximately 0.05 Cent/kWh
(BMWi, 2016b). However, as the lignite-fired power plants selected for the standby
mode are located north of the bottlenecks in the transmission grids, redispatch costs
should decrease.
To use the power plants, first a lead time of 240 hours is required to switch to
operational readiness and then further 11 or 13 hours are needed to reach minimum
partial load and full load respectively (BMWi, 2015c). As a result, the power plants in
standby mode are unable to react to unexpected events at short notice.
2.2.5 Capacity reserve
With the decline in wholesale prices and the corresponding decreasing margins,
power producers operating on the German market are exposed to growing economic
pressure. As a result, an unusually high number of capacities have already been decom-
missioned, and closure notifications for many other power plants have been submitted
(Figure 2.14). Although the decommissioning of power plants is an economic ne-
cessity from the viewpoint of supply companies, security of supply is dependent on
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sufficient dispatchable capacities. In 2014, the surplus capacity¹4 in Germany was
estimated at around 8GW, whereas a value of 5GW is reported for 2015 (ENTSO-E,
2014). According to a more recent analysis, generating capacities will be able to
cover the peak load at all times in the near future in Germany, but with the expected
decommissioning of conventional power plants, this could change starting in 2020
(ENTSO-E, 2015). The developments described together with the slow expansion of
the transmission network have triggered a debate on capacity remuneration mecha-
nisms in Germany, in particular, the implementation of a strategic reserve. Capacity
remuneration mechanisms are economically advantageous if they help to overcome
the market imperfections¹5 of the electricity market.
The central concept of a strategic reserve is to maintain a certain level of genera-
tion capacity, which no longer participates in regular market activities. In shortage
situations, this capacity can be deployed by the regulator to ensure that the demand
is always satisfied. Whereas a strategic reserve has the advantage of being fairly
straightforward to implement and, if necessary, to dissolve, it also entails serious
disadvantages (Cramton et al., 2013). Firstly, the power plants included in the reserve
are not allowed to participate in other market activities, which leads to the inefficient
use of the existing capacities. Secondly, it is challenging to design the strategic reserve
without distorting the market, i.e., ensure that in case the reserve is dispatched, the
resulting market price corresponds to the value of lost load (VoLL)¹6. If the value at
which the reserve is offered in the market is not sufficiently high, market prices will
be below those of an efficient spot market, and new investments may be suppressed.
¹4 The surplus capacity is defined as the difference between the reliable available capacity and the
load.
¹5 Among the variousmarket imperfections, the central problem of the electricitymarket is to generate
prices that reflect the opportunity costs of consumers in times when all capacities are already fully
utilized (Cramton et al., 2013).
¹6 The value of lost load describes the average willingness of customers to pay for the reliability of
their electricity supply. The individual willingness to pay can vary between close to zero and tens of
thousands of Euros perMWh, whereby extremely high values are typical for critical infrastructures
such as hospitals (Hogan, 2017).
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Furthermore, even if it was possible to determine the VoLL precisely¹7, its value only
corresponds to the average willingness to pay. Consumers whose individual VoLL is
below the average would be forced to spend more than they are willing to.
When designing the strategic reserve, Germany was able to draw on the experience
of other European countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Poland or Belgium (BMWi,
2014, 2015b,c; Consentec, 2012). The final concept defined by the German Energy Act
stipulates that both old and new plants may participate in the procurement process.
In contrast to the grid reserve, all capacities are procured within the framework
of a central and open auction. No capacities that are once part of the reserve may
participate in other markets, not even against the payment of a premium. Although
initially the reserve was supposed to be offered in the day-ahead market (BDEW et al.,
2013), the now valid concept provides that the reserve is only activated if a physical
deficit occurs that cannot be compensated by other measures (Figure 2.15). After
initial concerns of the European Commission about compliance with EU State aid
rules, the draft of the capacity reserve has been approved and, starting in 2019, 2GW
are to be contracted for each 2-year period until 2025 (European Commission, 2018c).
¹7 Currently, the VoLL cannot be determined precisely, but only be estimated by aggregating more or
less representative data of the different types of consumers (Coll-Mayor et al., 2012). This, however,
may change due to the rollout of smart meters and the resulting increasing availability of real measured
data.
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12:00 from12:42 14:30Dayd-10 Dayd-1 Dayd
Start of
next day
Start of physical
capacity deﬁcit
Time
Day-ahead
market
Intraday market Reserves
Activation of
capacity reserve
Activation of lignite-ﬁred
units in standby mode
Speciﬁcation
of schedule
Second auction:
Adapting ask bids
First auction:
No market clearing
Dispatch of lignite-ﬁred
units in standby mode
Dispatch of
capacity reserve
Balancing power and in-
terruptible loads activated
Extreme prices
in intraday market
Figure 2.15 | Operation of the German capacity reserve. The capacity reserve is used
in the event of a capacity deficit that cannot be compensated even though all existing
measures have already been applied. If in the first auction of the day-ahead market,
the amount of electricity is insufficient to meet the demand, a second auction may be
held in which the market participants adapt their buy and sell bids. If the market can-
not be cleared in this auction as well, various power plants in the capacity reserve will
be put on standby, i.e., the units will be started up, ramped up tominimum load so that
they can be switched to full load operation at short notice by the transmission system
operator. During the activation phase, in order not to interfere with the functioning
of the intraday market, transmission system operators must request active units to
ramp down by the amount generated by the units in the capacity reserve. If on the
next day, despite high prices in the intraday market, sufficient capacities are still not
available, the different operating reserves and interruptible loads are activated. If the
available positive control power and interruptible loads have largely been exhausted,
but the capacity deficit is still not eliminated, the units of the capacity reserve, which
are already running at minimum load, are dispatched at full capacity. Source: BMWi
(2015b, 2018b); European Commission (2017b).

Chapter³Techno-economicmodels for electricity systems
According to Hamming (1962), the purpose of computational calculations isnot to generate numbers, but to gain insights. This idea played an integral
role in the development of the first energy system models following the oil price
crisis in the 1970s (Huntington et al., 1982), when policymakers and business leaders
sought to gain a better understanding of the long-term impact of energy-related
decisions (Pfenninger et al., 2014). In the process of time, the demand for decision
support has strongly grown, and with it, the demands on the models have risen as
well (Ventosa et al., 2005), which, for example, is reflected in the growing number
of energy system models (Nakata et al., 2011). In this context, an increasing number
of specialized models have been developed that deal with only one specific aspect of
energy: electricity (Bazmi and Zahedi, 2011). These dedicated models can include
both short-term aspects, e.g., the daily power plant dispatch, and long-term decisions,
e.g., power plant investments with a time horizon of more than 20 years.
This chapter first addresses the requirements for electricity system models. This is
followed by a description of the various possible model classifications, the fundamen-
tal properties of the most common model types as well as their specific strengths and
deficits. Subsequently, the suitability of the model types for the research questions
of this work is examined. Finally, further challenges in the field of electricity system
modeling are addressed.
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3.1 Model requirements
This section outlines the requirements for a model that reflects the characteristics of
the European electricity sector. On the one hand, the essential components of the
sector, such as the various markets or actors, are described and, on the other hand,
technical model characteristics, e.g., the temporal resolution, are addressed.
In the past, state-regulated monopoly operators were present in the electricity
sector, which meant that the representation of different market participants could
be neglected. However, as current developments are primarily influenced by the
decisions and the interactions of individual market participants, the following real-
world aspects should be taken into account when modeling the electricity sector:
asymmetric information, imperfect competition, strategic behavior and collective
learning (Tesfatsion, 2002). These aspects, however, pose significant challenges for
most of the established approaches.
Although electricity is also traded over-the-counter between market players, the
central day-ahead auction at the EPEX SPOT is considered one of the most prominent
trading venues whose price signals are of great significance for the entire electricity
sector. Due to the manifold ways of marketing energy or power, e.g., via balancing
power markets, interdependencies between different market segments exist. As a
result, the capacity that has already been sold to provide positive balancing power can
no longer be offered on the day-ahead market. In addition, the provision of negative
balancing services by power plants must be taken into account when submitting bids
for the day-ahead market, which in turn can lead to negative prices (see Section 2.1.3).
Thus, to be able to model the price formation in the day-ahead market appropriately,
it is of high relevance to take these circumstances into account.
Given that most European countries are tightly connected to their neighboring
states through the European continental network, an isolated national approach does
not seem to be expedient. Instead, neighboring market areas must also be integrated
into models with a national focus. For instance, the electricity flows into and out of
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Germany or Switzerland amount to more than 100 TWh and 67 TWh per year, which
corresponds to 19% and 107% of the gross national consumption (AG Energiebilanzen
e. V., 2018; BFE, 2018). This is related to the fact, that although the different day-ahead
markets in Europe are mostly restricted to national territories, the vast majority
of them—representing about 85% of European power consumption (EPEX SPOT,
2018b)—is linked via a sophisticated market-coupling algorithm at the EPEX SPOT
(see Section 2.2.2). Thus, market results are influenced by bids from abroad.
A characteristic feature of electricity is that it can be stored on a large scale currently
almost exclusively by pumped storage power plants, whose potential, however, is
quite limited. At the same time, the demand for electricity is comparatively inelastic
(Lee and Lee, 2010). Hence, the electricity generation must adapt to the demand.
Therefore, models that exclude essential technical restrictions, such as the start-up
times of power plants, are only partially suitable for modeling electricity markets
(Ventosa et al., 2005).
The changing framework conditions in the electricity sector poses significant chal-
lenges for decision-makers. This applies in particular to decisions on investments,
whose value is strongly influenced by the uncertain development of various long-term
factors. For this reason, it is necessary to consider the uncertainties mentioned in the
previous chapter, e.g., prices of fossil fuels and emission certificates, technological
processes, the feed-in of volatile renewable energies, the behavior of market players
as well as the development of political and regulatory framework conditions (Möst
and Keles, 2010).
During the liberalization of the electricity sector, the regulatory and political frame-
work has changed profoundly, and it is expected that in the future the electricity sector
itself will undergo a fundamental process of change. This process is heavily influenced
by Germany’s climate policy goals and the associated growing share of renewable
energies. Furthermore, the introduction of new interdepending markets such as the
European emissions trading scheme or the strategic reserve (see Section 2.2.5) shows
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that a model should be flexible and expandable in order to simulate current and
possibly new future market elements.
3.2 Model classification
A multitude of different models has already been developed to analyze the electricity
sector, which, for example, can be seen in the numerous publications that reflect the
state of research in a selected sub-area, e.g., modeling of decentralized electricity sys-
tems (see Table 3.1). In view of this situation, it is appropriate to adopt a classification
to gain an overview of the numerous models and at the same time to be able to assess
their various properties.
A substantial complication is however that the literature does not contain a uni-
form, but manifold classifications. According to Ventosa et al. (2005), energy system
models can at the top level be divided into the following classes: Optimization models,
equilibrium models, and simulation models. Sensfuß (2007) adopts a similar classifi-
cation for energy system models, however, in addition, the different perspectives in
modeling, either “bottom-up” or “top-down,” are included. Top-down models take a
systemic, macroeconomic perspective; in contrast, bottom-up models are based on a
microeconomic foundation (Böhringer, 1998). Top-down models are able to replicate,
e.g., economic reactions to political shocks, but usually possess a very simplified
representation of the energy system and disregard sectoral or technological details
(Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008). Bottom-up models, on the contrary, integrate
the specific characteristics of the electricity sector, such as the multitude of different
generation technologies and energy carriers. However, the macroeconomic effects of
energy policy decisions are mostly neglected.
If the focus is on a particular aspect of the electricity sector, such as the price
of electricity, a different classification is preferable. Here, Möst and Keles (2010)
distinguish between econometric, financial, game-theoretic and fundamental models
(see Figure 3.2). Nonetheless, in some cases, it is difficult or even impossible to assign
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Table 3.1 | Reviews of electricity market/systemmodels. In the literature, there
exists a multitude of different approaches. However, many of the models con-
sidered in the following surveys share strong similarities by being bottom-up
models and employing either optimization methods or relying on agent-based
simulation.
Publication Topic Scope
Bazmi and Zahedi
(2011)
Modeling, optimization, and simu-
lation of the energy and electricity
sector
55 publications
Connolly et al.
(2010)
Integration of renewable energies
into electricity systems
37 models
Foley et al. (2010) Models of electricity systems 7 proprietary
models
Guerci et al.
(2010)
Agent-based models of electricity
markets
49 models
Möst and Keles
(2010)
Stochastic modeling of electricity
markets
20 models
Ringler et al.
(2016)
Agent-based models of decentral-
ized markets and smart grids
18 models
Sensfuß et al.
(2007)
Agent-based models of electricity
markets
14 models
Ventosa et al.
(2005)
Modeling of electricity markets 36 models
Weidlich and Veit
(2008)
Agent-based models of electricity
markets
26 models
a model to a single category, especially with hybrid models that attempt to combine
the advantages of different approaches in a single model (Böhringer, 1998).
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Models of
energy systems
Top-down
models
Bottom-up
models
Input-output
models
General equi-
librium models
Macroeconomic
models
Optimization
models
Simulation
models
Accounting
framework
Game-theoretic
models
System dynamics
models
Agent-based
models
Figure 3.1 | Overview of different model types for energy systems. Sensfuß (2007)
first introduces a classification into top-down and bottom-up models and, compared
to Ventosa et al. (2005), takes into account additional modeling approaches (macroe-
conomic and input-output models), which are mainly applied to energy systems in-
stead of electricity markets.
3.3 Model approaches
The subsequent sections describe the most common model classes based on the clas-
sifications described at the beginning: optimization models, agent-based models,
equilibrium (game-theoretical) models, system dynamics models, financial (quantita-
tive, stochastic), and statistical (econometric) approaches.
In addition, it is noticeable that a large part of the most recently developed models
(Bazmi and Zahedi, 2011; Connolly et al., 2010; Ringler et al., 2016; Weidlich and
Veit, 2008), falls into the category of optimization or agent-based simulation models.
This seems to be related to the fact that both types of models as bottom-up models
combine the ability to represent energy systems in great detail, which is of immense
importance for a broad range of energy economic research questions. In view of the
relevance of these approaches, both are examined and compared in more detail (see
Table 3.2).
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Modeling of the
electricity price
Financial
models
Econometric
models
Game-theoretic
models
Fundamental
models
Optimization
models
System dynamics
models
Agent-based
models
Figure 3.2 | Overview of different types for the modeling of electricity prices. Möst
and Keles (2010) make a further segmentation by also considering econometric and fi-
nancial mathematical models. However, contrary to Sensfuß (2007), game-theoretical
models are considered as a separate category and not as a sub-category among the
fundamental models.
3.3.1 Optimization models
Optimization models of an electricity system usually aim to minimize costs and at the
same time satisfy a given demand at all times. One the one hand, the short-term unit
commitment, in which technical restrictions such as the load gradients of thermal
power plants or the flow rates at pumped-storage power plants, can be taken into
account. On the other hand, long-term investments in renewable energies or the
expansion of interconnector capacities can be included (Fürsch et al., 2013). For
long-term decisions, either a time-step (also myopic-dynamic) or perfect-foresight
approach is applied (see Figure 3.3). Whereas in the former, successive optimizations
over sequential time periods are carried out, in the latter, a single optimization is
performed over the entire period under consideration (Keppo and Strubegger, 2010).
As different actors cannot be included in optimization models, they take the per-
spective of a central planner or an individual company and are analogously referred
to as “single-firm optimization models” (Ventosa et al., 2005). As a general principle,
it is usually assumed that this actor possesses perfect information, for example, with
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2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
a)
b)
c)
Decision horizon
Figure 3.3 | Decisions in optimization models assuming limited or perfect foresight.
In case a) a perfect-foresight approach is adopted; therefore, the decision horizon
corresponds to the entire period regarded. Right from the beginning, all informa-
tion with relevance for the decision-making process is available. For this reason,
there is no need to make any subsequent decision or even revise a previous decision.
In case b), a time-step approach is used, and first, a decision is made that
only affects the first part of the observation period. In 2020, a subsequent
decision will be taken for the remainder of the observation period. However,
this will not affect the outcome of the irreversible decision already taken before.
In case c), decision-making processes are probably implemented most realistic by
allowing for partially reversible decisions. If after 5 years new information be-
comes available, the last decision taken can be altered. In case of a revised de-
cision, due to the 10-year horizon, however, only the last five years are affected.
Source: Keppo and Strubegger (2010).
regard to all the technical equipment and investment options as well as the future
demand for electricity.
Despite the immense computing power available today, often simplifications have
to be made in order to calculate optimal results when the specific characteristics
of different generation technologies are considered. This includes, for example, the
aggregated representation of generation capacities at the national level (e.g., Traber
and Kemfert, 2011) or a limited temporal resolution, where representative days, e.g., 2
days for each season, and representative years, e.g., 5 or 10-year intervals, are selected
(cf. Blesl et al., 2007). However, these simplifications can lead to results deviating from
the optimum. As the extent of the deviation usually depends on the input data in a
non-linear manner, it is extremely complex to estimate the exact effect, which makes
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the interpretation of the analysis performed quite troublesome (Frew and Jacobson,
2016; Poncelet et al., 2016). For example, Haydt et al. (2011) show by comparing
models with a low or high temporal resolution, e.g., 288 or 8760 time periods per year,
that significant divergence can occur, especially with regard to the share of fluctuating
renewable energies and the associated CO2-emissions of the electricity system.
Since the beginning of energy system modeling, optimization models have played
a prominent role, and today are probably the most widespread model type. In the
field of optimizing energy systemmodels, prominent examples include, among others,
MARKAL/TIMES, PRIMES, EnergyPLAN, IKARUS and PERSEUS (Connolly et al., 2010).
Among these,MARKAL/TIMES is probably the best-known model family, whereby
the former stands for “Market Allocation” and the latter for “The IntegratedMAR-
KAL/EFOM System” (Loulou, 2008; Loulou and Labriet, 2008). Herewith it already
becomes clear that TIMES is based onMARKAL and can be regarded as its evolutionary
advancement. Within TIMES, some of the original criticisms of the economically
oriented MARKAL could be addressed by integrating the technical model EFOM
(Energy FlowOptimizationModel) that represents a network of different locations for
energy conversion, energy-intensive products, and primary energy carriers (Remme
et al., 2002).
MARKAL/TIMES was developed by a consortium of researchers from the IEA
member states and is aimed at investigating future energy developments based on
contrasting scenarios. Alone in 2015, TIMES was used in 70 countries and at 177
institutions (Chiodi et al., 2015).
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3.3.2 Agent-based models
Over the past two decades, coupled with the broad availability of high-performance
computing power, agent-based simulation, has experienced extensive growth and is
also established and widely deployed in the energy sector (cf. Guerci et al., 2010; Sens-
fuß et al., 2007; Weidlich and Veit, 2008). Another aspect fostering this development
is the fact that the consideration of different market participants has become increas-
ingly significant. This is a direct result of the liberalization of electricity markets, in
the course of which national markets have evolved from integrated monopolies to
liberalizedmarkets with numerousmarket participants. Furthermore, the possibilities
of agent-based models are numerous and multifaceted. Axelrod (1997) even calls
the agent-based simulation “a third way of doing science” that complements the
conventional inductive and deductive approaches.
In agent-based modeling, economic systems are considered complex dynamic
environments, in which agents follow their custom strategies to pursue partly contra-
dictory targets and are able to adapt their behavior to the current environment. In
this context, the term “agents” is defined comparatively broadly and includes among
others individuals (consumers, employees), economic entities (companies, regulatory
authorities), institutions (regulatory systems) as well as physical entities (transmission
networks, power plants) (Tesfatsion, 2006).
In general, agent-based models consist of a system of computational structures and
rules to simulate the actions and interactions of predefined agents, with the aim of
assessing their impact on the system as a whole. For this purpose, in a first step, a
model is created, which includes an initial population of agents, and the initial state of
the system is specified by defining the attributes of the agents—e.g., learning behavior,
knowledge about the environment.¹ Subsequently, the model is executed without any
further adjustments, i.e., all observed events must result from the interaction of the
¹ Axelrod (1997) recommends that assumptions underlying an agent-based model should be as plain
as possible and thereby the complexity only lies in the simulated results.
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Agent
Environment
Action at
State st
Reward rt
Figure 3.4 | Reinforcement learning. The agent knows the current state st of the
environment and has an expectation about the reward any action at achieves in this
state. After the agent selects an action a∗t , he receives the reward rt and is informed
about the new state st+1 of the environment. The realized payoff rt serves to adjust the
agent’s expectation associated with the selected action. In the next step, the agent
chooses another action a∗t+1 based on the expected rewards of all possible actions.
agents without external interference. At the end, the results can be carefully analyzed
and checked for potential inconsistencies.
A particular strength of agent-based models is that they are able to replicate imper-
fect competition (Tesfatsion, 2002), which is often found in the context of oligopolistic
electricity markets, e.g., in Germany, where in 2011 four corporations—EnBW, E.ON,
RWE, and Vattenfall—possessed about 80% of the thermal generation capacities (Bun-
deskartellamt, 2011). For this purpose, strategic bidding can be implemented. In
repeated interactions, agents that possess market power choose their markup level
using dedicated algorithms capable of taking the current state of the market into
account (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001). The ability to predict the behavior of agents in
new environments through machine learning is a valuable complement to existing
approaches in which learning is often neglected or cannot be modeled (Roth, 2002).
Among the numerous methods of machine learning, the algorithms mainly used
in the context of simulating electricity markets, rely on reinforcement learning (see
Figure 3.4), such as Roth-Erev- (Roth and Erev, 1995) or Q-Learning (Watkins and
Dayan, 1992).
Agent-based models offer great flexibility, for example, additional agents can be
added quickly, and the properties of existing agents, e.g., the ability to learn or the
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rules for interaction, can be conveniently adapted (Jennings, 2000). Thereby, the
influence of the various actors can be made visible even if learning algorithms are only
partially considered. In addition, agents can easily be modeled in different levels of
detail or as aggregated entities. On the flipside, for modelers, who have to determine
the level of detail, this also presents a major challenge, and often the process remains
an art more than a science (Bonabeau, 2002).
Whereas optimizationmodels aim to find the best value for their objective function,
the outcome in agent-basedmodels emerges from the interaction of all actors and does
not necessarily correspond to an overarching target, for instance, the cost-minimal
solution. However, it is possible to rely partly on algorithms, which have a much
lower computational complexity (An, 2012). This offers the advantage that despite the
explicit consideration of detailed techno-economic restrictions, a comparatively short
runtime can be realized, which renders the use of common simplifications used for
optimization models, such as representative days, superfluous (Nahmmacher et al.,
2016; Poncelet et al., 2016).
Another challenge in the development of an agent-based model is that human
behaviors need to be incorporated often, and thus potentially irrational actions or
subjective decisions are integrated, so-called soft factors that are often difficult to
calibrate, quantify or justify (Bonabeau, 2002). As a result, model results may to some
extent be challenging to predict and interpret, as they strongly depend on the initial
state of the system and the complex interaction of the agents.
To facilitate the model creation, there are various agent-based software libraries,
such as the widely used Repast (Argonne National Laboratory, 2017) or MASON
library (GeorgeMasonUniversity, 2017), which allow to create different agents, specify
their relationships or visualize the results for different applications. Often, however,
advanced programming skills are still required for their use (Zhou et al., 2007).
Solutions tailored specifically for electricity systems are also available: AMES (Li and
Tesfatsion, 2009), EMLab (TUDelft, 2017), SEPIA (Harp et al., 2000) orMASCEM (Vale
et al., 2011). When deciding on a solution, however, it must be taken into account that
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not all models are still actively developed, and some older versions are even no longer
publicly available.
3.3.3 Game-theoretic models
Game-theoretical models aim to derive optimal strategies for intelligent, rational
decision-makers and examine the resulting equilibrium states.² For this purpose,
mathematical games are defined in which each player selects a strategy from a set of
predefined strategies. Each strategy is then assigned a value by means of a payout
function depending on the strategies chosen by other players. If each player has
chosen a strategy and no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy while
the other strategies remain unchanged, a Nash equilibrium is reached (Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994).
In the field of electricity market modeling, it is possible to classify the most
common game-theoretic approaches into Bertrand, Cournot, and Supply-Function-
Equilibrium models (Li et al., 2011a). These models are particularly well suited for
analyzing the exercise ofmarket power by strategic players assuming oligopolistic com-
petition. In eachmodel, it is assumed that players make their decisions simultaneously.
Whereas in Cournot competition, players compete in quantity, in the Bertrand model
there is competition for the price. In contrast, in the Supply-Function-Equilibrium
model, players compete both in terms of quantity and price by choosing a strategic
supply function (Bolle, 1992). However, simplifications are frequently required, and
thus essential technical properties, such as downtimes orminimum operating times of
power plants, are ignored (Genoese, 2010). Consequently, it is oftentimes not possible
to examine existing markets adequately. However, descriptive case studies can be
carried out in which qualitative results are of primary importance, and quantitative
results only have a limited significance (Weber, 2005). For this reason, these types
² For a detailed overview of the application of game-theoretic models to electricity markets, see
Bajpai and Singh (2004) or Hobbs (2001).
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Figure 3.5 | Capacity stocks and flows in a system dynamics model. This diagram
shows an exemplary flowchart (cf. Ford, 1997), in which the stocks (“capacity under
construction” and “installed capacity”) describe the current state of the system and
are used as the basis for deriving decisions as well as actions, for example, the initiation
rate. The rates, on the other hand, describe the actions in the system, which in turn
cause changes to the inventory levels (Pereira and Saraiva, 2011).
of models are used primarily for providing policy advice and scarcely used in the
industrial sector (Möst and Keles, 2010).
3.3.4 System dynamics models
Thefirst system dynamicsmodels were developed in the 1950s by Forrester (1961), who
analyzed the dynamic behavior of complex systems and thereby obtained the following
central insight: In order to determine the behavior of a system, the sometimes time-
delayed relationships between its different interlocking components are often just as
relevant as these components themselves. Furthermore, new structures and unknown
behavior often occur as an emergent phenomenon, which cannot be explained by
the individual analysis of all components but can only be understood in the overall
context of the system (Goldstein, 1999).
System dynamics is utilized in a variety of different domains, e.g., for the modeling
of technical simulations, business processes or even for the analysis of social behavior
(Forrester, 1987). The electricity sector has some characteristics, such as the presence
of strategic behavior or market imperfections, which are particularly well suited for
system dynamics (Pereira and Saraiva, 2011). As a result, for example, national energy
policy measures, investment decisions under uncertainty or the liberalization of the
electricity sector were studied using system dynamics models (Qudrat-Ullah, 2013).
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A current overview of the different applications in the electricity sector can be found
in Ahmad et al. (2016).
For the creation of a system-dynamic model, a variety of toolkits is available, which
considerably simplify the process via a visual interface (Rizzoli and Young, 1997).
Among the most popular products are STELLA (Isee systems, 2017), Vensim (Ventana
Systems, 2017) or Simulink (Mathworks, 2017). On the one hand, these proprietary
tools provide rapid access for users who have expert knowledge in their field but are
unfamiliar with the mathematical concepts of the system dynamics approach. On the
other hand, the user’s ability to perform extensive customizations is limited.
The behavior of a system dynamics model and likewise the quality of the model
results is considerably influenced by the defined feedback loops (see Figure 3.5), whose
validation and calibration is a central challenge and a frequent point of criticism (Oliva,
2003). Another difficulty is that feedback loops do not allow to model the decisions of
individual agents or the ability to learn from experience (Schieritz and Milling, 2003).
3.3.5 Financial models
Financial mathematical models (also quantitative, stochastic or reduced-form mod-
els) attempt to identify and capture the so-called stylized properties of electricity
prices preferably through analytical formulas. These properties, i.e., price spikes
and correlations with other processes such as the oil or gas price, can be considered
universal as they are shared by the majority of the electricity spot markets (Carmona
and Coulon, 2014; Weron, 2006). Consequently, neither a supply or demand function
is defined, whose point of intersection lead to an equilibrium price, but rather the
number of factors and parameters is reduced to a minimum.
For this purpose, approaches originally developed for the modeling of interest rates
or the price dynamics of commodities are used, where, analogous to the electricity
price, it is often assumed that their values fluctuate and return to a long-term average,
which is also referred to as mean reversion (Geman and Roncoroni, 2006). For this
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purpose, the price development can be characterized by, e.g., an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process (Benth et al., 2007). In addition, to reflect the seasonal factors and the occa-
sional price jumps typical for electricity prices, for example, deterministic functions
or Poisson processes can be applied (Cartea and Figueroa, 2005).
In the field of financial mathematical models, a distinction is commonly made be-
tween the modeling of spot (Keles et al., 2013) and future prices (Fleten and Lemming,
2003). One reason for the popularity of this type of model is that the comparatively
plain structure often leads to theoretical developments, which can be verified against
empirical data (Carmona and Coulon, 2014). These models are used in particular for
riskmanagement purposes or the pricing of derivatives, but usually not for short-term
price forecasts.
3.3.6 Econometric models
Econometric (or statistical) approaches are used to model the price of electricity
by establishing a mostly additive or multiplicative mathematical relation³, between
its historical values and related exogenous variables such as the load, temperature,
time of day or different fuel prices (Aggarwal et al., 2009). This is based on the
assumption that the electricity price can be expressed by either the product or the
sum of different components. Once a model has been formulated, its parameters
must be estimated using statistical estimation methods, for example, the method of
moments, the Bayesian method or the method of maximum likelihood. In the latter,
probably the most widely employed method, the parameters are chosen in such a
way that the probability to observe the occurring historical values is maximized (Box
et al., 2008).
In the forecasting of electricity prices, econometric approaches enjoy wide interest
³ In economics, other mathematical relations, for example, a logarithmic relationship, can also be
assumed, as it is the case in the logit model (Harrell, 2015). In predicting bank failure (Martin, 1977) or
the likelihood of a homeowner defaulting on a mortgage (Campbell and Dietrich, 1983), this approach
is widespread, but it is not the case for modeling the electricity sector.
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as these, on the one hand, allow for an intuitive understanding of the individual
price factors4 and, on the other hand, existing knowledge, e.g., about the forecasting
of the load or wind feed-in, can be integrated (Möst and Keles, 2010). However, a
common point of criticism is that non-linear behavior, such as price spikes, can only
be reproduced to a limited extent. Nevertheless, for practical applications, the quality
of econometric approaches is comparable to others as non-linear behavior occurs
only rarely (Weron, 2014).
3.4 Model selection and further research needs
Based on the requirements mentioned in this chapter and the model properties
described subsequently, in the next sections, on the one hand, a model is selected,
and, on the other hand, the key challenges, which have to be addressed for the future
development of energy system models, are outlined.
3.4.1 Model comparison and selection
Econometric or financial mathematical models are primarily well suited for specific
purposes, i.e., for the forecasting of the electricity price or the valuation of derivatives.
However, they are only of limited use for analyzing further related aspects, such as the
effects of a strategic reserve or the development of CO2 emissions, as they do not take
into account significant technological and economic constraints. Therefore, these
models are not fully capable of reproducing the essential characteristics of electricity
markets or the behavior of the market participants (Ventosa et al., 2005).
Game-theoretical models focus on the strategies of the players and the resulting
market equilibria. However, in this context, qualitative results are of primary concern
(Weber, 2005), such as the existence of market power (Prabhakar Karthikeyan et al.,
4 For example, regression models with static (Bublitz et al., 2017; Cludius et al., 2014; Würzburg et al.,
2013) or time-variable coefficients (Paraschiv et al., 2014) are frequently used to examine the merit
order effect.
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2013). The dispatch of power plants is not simulated, which restricts the range of
application and thus does not provide any information on, for example, the energy
consumption. However, often game theoretical concepts are used in agent-based
models (Weiss et al., 2002), which makes a proper distinction between these two
model classes quite problematic. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the
terminology is not always used coherently in literature.5
Fundamental models such as system-dynamics-, optimization, and agent-based
models offer a wide range of potential applications by simulating the essential elements
of electricity systems. The benefit of being able to analyze the influence of these
fundamental elements, however, comes with a high level of effort—for instance, a
substantial amount of input data is required. Nonetheless, in order to understand the
interaction of the individual components of a system, it is necessary to represent and
analyze them explicitly.
Whereas in the past, in many existing models only techno-economic aspects are
considered, the social acceptance of technologies has gained an increasingly important
role as well as the involvement of stakeholders such as community groups or non-
governmental organizations in decision-making processes (Droste-Franke et al., 2015).
In addition, an increasing number of participants in the electricity market such as
households, who traditionally acted purely as consumers, take on the role of a so-
called prosumer who not only purchases electricity but also generates, stores, or
directly consumes it (Grijalva and Tariq, 2011). Viewing the electricity sector from the
perspective of a central planner who maximizes economic welfare in the system as in
the case of optimization models, thus, does not appear to be expedient. However, this
is a key strength of agent-based models, which are able to integrate individual actors
and strategic behavior directly. Nonetheless, the flexibility of agent-based models
also allows using optimization techniques for the individual decisions of the agents.
5 For instance, Vries and Heijnen (2008) refer to their model as a system dynamics model, although
the more appropriate term seems to be agent-based in regard to the accompanying model description.
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Table 3.2 | Characteristics of optimization and agent-based models for elec-
tricity systems and markets. Through the use of agent-based and optimization
models, an in-depth understanding of energy industry issues can be developed.
Both approaches have different advantages and disadvantages; thus, comple-
ment each other. Sources: Genoese (2010); Möst and Fichtner (2008).
Model
approach
Agent-based models Optimization models
Model
objective
Realistic simulation of the
development of the market,
e.g., wholesale prices
Determination of the opti-
mal outcome under a given
objective
Market per-
spective
Real, imperfect markets with
actors who behave strategi-
cally
Markets with perfect com-
petition and complete
transparency
Information Myopic and imperfect Myopic or complete
(perfect foresight)
Market prices Result of supply and demand,
including possible mark-ups
Marginal costs of electricity
demand (shadow price)
Strengths Considering strategic
behavior and imperfect infor-
mation, well extensible and
adaptable
Optimal results, established
methodology, transparency
through concise mathemati-
cal notation
Weaknesses Decision rules determine out-
come but in some cases hard
to validate
Deviations between opti-
mal results and real market
events, neglecting of the
participants’ perspectives
A comparison of the most important characteristics of both types of models can be
found in Table 3.2.
By integrating the perspective of an actor, as Farmer and Foley (2009) argue, a
wider range of non-linear behavior, e.g., sudden shocks, can be represented, thereby
allowing decision-makers to simulate and assess the impact of a range of policies
on an economic system under different future scenarios. However, it should also
be noted that the integration of a stakeholder perspective presents new challenges.
Due to the lack of publicly accessible data, in particular the parameterization of the
various agents is based on assumptions that are difficult to verify.
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A further advantage of agent-based models is the ability to create a model of high-
temporal resolution, which avoids significant deviations that could result from a
simplified temporal representation often found in optimization models (Frew and
Jacobson, 2016; Poncelet et al., 2016). System dynamics models are able to model
the essential elements of the electricity sector and can be used flexibly. However,
determining the flow rates is a major challenge and the lack of an option to represent
individual actors is a compelling argument for the agent-based approach chosen for
this work (Oliva, 2003; Schieritz and Milling, 2003).
3.4.2 Central challenges
In the following, the central challenges that energy system models face due to the
transforming framework conditions are addressed. In this context, it is imperative
to consider the increased complexity of the energy system by taking into account
the development of different uncertain influences, such as the future volume and
flexibility of electricity demand. In addition, detailed model validations need to be
carried out, and transparency should be increased by clearly communicating existing
model limitations.
Complexity and transdisciplinarity
Energy systems are becoming increasingly complex and decentralized, in part due to
the transition from large thermal power plants to a wide range of renewable energy
sources, which often renders approaches from the past insufficient to adequately
represent the future energy system.
In addition, energy systems have complex dynamic properties such as feedback
loops and lock-in effects, which are not represented by simplified decision rules based
solely on minimizing system costs. Even if complex modeling approaches entail
many challenges, they are able to yield new valuable insights, where other applying
modeling approaches produce over-simplified answers (Bale et al., 2015).
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Furthermore, critical influencing factors such as social justice, politics, and unfore-
seen technological advances are not adequately considered in most of the existing
models (Gilbert and Sovacool, 2014; Jefferson, 2014; Sovacool, 2014). The widespread
use of these models and the lack of alternatives lead to the fact that often purely
technological solutions are presented on energy-economic questions. However, the
social processes determining their acceptance and use are disregarded (Spreng, 2014).
The analysis of future energy systems, therefore, requires a broader collaboration
between technical, economic and social sciences in order to better assess and predict
actual developments (Sovacool et al., 2015).
Uncertainty
Uncertainty can generally be classified as parametric and structural uncertainty,
whereby the former refers to the uncertainty regarding the input data and the latter
refers to the limited ability to represent reality through a model (Hunter et al., 2013).
In models, usually only parametric uncertainty is regarded, as it is almost impossible
to thoroughly address structural uncertainty (Pfenninger et al., 2014).
There are different ways to address the effects of parametric uncertainty, depend-
ing on whether the model is deterministic, i.e., identical assumptions always lead
to identical results, or stochastic, i.e., identical assumptions may lead to diverging
results. With deterministic models, it is possible to include parametric uncertainties
by varying the input parameters of the model and analyzing their effects on the result
(Monte Carlo method). In stochastic models, such as stochastic optimization models,
uncertainties can be directly integrated into the model, e.g., by replacing a single
parameter with its mean value and variance (Mancarella, 2014; Wallace and Fleten,
2003).
Applying a Monte Carlo simulation is a comparatively basic way to integrate un-
certainty. Usher and Strachan (2012) show that gained results can be structurally
different from stochasticmodels. Even though stochasticmodels aremore challenging
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to create and apply than deterministic ones, they are required to adequately deal with
the evolving uncertainties in the energy sector (Strachan, 2011). However, as these
models still have limitations, it is important to communicate inherent assumptions
concerning the integration of risks in the presentation of results (Bale et al., 2015).
Validation
Economic models differ from physical models in the respect that no natural scientific
phenomena, which remain constant over time and space, are investigated. The focus is
rather on the interaction of market players whose actions are only partially observable
and whose objectives as well as assumptions are not known publicly. Thus, models
of the electricity market cannot be validated in the same way as physical models
(DeCarolis et al., 2012). Nevertheless, in order to identify possible divergences from
real-world systems, model results need to be compared with historical values so
that any divergence can be taken into account and results can be interpreted in a
more meaningful way (Fagiolo et al., 2007), which in most cases is only carried out
insufficiently. Furthermore, it would be helpful to define a standardized use case with
which better comparability of the different models can be reached. For this purpose,
the initiatives Open Power System Data (2017) and the Open Energy Modelling
Initiative (2017) are first promising steps.
Transparency
In the past, energy system models have been criticized for being intransparent or
even for representing a black box for external parties. As the methodology of a black
box model cannot be understood and comprehensively verified, society or decision-
makersmust have confidence in themodel’s abilities. However, if inconsistencies arise,
trust can vanish quickly (Loken, 2007). Furthermore, intransparency contradicts the
scientific method, where the reproducibility of results and evaluation are essential.
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Non-transparent modeling can lead to poor decisions with far-reaching conse-
quences. As described by Pfenninger (2017), in the preparation of the EU Energy
Roadmap, opaque and overly optimistic assumptions for onshore wind power in the
UK have influenced the national legislation andmay have delayed the decarbonization
of the British energy sector. Such and similar events explain the call of Acatech et al.
(2015) to make the source code of energy system models as well as all input data pub-
licly available. In practice, however, this is proving to be difficult, first and foremost,
due to trade secrets or security concerns over critical infrastructure data. Another
recommendation is to review the source code of the models to further improve its
quality and eliminate errors. Althoughmost of the studies andmodels do not yet meet
the demands for more transparency, several open source initiatives have already been
established in recent years, e.g., EMLab (TUDelft, 2017) or OSeMOSYS (Howells et al.,
2011), the former being an agent-based model family and the latter an optimization
model. In addition, Open Power System Data (2017) provides scientists with access
to an open database containing, for example, techno-economic data on power plants
or time series of the feed-in of renewable energies.

Chapter4An analysis of the decline of electricityspot prices in Europe: Who is to blame?
European electricity markets are currently going through a phase of transition,which is shaped by three key factors: The expansion of renewable energies, es-
pecially wind power and photovoltaics, the phase-out of nuclear energy and the
European market integration.
Different promotion schemes were installed in European countries to support the
expansion of renewable energies. Germany as a leading country in the promotion
of renewable energy already introduced its first renewable energy law (“Stromein-
speisegesetz,” Bundesregierung, 1990) in 1991. This law is regarded as the first feed-in
law worldwide and marked the start of a tremendous rise of renewable energies. In
2000, technology-specific feed-in tariffs were established, as most renewable energies
have not been able to undercut the costs of conventional fossil-fueled power plants.
These tariffs guaranteed a fixed price for all electricity generated in a predetermined
period that is paid by the transmission system operators who pass on the costs to the
end consumers (German Renewable Energy Sources Act, Bundesregierung, 2000).
In 2015, renewable energies contributed with 195.9 TWh (about 30%) to the electricity
generation, which compared to 2005 corresponds to an increase of 213% (BMWi,
2016c). Among the different renewable energy sources, wind is currently the most
important source of energy production with a share of 44.9% followed by biomass
(22.6%) and photovoltaics (19.6%). However, considering entire Europe, hydropower
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still has the largest share with 45.4% mainly due to the electricity production in the
Alpine and Scandinavian countries (European Commission, 2015).
A major advance for the integration of the European electricity markets represents
themarket coupling inCentralWestern Europe (Benelux, France, andGermany) at the
EPEX SPOT, which started onNovember 9, 2010 (EPEX SPOT, 2016). About three years
later, market coupling was extended to also include North-Western Europe (NWE).
Through market coupling, generation capacities can be used more efficiently across
borders andmarket participants profit fromwelfare gains (Weber et al., 2010). As long
as sufficient interconnecting capacities between neighboring countries are available,
wholesale prices in coupled markets converge, leading for instance to identical day-
ahead market prices in Germany and France in about 27% of the time in 2015.
In the last years, the transition of the German electricity market was accompanied
by a strong price decline for base as well as peak wholesale prices (see Figure 4.1).
In 2011, the yearly base price corresponded equal to 51.12 EUR/MWh but dropped to
31.63 EUR/MWh in 2015, a decrease of roughly 38%. Electricity generators have been
profoundly affected by these developments, evenmore so as no capacity remuneration
market is currently implemented in Germany. Many power plants are facing dimin-
ishing return. Currently, the decommissioning of 9 GW of thermal capacities within
the next years is expected (BNetzA, 2016c), stirring up concerns about generation
adequacy.¹ In order to safeguard the transition phase of the electricity market and
to guarantee security of supply, the German government decided to implement a
capacity reserve that will be procured in December 2016 (BMWi, 2015). Investment
decisions in a changing market with major uncertainties are challenging and certainly
not all market participants expected the ongoing price decline. E.ON, for example,
decided in 2008 to build a state-of-art gas-fired power plant (Irsching 5) with an
efficiency of 59.7% and forecasted more than 4000 yearly operating hours (Thom-
¹ As power plant owners are not obliged to explain the reasons for a decommissioning, it not clear to
which extent the decisions are based on economic or technical reasons.
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Figure 4.1 | The day-ahead market prices for the German/Austrian market zone. The
development of base and peak prices shows a clear trend. Since 2011, annual av-
erages have fallen, with the decline slowing down recently. From 2011 to 2012
the base prices dropped by 8.53 EUR/MWh, from 2014 to 2015 the reduction was
1.13 EUR/MWh, which indicates a stabilization of the market. Also, the difference
between base and peak prices, which in 2011 amounted to 6.00 EUR/MWh, has de-
creased to 3.43 EUR/MWh in 2015. Source: EPEX SPOT (2018b).
son Reuters, 2013). However, on April 1, 2016, the power plant was scheduled to be
decommissioned due to economic reasons (Uniper, 2016).²
In the public perception and many political discussions, the blame for the current
price slide and the related developments is shifted to the expansion of renewable
energies, which have been strongly fostered by financial subsidies. Additionally, in the
recent academic discourse, there is a broad spectrum of research that focuses on the
impact of the promotion of renewable energies, but only few studies have been under-
taken to analyze the impact of other factors on wholesale electricity prices. Therefore,
this chapter contributes to the academic discussion by providing a quantitative anal-
² Already in 2012, Irsching 5 achieved only half of the expected yearly operating hours (Thomson
Reuters, 2013) and became part of a reserve for redispatch measures until 2016. Afterward, the power
plant was supposed to be decommissioned. However, this decision is currently facing a ban from the
regional transmission system operator (TSO) due to security and reliability of supply concerns.
82 the decline of electricity prices
ysis of the fundamental price drivers and their impact on the recent decline in the
German wholesale electricity prices, which also can be observed in other European
markets such as France, Italy or Spain. To understand also the future effect of these
price drivers on electricity prices and power plant investments, different scenarios
for the development of price drivers until 2020 are generated and applied. These
scenarios allow on the one hand to understand, how strongly electricity prices can
vary in 2020, and on the other hand to assess the economic feasibility of power plant
investments, especially that of gas power plants. For this reason, in the final step,
based on a net present value (NPV) approach, an economic evaluation of a state of
the art power plant with a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) similar to Irsching 5 is
carried out.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.1, selected
studies on price drivers in electricity markets are discussed. In the next section, the
methodology is described, and three different models are presented. Section 4.4 then
shows an analysis of the main price drivers in the German electricity market. Finally,
in Section 4.5 the results are summarized and a conclusion is presented.
4.1 Literature review
In this section, an overview of previous studies is shown that analyzes the influence
of fundamental factors on electricity prices. In these studies, a wide range of models³
is utilized. According to Aggarwal et al. (2009), electricity market models can be
classified into game theory, simulation and time series models. Game theory models
often focus on the strategies of the market players, simulation models create a detailed
representation of the electricity system and time series models use historical data
of the dependent variable. As there does not exist any study within the mentioned
scope that utilizes a game theory model, in the following, only a distinction between
simulation and time series models is made.
³ A recent discussion and outlook on electricity price modeling can be found, e.g., in Weron (2014).
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In line with the rise of renewable energies, many of the recent studies focus on the
effect of wind and photovoltaics on the electricity price, the so-called merit-order
effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008), and do not discuss the impact of fuel price changes or
changing import/export flows. Furthermore, as Würzburg et al. (2013) point out, it
must be kept in mind that the comparability of studies regarding the merit-order
effect is limited due to the heterogeneous approaches, e.g., different sets of included
fundamental variables (e.g., fuel prices, market scarcity), alternate scope (inclusion of
neighboring countries or emission trading systems) and varying scenarios (no changes
or alternative capacity expansion paths). An overview on the selected literature can
be found in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 | Studies on influence factors of the electricity price. With regard to the geographical
focus, Europe is at the center of interest and, regarding the influence factors, most studies
analyze the effects of wind and photovoltaics. The studies in the table are listed in alphabetical
order.
Study Method-
ology
Regional
scope
Time
period
Focus and key findings Results
(EUR/MWh)
Reference
point
Bode and
Groscurth
(2006)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2005 Impact of renewables; price
reduction depends on the
level of the installed
renewable capacity
RES (Elastic
demand)
RES (Inelastic
demand)
−0.55
−0.61
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
Cludius et al.
(2014)
Time
series
Germany 2008–
2016
Effect of wind and solar,
Energy-intensive industry
profits from low electricity
price due to welfare transfers
2010–12 Wind
2010–12 PV
2016 Wind+PV
−1.07
−1.14
−14 to
−16
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
Scen. vs.
Nonee
Dehler et al.
(2016)
Time
series
Switzer-
land
2011–
2015
Price influence of neighboring
countries; even though no
large gas-fired power plants
are installed in Switzerland,
gas price drives electricity
price which is explained by
the important role of gas in
the Italian market
Gas coefficent
Summer
Gas coefficent
Winter
0.25
0.81
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
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Study Method-
ology
Regional
scope
Time
period
Focus and key findings Results
(EUR/MWh)
Reference
point
Ederer (2015) Simula-
tion
Germany 2006–
2014
Impact of offshore wind;
similar impact of on- and
offshore wind on market
prices, offshore wind imposes
less variability on market price
Wind onshore
short-term
Wind offshore
short-term
Wind onshore
long-term
Wind offshore
long-term
−0.56
−0.75
0.11
−0.19
TWh y. g.b
TWh y. g.b
TWh y. g.b
TWh y. g.b
Gelabert et al.
(2011)
Time
series
Spain 2005–
2010
Impact of renewables;
decreasing trend in the
estimated magnitude of
merit-order effect
RES 2005
RES 2006
RES 2007
RES 2008
RES 2009
RES 2010
−3.80
−3.40
−1.70
−1.50
−1.10
−1.70
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
GW inj.a
Hirth (2018) Simula-
tion
Ger-
many/
Sweden
2008–
2015
Drop in spot prices; most
important drivers in
Germany/Sweden is the
increase of renewable
generation, followed by the
carbon prices respectively the
demand
RES (DE)
Carbon (DE)
RES (SE)
Demand (SE)
−15.80
−12.50
−19.90
−18.20
2008 vs.
2015
2008 vs.
2015
2010 vs.
2015
2010 vs.
2015
Kallabis et al.
(2016)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2007–
2014
Decline of futures prices;
carbon emission allowances
price most important driver of
futures electricity prices
Carbon
Wind and PV
−14.14
−6.28
2007 vs.
2014
2007 vs.
2014
O’Mahoney
and Denny
(2011)
Time
series
Ireland 2009 Effect of wind; savings from
wind-generated electricity are
greater than subsidy over
regarded time period
Wind −9.90 GW inj.a
O’Mahoney
and Denny
(2013)
Time
series
Ireland 2009 Generator behaviour,
Electricity market seems to be
efficient, Gas is price driver,
coefficients of coal and oil
price are not significant
Gas coefficent 0.55 GW inj.a
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Study Method-
ology
Regional
scope
Time
period
Focus and key findings Results
(EUR/MWh)
Reference
point
Paraschiv
et al. (2014)
Time
series
Germany 2010–
2013
Effect of wind and solar;
merit-order effect differs
among hours of the day due
to changing demand, coal as
well as gas price has a strong
effect in hours with a typically
higher demand, e.g., 12 and
18
(Results only
shown in figures)
Sensfuß et al.
(2008)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2001,
2004–
2006
Impact of renewables;
merit-order effect exceeds the
volume of the net support
payments
RES 2001
RES 2004
RES 2005
RES 2006
−1.70
−2.50
−4.25
−7.83
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. N.c
Sensfuß
(2013)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2011–
2012
Impact of renewables;
energy-intensive industry
profits from low prices due to
lower levys
RES 2011
RES 2012
−8.72
−8.91
Hist. vs. S.d
Hist. vs. S.d
Thoenes
(2014)
Time
series
Germany 2011 Impact of nuclear
moratorium; future prices
adjusted by 6 GW shut down,
shortly afterward less
(No results in
EUR/MWh)
Traber and
Kemfert
(2011)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2007–
2008
Effect of wind; wind reduces
profitablity of gas-fired power
plants
Wind −3.70 Hist. vs. N.c
Traber et al.
(2011)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2020 Impact of RES; slight increase
of EEG levy expected in 2020
RES −3.20 2010 vs.
2020 S.
Weber and
Woll (2007)
Simula-
tion
Germany 2006 Effect of wind; merit-order
effect depends on the
regarded time horizon
Wind (short-
term)
Wind (medium-
term)
Wind (long-
term)
−4.04
0.40
1.00
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. S.d
Hist. vs. S.d
Weigt (2009) Simula-
tion
Germany 2006–
2008
Effect of wind; wind capacity
cannot significantly reduce
required fossil capacities
Wind 2006
Wind 2007
Wind 2008
−6.26
−10.47
−13.13
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. N.c
Hist. vs. N.c
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Study Method-
ology
Regional
scope
Time
period
Focus and key findings Results
(EUR/MWh)
Reference
point
Würzburg
et al. (2013)
Time
series
Germany,
Austria
2010–
2012
Effect of wind and solar;
German nuclear exit did not
affect merit-order effect, price
effect of wind and solar are
similar
Wind and PV −1.00 GW inj.a
a Per GW injection.
b Per TWh yearly generation.
c Historical generation versus no generation.
d Historical generation versus alternative scenario generation.
e Scenario generation versus no generation.
Simulation models
One of the first studies of the merit-order effect is carried out by Sensfuß et al. (2008),
who use an agent-basedmodel of the German electricitymarket to analyze the effect of
electricity production fromwind power and photovoltaics on the day-ahead electricity
price. They determine an average price reduction for the year 2001 of 1.70 EUR/MWh
and for the years from 2004 to 2006 a reduction of 2.50 to 7.83 EUR/MWh. In another
study, Sensfuß (2013) applies the same model and calculates a price reduction of
8.72 EUR/MWh and 8.91 EUR/MWh for 2011 and 2012 respectively. In this analysis,
the electricity production of biogas and biomass is considered as well as additional
capacities of coal and gas-fired power plants in the scenario with no renewable pro-
duction.
Bode and Groscurth (2006) take a rather simplistic approach by calculating the
intersection of the electricity demand and supply curve under the assumption of
perfect competition and static daily demand profiles for each month. They show
that the price reduction depends on the level of the installed renewable capacity and
quantify the effect in the case of an elastic demand at 0.55 EUR/MWh per GW and in
the case of a nearly inelastic demand at 0.61 EUR/MWh per GW.
Using a fundamental merit-order model of the German electricity system that
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separates between 34 different power plant types, Weber andWoll (2007) find that
in 2006 the feed-in of wind leads to a short-term price reduction of 4.04 EUR/MWh
when compared to a scenario with no wind feed-in. However, if the wind capacity is
replaced by alternative hypothetical power plants, they expect a medium-term price
effect of −0.40 EUR/MWh and long-term effect of −1.00 EUR/MWh.
In another study,Weigt (2009) carries out an analysis of the effects of wind energy by
applying a model of the Germany electricity market that minimizes unit commitment,
start-up andmarginal costs without taking into account cross-border flows. Although
the results show that the installed capacity cannot significantly reduce fossil capacities,
it, however, does reduce the average wholesale market price. In line with the growing
wind capacity, the price reduction from to 2006 until mid-year 2008 is estimated to
range from 6.26 to 13.13 EUR/MWh. Based on the work of Traber and Kemfert (2009),
Traber and Kemfert (2011) apply an optimization model (ESYMMETRY) to analyze
the impact of wind energy in Germany. Compared to the prices of a counterfactual
scenario with no wind feed-in, the historical wholesale electricity prices from winter
2007 to autumn 2008 are on average 3.7 EUR/MWh higher. In a subsequent study,
Traber et al. (2011) compare two scenarios for the German electricity market in 2020,
one baseline scenario with an expansion of renewable capacities and one scenario
with no further expansion of renewable capacities but increased coal power plant
capacity. Here, the additional electricity production of renewable energies is expected
to lead to a price reduction of 3.2 Euro/MWh.
Ederer (2015) analyzes the historical and expected impact of offshore wind in
Germany from 2007 to 2019. Instead of constructing a detailed fundamental model,
they use original market data for ask and the supply bids and implement the market
clearing algorithm used at the EPEX SPOT. For scenarios with additional wind capacity,
a short and a long-term effect are incorporated, i.e., additional electricity supply bids
at low variable costs and the replacement of base-load capacity. The simulation
suggests that on short-term decreasing prices are related to the excess of supply, but
on long-term market average prices do not change due to additional wind generation
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as base-load power plants are replaced. However, due to the limited availability of
wind compared with thermal capacities, the electricity price shows increased volatility.
Contrary to most studies that focus on the day-ahead market, Kallabis et al. (2016)
introduce a parsimonious model for the electricity futures market and analyze the
development of the German futures prices from 2007 to 2014. They obtain the result
that the volatile carbon emission allowances price was by far themost important driver
of electricity priceswith an effect of 14.26 EUR/MWh–more than the combined impact
of changes triggered by the demand, renewables and fuel prices (10.05 EUR/MWh).
However, according to their results, the overall contribution margin of the power
plants was affected the most by the regressing demand followed by the increasing
electricity production from renewables. Moreover, they find that the effect of the
carbon price on the margins is twofold, whereas gas-fired and nuclear units face
decreasing margins, the more carbon-intensive technologies such as coal and lignite-
fueled power plants could increase their profits.
Time series models
In contrast to the previous studies that represent the electricity system by using
bottom-up modeling approaches, the articles presented in following paragraphs rely
on econometric concepts, especially regression models to analyze the drivers of
wholesale electricity prices.
O’Mahoney and Denny (2011) develop an hourly multiple linear regression model
for the Irish electricity market. They find that in 2009 the electricity price is 12% lower
due to electricity generation from wind and with additionally installed wind capacity
the electricity price decreases by 9.9 EUR/MWh per GW. In a subsequent study, in
order to analyze the generator behavior in the Irish electricity market, O’Mahoney
and Denny (2013) construct a multiple linear regression model with a set of variables
that includes the fuel/carbon prices, the marginal capacity and the net demand that is
covered by the conventional supply. They apply the model to hourly data from 2009
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and show that the Irish price mainly depends on the gas price, the net demand and the
marginal capacity. The coefficients of coal and oil price are not significant which they
explain by the fact that in Ireland about 60% of the conventional capacities consist
of gas-fired power plants. Additionally, the model is run as a separate regression for
each hour of the day, which improves the results and shows that the influence of fuel
prices is time-dependent.
In another piece of research, Würzburg et al. (2013) analyze the effects of the
electricity generation of photovoltaics and wind for the German–Austrian market
area via a multiple linear regression model that amongst others includes the load, gas
price, and cross-border flows. With data from July 2010 to June 2012, they quantify the
impact of the wind and photovoltaic feed-in at about 1 EUR/MWh per GWh, which
they describe as counterintuitive as the photovoltaic feed-in correlates typically with
a higher demand contrary to the wind feed-in. Moreover, the decommissioning
of about 7GW of nuclear capacity did not alter the price reduction of wind power
and photovoltaics. Interestingly, in their results, the coefficient of the import-export
electricity is insignificant even though exports changed drastically subsequently to
the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in 2011.
Cludius et al. (2014) analyze the distributional effects of the rising renewable genera-
tion for different types of electricity customers by developing a multivariate regression
model of the electricity price similar to Gelabert et al. (2011). They find that the elec-
tricity generation by photovoltaics and wind has reduced the electricity price by
6 EUR/MWh in 2010 and 10 EUR/MWh in 2012, which energy-intensive industries
benefit from as, in contrast to private households, the industries cover only a small
share of the passed through charges. Additionally, they carry out a prognosis for 2016
and estimate the price reduction to be around 14 to 16 EUR/MWh, depending on the
different regarded expansion paths of renewable energies.
In a recent analysis, Dehler et al. (2016) focus on the Swiss electricity market and
its interdependencies with neighboring countries in the timeframe of 2011 to 2014.
For each hour of the day, they apply a multiple linear regression model and show that
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during summer the electricity price and the feed-in from renewables in Germany
affect the Swiss price although during winter, peak load situations in Italy and France
are correlated with high prices on the Swiss market. Even though no large gas-fired
power plants are installed in Switzerland, their results show the gas price influences the
Swiss price with a coefficient of 0.25 EUR/MWh and 0.81 EUR/MWh during summer
and winter respectively, which is explained by the important role of gas in the Italian
market.
Evaluating the effects of the nuclear moratorium in Germany in March of 2011,
Thoenes (2014) develops a semiparametric cointegration model that incorporates
daily prices of carbon emission allowances, natural gas, and electricity. Day-ahead
electricity prices are used to calibrate the model, and future prices before and after
the moratorium decision are analyzed to quantify the direct impact of the reduced
available capacity and the increase in the gas and carbon emission allowance prices.
The results indicate that the change of the gas and carbon emission allowances price
is insufficient to explain the increase in the futures electricity prices. Immediately
after the decision, futures electricity prices showed a capacity effect of 6GW, but after
several trading days, this effect decreased, which might be attributed to adaption
effects, e.g., different exchange flows.
Instead of applying a classical linear regression model, Paraschiv et al. (2014) take
a different approach by developing a dynamic fundamental model, which is used to
analyze the impact of fuel and carbon prices as well as wind and photovoltaics on the
day-ahead electricity price in Germany. By using separate time-varying coefficients
for each hour of the day, they show how the impact of the fundamental variables
depends on the load profile. For example, the effect of wind is highly dynamic, in
hours at night with a low demand the impact of wind can lead to drastic price changes,
and even negative prices might occur. Regarding the fuel prices, the investigation
states that the coal price has a strong effect in hours with a typically higher demand,
e.g., 12 and 18, where coal-fired power plants are often submitting the price-setting
bid, and the influence of the gas price is strongest in peak-demand hours as gas-fired
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power plants usually have higher marginal costs than coal-fired units. However, due
to the growing electricity production of photovoltaics, the effect of the gas price
decreased over time. Furthermore, they find that the impact of the carbon emissions
allowances price is higher in low demand hours, which is related to the fact that coal
or lignite-fueled power plants produce more CO2 emissions than gas-fired power
plants.
In summary, the literature review shows the broad range of different approaches
that are used to analyze the price impact of especially renewable energy sources.
As the sharp price decline in wholesale prices from 2011 to 2015 is not sufficiently
analyzed in the existing literature, this study enhances the literature by focusing on
this extraordinary development of the German wholesale electricity prices in this
study. However, as many other European electricity markets face the same price
decline triggered more or less by the same drivers, the analysis can be transferred
to other spot markets going through similar changes like the switch to renewable
energies.
Whereas other studies apply a single method, which has its specific limitations, dif-
ferent modeling approaches are applied to the same research question to derive robust
results taking into account these limitations. Moreover, robust results are provided by
comparing two different years, thus, the stochastic influences e.g. a stronger or weaker
wind year should have less importance. Contrary to other approaches, e.g. Kallabis
et al. (2016), the agent-based model applied in this study is able to incorporate, for
example, different market players, ramping costs and strategic behavior.
92 the decline of electricity prices
4.2 Modeling approach
In order to analyze the price development in theGerman electricitymarket, a threefold
approach featuring a standard linear regression, a dynamic regression, and an agent-
based simulation model is adopted and described in the following subsections (for
an overview see Table 4.2). In this way, the results of the models applying the same
data can directly be compared, and the strength and weaknesses of each approach can
be considered. A linear regression model, for example, relies on strict assumptions
such as the homogeneity of variance or the absence of multicollinearity in the input
data that cannot always be ensured (e.g., Berry and Feldman, 1985). Additionally,
non-linear dynamic effects, for instance the shutdown of several nuclear power plants
in 2011 in Germany, are challenging to implement. In contrast to linear regression
models, agent-based models can integrate these effects, but rely on detailed data that
is not always publicly available—e.g., the efficiency of power plants or the local heat
demand that companies often treat as trade secrets—and hence assumptions have to
be made that are difficult if not impossible to verify.
4.2.1 Linear regression model
A multivariate regression model similar to O’Mahoney and Denny (2013) is used,
where the hourly day-ahead electricity price pt is the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables consist of the hourly load loadt, the hourly forecasted feed-in
from photovoltaics solarForecastt and wind windForecastt and the lagged daily prices
for natural gas gasPricet−24, hard coal coalPricet−24 and CO2 emission allowances
carbonPricet−24.4 Seasonal dummies dst are introduced to reflect systematic changes
in the demand and the planned non-availability of power plants, which usually is
4 Similar toWürzburg et al. (2013), it is found that the electricity exchange with neighboring countries
was most often insignificant and alternated between having a positive or negative impact. This is
probably related to the fact that the exchange flows strongly depend on the expected price differences
with neighboring markets and as these differences are not included in the model, it is challenging to
interpret the exchange flows in itself. Thus, the exchange is excluded from the regression.
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Table 4.2 | Characteristics of the applied models. The input data required for the
models increases from linear to agent-based models, as well as the complexity and
the effort required for their maintenance. As a result, they are primarily suitable for
different applications.
Objective Strength Weakness
Linear
regression
model
Explain dependent
variable (electricity
price) through
regressors, e.g.,
demand, wind
Easy to implement,
wide-spread method
Multi-correlations
have to be ruled out
(Belsley et al., 1980),
non-linear dynamic
effects cannot be
captured, e.g., the
shutdown of several
nuclear power plants
Dynamic
fundamen-
tal
model
Capturing the
varying influence of
fundamental
parameters on
dependent variable
Dynamic influences
can be considered
while keeping a
closed mathematical
structure
Estimation of
coefficients is
complex, the system
of equations requires
many parameters
(Bai et al., 2013)
Agent-
based
model
Detailed bottom-up
model of relevant
system, e.g., power
plants, market
players
Imperfect markets
and private
information can be
included, scenarios
Time-consuming
implementation,
decision-making
rules hard to validate
higher during the summer and, hence, affects the fuel mix. Instead of choosing
dummies to capture the daily and weekly patterns in the electricity prices that are
caused by the different typical demand curves, which, e.g., are lower at night and on
weekends, the regression was applied for each combination of the day type, either
a working day or a non-working day t ↦ d ∈ {WD,WE}, and the hour of the day
t ↦ h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 24}:
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Table 4.3 | Test for multicollinearity for the 12 hour on working days. According
to Belsley et al. (1980), it is most important to first focus on the highest condition
number (condIdx), which shows moderate values and, thus, further analysis is of in-
terest. In a next step, the corresponding variance-decomposition proportions need
to be analyzed.
condIdx intercept load wind pv gas coal carbon dum1 dum2 dum3
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2.52 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.05
2.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.15
3.83 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.00
5.12 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.06
6.85 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.24 0.39 0.39
9.30 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.22
22.98 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.39 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.06
32.17 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.88 0.60 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.03
83.45 0.97 0.93 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.04
pt =β0h,d + βloadh,d Loadt + βwindh,d windForecastt + βsolarh,d solarForecastt+ βgash,dgasPricet−24 + βcoalh,d coalPricet−24 + βcarbonh,d carbonPricet−24+∑3i=1 β ih,ddst + єt if d(t) = d ∧ h(t) = h
(4.1)
As the estimation of the β-factors can be affected negatively by multicollinearity,
ideally, all exogenous variables should be uncorrelated. Although for some of the
exogenous variables no relationship is expected, e.g., the emission allowances price
and the wind feed-in, others might influence each other, for example, the fuel prices.
In order to test formulticollinearity, a condition number test was carried out (Belsley et
al., 1980). The test results do not indicate severe multicollinearity, but there is a strong
relationship between the intercept and the load as well as a moderate dependency
between the emission allowances, coal and gas price (Table 4.3).
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Table 4.4 | Statistical outliers in the German day-ahead electricity
prices. The number of statistical outliers in the period from 2011
to 2015 is comparatively low and averages only 0.35%. Further-
more, it can be noted that more than half of the statistical outliers
occur in 2012. Source: EPEX SPOT (2018b).
prices < −25 EUR/MWh prices > 100 EUR/MWh
occurrences percentage occurrences percentage
2011 3 0.03% 11 0.13%
2012 23 0.26% 60 0.68%
2013 15 0.17% 17 0.19%
2014 16 0.18% 0 0.00%
2015 8 0.09% 0 0.00%
Outlier
The electricity prices from 2011 to 2015 contain only few outliers (see Table 4.4).
However, these outliers, the upper as well as the lower ones, can significantly affect
the results of the regression. Although outliers can contain valuable information
and do not necessarily have a negative effect on the reliability of the results (Belsley
et al., 1980), in this case the coefficient of determination R2 improved considerably
if the outliers were excluded from the calculation of the coefficients. In order to
identify the outliers, the iterative process proposed by Trück et al. (2007) is applied.
In a first step, all outliers are determined as prices that are outside of the interval
I = [−3σ + x˜ , x˜ + 3σ] where σ denotes the variance and x˜ the median of the electricity
prices. This step is then repeated until all prices lie within the interval I.
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4.2.2 Dynamic fundamental model
Similar to Paraschiv et al. (2014) and Karakatsani and Bunn (2008), a state space
model with time-varying regression coefficients for the day-ahead electricity prices
is developed. Applying an approach with time-varying coefficients is based on the
assumption that the price formation is continuously adapting to the changing funda-
mental factors, e.g., sudden decommission of nuclear capacities, European market
integration, new regulatory policies (e.g., market stability reserve) or new market
rules (e.g., negative prices or block bids). Using a time-varying model has already
proven to be effective in the studies of, e.g., Mount et al. (2006) or Karakatsani and
Bunn (2010).
Similar to the linear regression model, the dynamic fundamental model is im-
plemented for each hour of the day, so daily patterns, e.g., hours with high or low
demand can be analyzed separately, yet in contrast, for this model only working days
are included. This is related to the fact that coal, gas or carbon emission allowances
are only traded on working days and thus for weekends/holidays no separate values
exist which, however, are required for an adequate calibration.5
The incorporated variables differ slightly from the linear regression model with
constant parameters. In order to deal with autocorrelation and include price signals,
the lagged electricity price from the previous day for same hour of day is used. The
lagged price should have a positive reinforcing influence on the current price, as
extreme electricity prices tend occur within a short time frame (Huisman andMahieu,
2003). The model is then formulated as follows:
yi ,t = Xi ,t bi ,t + єi ,t (4.2)
5 For the linear regression model, the fuel price on weekends/holidays equals the last available traded
price as the model does not take into account the price difference from the previous day. However, this
approach is not applicable to the time-varying regression model that relies on the changes between
time steps.
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bi ,t = bi ,t−1 + ηi ,t (4.3)
where for i ∈ {1, . . . , 24}
bi ,t = (b0i ,t , bloadi ,t , bwindi ,t , bsolari ,t , bgasi ,t , bcoali ,t , bcarboni ,t , bexchangei ,t , bmeanlag−1i ,t )′
Xi ,t = (x0i ,t , x loadi ,t , xwindi ,t , xsolari ,t , xgasi ,t , xcoali ,t , xcarboni ,t , xexchangei ,t , xmeanlag−1i ,t )
ηi ,t ∼ N (0, Qi)
єi ,t ∼ N (0, Ri)
E (єi ,tηi ,t) = 0
Qi = diag (σ2i ,0, . . . , σ2i ,meanlag−1)
Equation (4.3) is called the transition equation and describes the change of the
regression coefficients over time. Equation (4.2) represents themeasurement equation,
which relates the vector of the exogenous variables Xi ,t to the electricity price yi ,t.
For the calibration of the model, first, the covariance matrices Qi and Ri , which
are assumed to be constant over time, are calculated with the maximum likelihood
estimation. Afterward, the coefficients bi ,t−1 of the different fundamental factors are
estimated with the Kalman Filter. This is done for each step t taking into account only
the information that is already available at that time. Subsequently, for each hour of
the day, the dynamic influence of the regarded factors can be analyzed.
4.2.3 Agent-based simulation model
In addition to the previously described regression models, an agent-based bottom-up
model of the German electricity market is chosen. Agent-based models have already
served as a tool to assess a wide range of research questions in the context of electricity
markets (Guerci et al., 2010; Ringler et al., 2016; Weidlich and Veit, 2008). Depending
on the scope, each model features a specific architecture, e.g., included market areas,
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timely resolution, and a different set of agents. These sets usually contain agents
that represent the most relevant market participants who interact with other agents,
who make their own decisions based on public and private information and learn
from their past behavior (Tesfatsion, 2006). One major advantage of the agent-based
approach is that imperfect markets such as oligopolies can be represented.
As reliable input data is essential for obtaining accurate results—especially for a
bottom-upmodel that requires vast amounts of information—data needs to be chosen
with care. For the model, all power plants of capacity larger than 10MW are included
with their techno-economic characteristics—i.e., efficiency, net capacity, fuel—based
on an official list provided by the BNetzA (2016d). As national grid restrictions do
not influence the day-ahead price formation in Germany, the German market area is
regarded as a “copper plate.”
In this model, the day-ahead market is operated by a central agent who receives
bids from the different demand and supply agents. The supply side is modeled with a
high level of detail. In order to determine the bids for its plants, each electric supply
agent follows a multistep process. First, the price of the next day is forecasted. Based
on the forecasted prices as well as the techno-economic restrictions, such as the
start-up time of the power plant, a possible operating schedule is determined. Then,
the supply agents submit hourly bids that include the variable costs and, in case the
power plant is not already running, linear distributed start-up costs. To avoid start-up
costs, block bids with a price below the variable costs can be placed for a base-load
power plant, e.g., in a situation with high wind feed-in where the unit is expected to
be out of the market for several hours. Thus, negative prices can be simulated as well.
Different renewable energy sources, e.g., photovoltaics, wind, biomass, running water,
are incorporated in the model. Based on hourly profiles, bids for each renewable
technology are submitted by the grid operator. As the model focuses on the German
electricity market, the exchange with other countries is represented by an exchange
agent that trades the historical exchange volumes.
After all agents have submitted their bids, the market operator determines the
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market-clearing price and the accepted volume for all bids. The electric supply agents
then determine the dispatch off their power plants for the next day and learn from
their profits.
A more thorough description of the model as well as validation of the model’s
results is provided by Bublitz et al. (2014a).
4.3 Data and model validation
In this section, an overview of the different data sources and a descriptive analysis of
the price drivers in the regarded period from 2011 to 2015 is provided. Subsequently,
this information is used to validate the different selected models.
4.3.1 Data sources
As the day-aheadmarket price can be seen as an hourly reference price for the German
electricity market, the German/Austrian day-ahead market price at EPEX SPOT was
chosen for the analysis in the next section. Whereas the intraday market could have
been chosen as well, in comparison the total trading volumes on the day-ahead
market are several times higher. In order to adequately model the day-ahead price,
all other data should represent the day-ahead level of information as more recent
information was not available to the market participants when submitting their bids
to the EPEX SPOT.
The hourly German electricity load Load∗t is published by the EuropeanNetwork of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E, 2016). As the total monthly
load values do not cover the total monthly consumption, e.g., 95% for 2014 and 97%
for 20156, a constant for each month and year cy,m is added to the hourly load values
6 This difference is mainly caused by the decentralized electricity generation and consumption in the
grids of larger municipal utilities or industrial companies (BMWi, 2013).
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so that 100% of the consumption is represented.7
Loadt = Load∗t + cm,y (4.4)
Due to the stochastic nature of the electricity generation from solar and wind, market
participants do not have knowledge of the exact next-day electricity feed-in from solar
and wind when participating in the day-ahead market and need to rely on forecasted
values. Although each market participant uses undisclosed forecasts methods, there
exists a publicly available forecast from each transmission system operators for their
network area. Even though the data is usually published around 6 p.m. on the previous
day and thus usually not available to the market participants when submitting their
bids to the day-ahead auction, which takes place at 12 a.m, it is assumed that this
forecast is a reliable approximation of the different forecasts of the market participants.
As the forecasted feed-in differs from the total yearly feed-in published by the BMWi
(2016c), the forecast is scaled by a parameter cy:
Windt = cy ⋅Wind∗t (4.5)
Due to the time-consuming transport, coal is not traded on the spot but derivatives
market at the EEX. For the analysis in the next section, the monthly futures of the coal
reference index API 2 at the ARA inland ports (API2-CIF-ARA-Coal-Month-Future)
are used.
Since October 2011, there are two market areas for the trading of natural gas in Ger-
many, GASPOOL that spans from North to East Germany and NetConnect Germany
(NCG) from South to West Germany. For both market areas, a daily reference price is
published at the EEX. The arithmetical average of these reference prices is then used
for the case study.
7 Although a linear scaling factor could also be applied, in some cases this results in unreasonably
high load values, thus, adding a monthly constant is the better option.
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Table 4.5 | Overview of the main input data. The data shows opposing
trends. On the one hand, the feed-in from photovoltaics and wind
is rising. On the other hand, the average load and the coal price are
decreasing. Futhermore, the development of the carbon and natural
gas price, is more volatile and shows no clear trend. Source: EEX (2016);
ENTSO-E (2016).
Load PV Wind Gas price Coal price Carbon price
[GW] [GW] [GW] [EUR/MWh] [EUR/MWh] [EUR/EUA]
20
11
Mean 62.13 2.24 5.56 22.78 12.48 12.97
SD 11.15 3.31 4.67 1.42 0.42 2.88
Min 35.96 0.00 0.29 15.27 11.67 6.50
Max 88.48 13.94 24.50 26.18 14.24 16.84
20
12
Mean 61.46 3.00 5.75 25.16 10.46 7.37
SD 11.12 4.53 4.57 2.07 0.62 0.71
Min 35.98 0.00 0.25 20.24 9.41 5.71
Max 87.03 20.64 24.46 40.25 12.34 9.31
20
13
Mean 60.57 3.54 5.89 27.16 8.84 4.48
SD 10.16 5.54 5.01 1.79 0.48 0.67
Min 36.95 0.00 0.30 25.20 7.97 2.68
Max 82.32 24.59 27.67 39.48 9.84 6.53
20
14
Mean 60.43 3.99 6.37 21.13 8.09 5.95
SD 10.67 6.03 5.55 3.01 0.30 0.70
Min 36.00 0.00 0.30 15.36 7.53 4.35
Max 83.03 25.61 29.72 28.28 8.93 7.24
20
15
Mean 59.50 4.39 10.01 19.88 7.21 7.67
SD 10.74 6.68 8.31 2.04 0.57 0.58
Min 35.26 0.00 0.55 13.40 6.00 6.42
Max 81.57 27.84 43.45 24.24 8.23 8.65
For the carbon price, the settlement price of the European Emission Allowances
(EUA) of the relevant trading phase (II or III) at the EEX is applied. As no price exists
for a weekend day or holiday, in this case, the last available price is extrapolated.
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4.3.2 Descriptive analysis of the price drivers
An overview of the yearly averages, the standard deviation, the minimum and maxi-
mum for each of the selected fundamental variables is provided in Table 4.5. Several
conflicting trends can be identified: From 2011 to 2015 the load and the coal prices are
decreasing, whereas the feed-in from photovoltaics and wind is increasing. The gas
price shows a more volatile development, first the price rises until 2013 and afterward
drops to a lower level than in 2011. By contrast, the price of emission allowances falls
until 2013 and then increases but stays behind the average value of 2011. The yearly
standard deviation as well as the range of the emission allowances, hard coal, and
natural gas price are relatively low in comparison to the load and the feed-in from
wind and photovoltaics.
As OTC transactions only account for a minor volume of the short-term electricity
trades, the day-ahead price for the German-Austrian market area can be regarded as
a reference price. Electricity producers offer their conventional capacities based on
their variable costs that mainly consists of fuel, emission allowances and operation
and maintenance costs. Figure 4.2 shows these capacities sorted ascending by their
variable costs (merit order curve) for the years 2011 and 2015. Base-load power plants,
i.e., nuclear and lignite-fired power plants have the lowest variable costs, followed
by coal and gas-fired power plants and peak load oil-fired units. The shut-down of
roughly 11GW of nuclear capacities in 2011 shifted the whole curve to the left, which
alters the electricity price in most hours, as the minimum load from 2011 to 2015 is
roughly 35GW (see Table 4.5). This effect is partially compensated by the growing
feed-in from wind and photovoltaics that increased from 2011 to 2015 on average by
6.6GW. Moreover, the low carbon and coal price lead to increased competitiveness of
coal-fired power plants. As the gas price has only slightly decreased and gas-fired fuel
plants are not as strongly affected by the lower carbon price, gas-fired power plants –
even those with a high efficiency – cannot compete with coal-fired power plants in
2015.
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Figure 4.2 | The merit order of the conventional capacities in Germany. When ex-
amining the different merit orders, two aspects stand out. First, the total capacity
has been severely reduced as a result of the nuclear phase-out. Second, the marginal
costs, especially for coal and gas-fired power plants, are sharply lower. Sources: EEX
(2016); BNetzA (2016d).
104 the decline of electricity prices
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the residual load8 and electricity prices. It
can be observed that an increase of the load usually results in a higher market price. If
the residual load falls below a certain level and base-load power plants for some hours
are forced to be turned off, negative prices can occur due to slow ramping rates, start-
up costs and the obligation to provide system services such as the provision of primary
reserve capacity. Negative prices strongly depend on the number of operational base-
load plants and mostly occur at night, when a low demand coincides with a high
feed-in from wind.
4.3.3 Model validation
In the following, a brief overview of the adequacy of the selected models for the price
analysis described in the next section is given. Whereas the linear regression model
and the agent-based model yield valid results, the results of the dynamic fundamental
model are only of limited informative value.
The linear regression model has a high explanatory power with R2 ranging from
0.69 to 0.83 (see Table 7.6). Also, as shown in Bublitz et al. (2014a, 2015a,b); Keles et al.
(2016a), the agent-based simulation model is well capable of representing electricity
market dynamics. Seasonal, weekly and daily patterns are adequately represented,
which results in significant statistical figures, e.g., a R2 above 0.75 or a mean absolute
error (MAE) below 4.
However, the results of the dynamic fundamental model are of limited benefit
for this analysis, even though the statistical figures show that the model possesses a
high explanatory power (see Table 4.6). Although highly volatile factors such as the
wind feed-in or load are adequately captured within the model, the coefficients of
less volatile price drivers are insignificant most of the time or if significant, possess
values that are non-plausible from a fundamental economic perspective. In contrast
8 Here the residual load is defined as the load subtracted by the electricity generation from wind and
photovoltaics.
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Figure 4.3 | The hourly day-ahead prices in the market area Germany/Austria as a
function of the residual load for the years 2010–2015. The scatter diagrams for each
year are similar to the corresponding annual merit order curves. Although in extreme
situations, either with a very low or a very high residual load, the different values
deviate more strongly from each other. Negative electricity prices usually occur incase
the residual load drops below 30GW. However, this is influenced by the availability
and flexibility of the base load power plants as well as the duration of a low-load
period. If maintenance work is carried out on many power plants at the same time,
the limit from which negative prices occur can be lower. For example, in 2015, despite
a residual load of less than 14GW, there were no negative prices in certain hours.
Sources: EEX (2018a); ENTSO-E (2016).
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to the other obtained results, the dynamic model states that, e.g., an increasing coal
price lowers the electricity price in peak hours by a factor of about 2. This is related
to the fact that the calibration of the model is based on daily changes. However, a
gradual development, e.g., the decline of the coal price that extends over several
years, has an almost negligible short-term effect in comparison with the changes
of the wind or photovoltaic feed-in. Strong daily changes or price shocks which
could improve the results, only occur once in the regarded period, when the gas
price increases from about 24 to 40 EUR/MWh within a few days. Besides this single
significant change, there are no remarkable changes in the fuel prices in the short
term. Therefore, the dynamic model cannot determine plausible beta coefficients for
the long-term developing fuel prices. This approach can determine short-term effects
quite well but indeed fails for the analysis of the mid- and long-term effect, which is at
the focal point of this study. Hence, the linear regression model and the agent-based
model are used in the following to analyze the rather long-term price development
between 2011 and 2015.
4.4 Analysis of the price decline
In this section, an analysis of the decline of the German wholesale electricity prices
based on historical data is carried out. First, the models from Section 4.2 are applied,
then the price effect of the different fundamental factors is calculated and compared
to existing studies. Then, it is shown how the development of the electricity price is
affected by the selected fundamental factors in two scenarios.
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Table 4.6 | Results of the linear regression and the dynamic funda-
mental model. Although both models have similar explanatory power,
the values as well as the significance of the fundamental factors differ
greatly and, as in the case of coal, even show a sign change for the 3
and 18 hour of the day.
Hour 3 12 18
Model Dynamic Linear Dynamic Linear Dynamica Linear
Observations 1247 1250 1247 1258 1222 1227
R2 0.77 0.71 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.71
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.71 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.71
MAE 3.17 3.75 3.63 4.38 5.30 5.49
MAPE 0.91 1.05 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10
MAPE*b 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10
RMSE 5.19 5.08 4.82 5.57 7.63 7.07
prob bcarboni,t 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.45 0.00
prob bcoali,t 0.15 0.04 0.73 0.00 0.01 0.00
prob bgasi,t 0.47 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.93 0.00
avg bcarboni,t −0.14 1.16 0.77 1.11 0.78 0.84
avg bcoali,t −0.78 0.25 0.20 0.93 −2.37 0.94
avg bgasi,t 0.13 0.22 0.59 0.62 1.02 1.08
a The first 25 values are not included for the calibration with the dy-
namic model as they contain a price jump, which strongly distorts the
statistical figures, e.g., resulting in a RMSE close to 100.
b Due to the large impact of prices close to zero on the MAPE, all his-
torical prices in the interval [-1, 1] are filtered for the calculation of the
MAPE*.
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4.4.1 Impact of each price driver
Based on the datamentioned above and the differentmodeling approaches introduced
in Section 4.2, the main drivers for the electricity price development at the EPEX SPOT
market is analyzed, especially the price reduction between 2011 and 2015. Therefore,
the price reduction effect itself weighted with the hourly load in the analyzed year
will be determined. The relative price effect will be calculated with the help of the
regression model as well as with the agent-based simulation model. In the case of the
regression model, the coefficients of the analyzed fundamental drivers will be used to
determine the effect:
pe(x,T) = ∑t∈T βxd(t),h(t) ⋅ xt ⋅ Loadt∑
t∈T Loadt
(4.6)
In the case of the simulation model, two different runs are carried out. The first
run is done by using the historical numbers of the analyzed fundamental parameter,
e.g., carbon prices, and year, the second run is carried out by fixing the value of the
analyzed parameter at the level of 2011, whereas the others remain the same as in the
first run. The difference of electricity prices from both runs represents then the price
(reduction) effect pe of the analyzed parameter:
pe(x,T) = ∑t∈T (pxt − preft ) ⋅ Loadt∑
t∈T Loadt
(4.7)
Based on themodels’ results and the definedmeasures for the price reduction effect,
the impact of main price drivers is analyzed in the following. Surprisingly, the price
impact of the strong expansion of photovoltaics (from 2011 to 2015) in the last four
years is not as strong as mentioned in recent public discussions (in total 2.1 EUR/MWh
calculated with the agent-based model between 2011 and 2015 and 2.4 EUR/MWh with
the regression model respectively). The impact of wind power, however, seems to be
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Figure 4.4 | Price effect in 2014. The effects in the year 2014 can be divided into three
groups. The first group, consisting of export and capacity, has negative effects. This
is followed by a group with a slight positive influence consisting of gas, solar, demand
and wind. At the end comes a group with carbon and coal which shows a significant
positive effect.
stronger, especially if the year 2015 is examined. The strong increase in German wind
installations (on- and offshore) in 2015 combined with a windy year leads to a more
significant wind merit-order effect. The price reduction resulting from wind power
feed-in increased from 2014 to 2015. Whereas in 2014 values were below 1 EUR/MWh,
in 2015, the agent-based and the regression model calculated values of 3.3 EUR/MWh
and 4.4 EUR/MWh respectively. Both models determined a significant wind effect,
which is, however, still below the price reduction effect of carbon or coal prices.
As illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the decrease of coal and carbon prices has by
far contributed the strongest to the price reduction between 2011 and 2014 or 2015.
The regression model calculates a stronger price impact for the coal price than the
agent-based simulation, whereas for carbon prices it is vice versa. However, both
models determine these two parameters as the main price reducers with a total price
reduction effect of almost 11 EUR/MWh.
The results of the agent-based model also show that the price reduction between
2011 and 2015 would be even stronger if there were the same amount of capacities in
the market as in 2011. The decrease of power plant capacities in the German electricity
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Figure 4.5 | Price effect in 2015. As in 2014, different groups can be identified. While
the first group consists of export and capacity and has a negative effect, the division
into further groups is no longer as distinct. For example, carbon and coal exhibit the
strongest effect, but wind and demand also have a significant influence, whereas gas
and solar have a weaker effect.
market (primarily due to the nuclear phase-out) and the growing net electricity
exports lead to a recovery of prices by about 4.30 EUR/MWh and 4.60 EUR/MWh
respectively.
However, there are some differences in the height of the impact of especially coal
and carbon prices determined by the two different models (agent-based and linear
regression model). Compared to the linear regression model, a lower price reduction
effect of carbon prices is determined applying the fundamental agent-based approach.
This may result from the fact that mainly lignite-fueled power plants, as the most
carbon-intensive technology, show a corresponding change in variable costs, but as
base-load power plants, they are rarely price setting. Additionally, the increase in the
electricity price induced by the carbon price is lowered when a fuel switch, e.g., from
coal to gas occurs. These effects are better captured by a fundamental agent-based
model than by a statistical approach, so that price impact is much lower than the one
in the case of the linear regression model. Another explanation of the strong effect of
the regression model might be that it does not include other explanatory variables,
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e.g., the electricity flows with neighboring countries or the German plant fleet, which
may have lead to an overestimation of the betas of the included variables.
In comparison with the regression model, the price effect of coal prices determined
with the agent-based model is about 2 EUR/MWh higher. As the agent-based model
incorporates each power plant with its technical characteristics, it has the strength to
adequately represent changes in the merit-order and hence can provide a reasonable
estimation of the induced price effect. The agent-based model, therefore, can also
deal with non-linear relationships between coal and electricity prices, although the
linear regression model cannot capture these non-linearities and may underestimate
the price reduction effects caused by strong changes in coal prices.
Overall, it can be stated that bothmodels determine the development of the coal and
carbon emission certificate prices as the main source for the reduction of wholesale
electricity prices the German electricity market faces since 2011, although the impact
of the fluctuating renewables is considerably lower. However, the differences in the
renewables effects between 2014 and 2015 show that this effect is growing especially
with the ongoing expansion of wind capacity.
4.4.2 Scenarios for the price effect and economic feasibility of gas-fired
power plants in 2020
In the following, the agent-based and the regression model are used to forecast the
electricity prices in 2020 applying two scenarios for the fuel prices and a scenario
for renewable power production extracted from P3 Energy & Storage (2015). For the
“low” fuel and carbon price scenario, the fuel prices are assumed to remain at the
current level, whereas the 2011 prices are assumed as a “high” price scenario for 2020.
The results indicate that the volume weighted average prices in 2020 will fall to or
even below 30 EUR/MWh, if the fuel and carbon prices stay on today’s level. The
additional reduction is expected to originate from the renewable power expansion
until 2020, as all the other parameters remain on the same level as in 2015. An even
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stronger decrease would be expected without the already planned decommissioning
of power plant capacity, which is considered in the agent-based model. This may also
be the reason why the model predicts a smaller price reduction.
In contrast to the “low” price scenario, a strong increase in electricity prices is
determined by both models in the “high” fuel and carbon price scenario, in which the
electricity prices are expected to reach the 40 EUR/MWh level again. In this scenario,
the fuel and carbon price increase to the level of 2011 would strongly overbalance the
price reduction effect of the additional renewable energy sources (RES) expansion in
the electricity sector.
Based on the electricity price development described above, Table 4.7 shows the
number of hours with a positive spread between the electricity prices and the variable
costs of a CCGT power plant. It is obvious that the number of hours with a positive
spread is further reduced in the “low” fuel and carbon price scenario, although there
is a significant increase in the “high” price scenario. The numbers of positive spread
increase again to more than 2300 and even to 2782 determined by the agent-based
model for the high price scenario. The increase in time with positive spread leads
to a positive annual return for an exemplary CCGT power plant with 55% efficiency
rate, an emission factor of 0.202MWhth, other variable costs of 2 EUR/MWh and
operational fixed costs of 19 000 EUR/MW (Blesl et al., 2012). However, the annual
return is only slightly positive, so that it can be stated that without reaching the level
of 2011 for coal and carbon prices or without further decommissioning of coal and
lignite capacities, it will be difficult for even very efficient CCGT plants to operate
economically feasible. Hence, if carbon and fuel prices remain at the low level of 2015,
another market mechanism will be required to keep this efficient and flexible gas
capacity in the market, especially if it should serve as backup capacity for fluctuant
renewables.
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Table 4.7 | Simulated day-ahead market prices. Volume weighted day-ahead mar-
ket price, hours with a positive clean spark spread (CSS) and annual return under
different fuel scenarios of an exemplary CCGT power plant (efficiency 55%).
Year Scenario Price Annual return of a # hours with
[-] [-] [EUR/MWh] CCGT [kEUR/MW] positive CSS [h]
2011 Historical 51.96 39.68 5338
2014 Historical 34.35 −6.31 2076
2015 Historical 33.05 −3.65 1947
2020 Low Regression 28.26 −8.07 1380
2020 Low ABSM 30.02 −4.18 1547
2020 High Regression 40.29 1.58 2382
2020 High ABSM 40.07 2.77 2782
4.4.3 Comparison of the results with existing studies
To embed these results into the discussion about electricity price drivers, the results
are compared to those in the literature. As most of the existing studies focus only on
the merit order effect of renewables, a comparison based on this criterion is carried
out. This comparison is extended to the comparison of other price drivers analyzing
the relative effect of these parameters, as there is hardly any study analyzing exactly
price decline between 2011 and 2015. That is why the relative effect is also calculated
from the absolute values described in other studies about price drivers.
However, at first, the regression model is applied to determine the total effect of
fluctuant renewable energy sources. The price reduction of renewables, i.e. the merit
order effect, is equal to 8 EUR/MWh in total for 2011 and 9 EUR/MWh for 2012, which
is in the range of the merit order effect determined by Sensfuß (2011), who applies an
agent-based model of the German electricity market (see Figure 4.6).
In 2015, the merit order effect of the renewables available in total corresponded to
14.70 EUR/MWh. Cludius et al. (2014) determine a similar effect, whereby they use
estimated values for the electricity prices in 2015. This shows that the hourly linear
regression model introduced in Section 4.2.1 produces similar results for renewable
effect compared to other models.
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Figure 4.6 | Merit order effect in Germany from 2011–2015. The results from Cludius
et al. (2014) for the period from 2013–2015 are taken the scenarios “reference”
(2013/2014) and “high wind” (2015) and thus deviate from the historical feed-in
values.
Comparing the results with Kallabis et al. (2016), who carry out a study for the
decrease of German electricity future prices from 2007 until 2014, a similar relative
price impact9 can be observed for the prices of emission allowances. Kallabis et al.
(2016) calculate an electricity price reduction of 0.72 EUR/MWh per EUR/EUA price
reduction¹0. A relative price effect of 0.70 to 1.09 EUR/MWh EUR/EUA is determined.
This also applies to the effect of renewables, which corresponds to a reduction of
0.13 EUR/MWh per TWh feed-in from RES and is close to the range of the effect of
0.08 to 0.12 EUR/MWh per TWh.¹¹However, there are interdependent effects between
the price of emission allowances and the level of renewable generation. While the
9 Here, a relative effect means that the absolute effect is broken down to the marginal change of a
price driver.
¹0 Kallabis et al. (2016) show only the absolute effect in their study, but the relative effect can be derived
via the base electricity futures with delivery in 2014 that were traded in Q4 2007 and Q4 2013.
¹¹ In a working version of the article, a value of 0.09 EUR/MWh was presented (Kallabis et al., 2015),
closely matching the range in the results here.
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effects are still investigated (Hintermann et al., 2016), in the long term, a demand
reduction induced by an expansion of renewable energies should lower the carbon
price. Nonetheless, for the regarded time period, renewables explain only a small
part of the carbon price variations (Koch et al., 2014; Rickels et al., 2015). Also taking
into account that the expansion of renewable energies in Germany has only a limited
impact on the European level, the interdependent effects should be negligible for the
results of this study.
Regarding the effect of coal and gas prices, the relative effect calculated from the
absolute values of Kallabis et al. (2016) is not indicative due to the small total change
of the price drivers within the analyzed period. However, within the time period
of this study the fuel prices possess a significant development, thus, a strong price
reduction effect for especially coal prices (0.91 to 1.12 EUR/MWhel per EUR/MWhth)
could be determined. That is why the coal price beside the carbon price is determined
as the most influencial price driver between 2011 and 2015, although they only see the
carbon price as the primary driver of future electricity prices between 2007 and 2014.
4.4.4 Critical reflection of the modeling approach and results
Although the models described in Section 4.2 perform quite well to determine elec-
tricity price drivers, which becomes evident from the comparison of the results with
other studies, the applied approaches have still room for improvement. To analyze the
price impact of each influencing parameter between 2011 and 2015, two fundamentally
different models are applied, a linear multiple regression model based on historical
time-series of the prices and their drivers as well as a fundamental agent-based ap-
proach that considers all important system elements of the electricity market. Thereby,
it has to be mentioned that especially the linear regressionmodel is not able to capture
the non-linearities in the price relation. However, as the different regression models
are calibrated for each of hour of the day and a further differentiation for workdays
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and non-workdays is carried out, themodels are applied to relatively similar situations
in which the non-linearity should not severely distort the results.
The applied agent-based model simulates the German electricity system with its
main fundamental elements. However, static import and export flows are used in the
model to describe the electricity exchanges between Germany and its neighboring
countries. This approach does not consider the reciprocal effect between prices and
exports/imports and therefore possible changes in the price impact. In future research,
this issue is to be addressed. However, no significant changes in the price effect of
each price driver is expected, as wholesale prices in the neighboring countries show a
similar development in the last years as the German electricity price and hence the
cross-border flows are expected to be stable after varying a price parameter.
Additionally, the static approach used for the determination of the price effect needs
to be addressed as well. More detailed, all other parameters are fixed at the level of 2015
and only the analyzed parameter between the values of 2011 and 2015 is changed. Thus,
effects that a parameter would have on the other influencing parameters, if it stayed at
the level of 2011, e.g., the lower availability of wind power would influence the exports
are not regarded. As a smaller period of four to five years is regarded, in which no
substantial differences in investments in power plants are expected, and the structure
of the energy system may not severely change, the model error without considering
the interdependencies is assumed to be rather low. Therefore, the calculated price
reductions of each parameter are still meaningful. However, the analysis could be
extended allowing more cross-dependencies in future with applying, e.g., vector
autoregressive models.
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4.5 Conclusions and policy Implications
In this study, the main price drivers for the electricity prices at the EPEX SPOT are
analyzed focusing on their contribution to the price fall between 2011 and 2015 (decline
of about 20 EUR/MWh). Although recent studies have mainly focused on the price
effect of renewable energies, especially photovoltaics and wind, and determined the
so-called merit order effect, in this chapter, the focus is set on the most important
fundamental price drivers that lead to the price reduction in recent years. The results
demonstrate that fuel and carbon prices still have a dominating impact on wholesale
electricity prices and that the drop in coal and carbon prices was the main reason
for the decline of electricity spot prices. Contrary to ongoing discussions, the strong
expansion of photovoltaics in Germany was not the primary price driver, and the
related merit-order effect was not primarily responsible for the sharp decline in
wholesale electricity prices. The additional price effect of photovoltaics between 2011
and 2015 was relatively low compared to the effect of coal and carbon prices. Hence,
the widespread opinion that the merit order effect of renewables is the main reason
for the low prices faced today at wholesale markets has to be at least partly rejected.
The total price effect of renewables since their market introduction makes up 14 to
15 EUR/MWh in Germany and is indeed a strong effect. However, the additional price
effect between 2011 and 2015 is contributing only partly (5.40 EUR/MWh determined
with the agent-based model, 6.80 EUR/MWh with the regression model) to the price
decrease of almost 20 EUR/MWh in this period.
Using different types of models for this analysis proved to be helpful to gain a
thorough understanding of the price impact of the regarded fundamental factors and
to quantify the related uncertainty. As all models have their specific shortcomings, the
application of several models helps to derive robust results. As the linear regression
model can be implemented with relatively little effort, it seems to be a suitable way to
identify themain trends. However, caution has to be paid for substantial input changes
that might result in non-linear effects. In this case, the agent-based bottom-up model
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yielded more plausible results. Nevertheless, the implementation and application of
this type of models are quite complex recent studies have mainly used regression
models. The results of the time-varying regression model are of limited benefit for
this analysis as in contrast to the volatile feed-in of wind and photovoltaics, the price
effect of the gradually changing fuel and carbon prices is not adequately captured.
The linear regression and the agent-based model, however, can also be used to analyze
price effects in other countries and electricity markets, which faced a strong price
decrease in the last years, too.
Furthermore, the price models are used to analyze the income situation and the
annual return of gas power plants, which will still be required in the future energy
system to balance fluctuating renewables. The scenario analysis for 2020 shows that if
the coal and carbon prices recover to the level of 2011, a modern CCGT power plant
can generate enough income to meet the variable and operational fixed costs. In this
situation, the prices are high enough to achieve a slightly positive annual return. This
may be sufficient to keep existing gas-based capacity in the market, but would not
incentivize new investments. However, the development of other parameters, such as
surplus capacities in the electricity market, plays also an essential role in the recovery
of electricity prices and hence for the profitability of gas-fired power plants.
In this context, the decision of the European Commission to establish a market
stability reserve from 2019 on and to take certificates out of the carbon market is
a step towards the right direction. However, it may not be sufficient to completely
remove the oversupply with certificates and thus, to achieve a recovery of certificate
prices. Regarding the development of the current surplus volume in the next years,
additional measures might be necessary to trigger an increase of carbon prices in
order to make the operation of more environment-friendly gas power plants favorable
compared to coal power plants. However, policy measures regarding carbon policy
have to be installed at European level and should even be harmonized worldwide,
as more restrictive national measures without harmonization can lead to “carbon
leakage” or a new surplus of certificates in the EU-ETSmarket.
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If carbon and coal prices remain at the current low level, the economic operation
of gas power plants will be hardly possible, and it will be difficult for energy suppliers
to keep them in the market. In this case, other market mechanisms, such as a capacity
remuneration mechanism, will be required to operate these flexible power plants
profitably and thus, to keep them in the electricity market. However, implementing
newmarket regulations has to be donewith care, as it can disturb themarket operation
resulting in new uncertainties for investors.
Continuing low prices will keep the market value of electricity generated from RES
at a low level as well, which in turn makes higher funding volumes for renewables nec-
essary. Also in this respect, the recovery of the prices of coal and emission allowances
prices is essential.

Chapter5Insights from theoryand real-world implementations
of capacity remuneration mechanisms
Areliable electricity system remains one of the main objectives of energy marketregulators. This objective requires the stimulation of adequate investments
on the supply side by market prices, which are to be high enough to finance not
only the operational but also the fixed costs. However, generating adequate price
signals becomes more and more challenging during the energy transition phase
mainly shaped by the expansion of distributed RES. This intensified the discussion on
demand-supply adequacy and lead to the proposal and in some cases introduction of
mechanisms to remunerate capacity providers. However, the necessity and the design
of capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) is diversely evaluated in the literature.
Due to the already large and still quickly growing number of studies on CRMs¹, it is
increasingly hard to keep an up-to-date overview. As several real-world experiences
in the implementation and administration of CRMs have been gained, reviews have
already been carried out focusing on the practical lessons learned (e.g., Batlle and
Rodilla, 2010; Beckers et al., 2012; Bhagwat et al., 2016b; Karacsonyi et al., 2006; Spees
et al., 2013). However, due to the rapid development and frequent regulatory changes,
¹ In the literature, two other terms—capacity mechanism and capacity markets—are commonly used
as synonyms for capacity remuneration mechanisms. Here, however, capacity markets have a narrower
definition and are considered as a specific variant of the different mechanism to enumerate capacity
(see Section 5.2).
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some of the presented information is already obsolete. Other more broadly oriented
studies provide a systematic description of CRMs as well as a descriptive comparison
(e.g., DNV GL, 2014; Doorman et al., 2016; European Commission, 2016b; Hancher
et al., 2015; Vries, 2007) or focus on the fundamental economic principles of CRMs,
(e.g., Cramton et al., 2013; Stoft, 2002). Beside these studies on theoretical concepts of
market design and CRMs as well as a review of mechanisms implemented in some
countries, to the best knowledge of the authors, there does not exist a comprehensive
review of the discussion and assessment of different design options for the electricity
market in the literature.
Therefore, this chapter aims to guide both, new entrants and advanced researchers,
through the field of electricity market design by providing a comprehensive and up-to-
date overview of market design options. As the topic is well discussed in the literature
and there are several real-world implementations of CRMs today, this chapter aims
not only to review theoretical studies on electricity market design but also to describe
a selection of real-world implementations of CRMs as alternative design options. This
enables the potential reader to gain insights from theoretical approaches and related
studies as well as from practical implementations.
In order to understand why there are so many approaches in theory and practice
and how the discussion about the requirement for alternative design options evolved,
Section 5.1 provides a review of the discussion about generation adequacy and about
the performance of the energy-only market (EOM). Afterward, the focus is set on the
assessment ofmarket design options in the literature, both from a practical perspective
and theoretical perspective. In the practical case, a selection of the most relevant
design options implemented in electricity markets around the world is discussed
(Section 5.2). The theoretical perspective considers the assessment of the impacts
of different design options on regulatory targets, such as generation adequacy and
RES integration (Section 5.3). The review of the latter perspective is carried out in
focusing on the qualitative discussion of limitations and benefits of each market
design option, as well as on the model-based analysis of impacts on different criteria,
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e.g., market welfare, security of supply or incentivizing flexibility. Finally, the main
common findings are discussed, open questions with which researchers are currently
confronted are pointed out, and a set of policy implications is derived (Section 5.4).
5.1 The ongoing debate about securing generation adequacy
The question of whether EOMs generate sufficient price signals to incentivize in-
vestments in generation capacity is closely linked to the specific characteristics of
electricitymarkets, i.e., their long-standing barriers andmore recent challenges. There-
fore, after describing these characteristics, the discussion on generation adequacy is
summarized to show the motivation behind CRMs, to make the review more compre-
hensive and to present the latest findings from the fast-growing literature in a broader
context.
5.1.1 Existing barriers to generation adequacy
The barriers in the electricity sector can be clustered in physical and market-related
ones. Physical barriers are mainly based on the fact that electricity systems need to
balance generation and consumption in each node of the electricity grid at every point
in time, as the disruption of electricity frequency can lead to severe damages, such as
the destruction of connected devices or even the collapse of the entire power system
(Kwoka and Madjarov, 2007). Usually, the most substantial amount of electricity is
already traded several months or years in advance via forward contracts and OTC
markets that allow energy suppliers to hedge their portfolio (Meeus et al., 2005). As
the possibilities to store electricity economically are still limited, and deviations from
the expected consumer demand as well as the unexpected unavailability of generation
capacity induce a need for short-term trading, spot markets usually possess high
liquidity. However, as a certain time between spot market clearing and fulfillment
is still necessary to organize the delivery, current wholesale markets are unable to
capture these temporal and spatial requirements in their clearing process. Hence,
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other market or regulatory mechanisms are required. Furthermore, due to the nature
of the electricity network, a free-rider problem occurs as up to now the network
cannot differentiate between customers with and without contracts guaranteeing a
reliable supply (Lynch andDevine, 2017). Therefore, an EOM design without reliability
contracts cannot discriminate between customers who are willing to pay for reliability
and those who are not (Joskow and Tirole, 2007). These technical properties are
one reason why electricity prices as the outcome of market equilibrium cannot carry
all information and signals necessary for the reliable long-term operation and the
required investments in the generation infrastructure.
One example for market-related barriers are price caps in spot markets, which are a
regulatory barrier introduced to protect consumers and to avoid the abuse of market
power in the absence of demand elasticity (Stoft, 2002). However, as Petitet et al.
(2017) point out, price caps are usually set below the VoLL for political reasons, and
the resulting investments in generation capacity are likely not sufficient to cover the
electricity demand at all times. Even though it is theoretically possible to set shortage
prices or price caps sufficiently high, i.e., equal to the VoLL, in practice its specific
value would have to be determined first, a task often described as difficult or even
impossible to perform (e.g., Cramton et al., 2013; Willis and Garrod, 1997).
Therefore, other measures may be required to replace signals coming from price
spikes and to generate sufficient incentives for investments (Doorman et al., 2016).
These additional measures are to be implemented to address the so-called missing
money problem, which can be defined as the lost earnings beyond the price cap,
especially for peak load power plants (see Figure 5.1b). More detailed, missing money
is that part of these lost earnings that is necessary to cover the investment and all
other fixed costs. For Joskow and Tirole (2007), missing money may also occur due to
premature technical decisions of system operators to avoid market disequilibrium and
brownouts². Furthermore, Newbery (2016a) argues that even if earnings from price
² In the electricity system major failures result in brownouts or blackouts. A blackout is a disruption
in a wider range of an electricity system up to a total collapse of the whole supply whereas a brownout
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spikes are sufficient to cover fixed and capital costs, investors might not be willing to
bear the associated risks and are unable to lay them off through futures and contract
markets. In this case, the problem is referred to as missing market instead of missing
money (Newbery, 1989).
Another problem in current wholesale electricity markets is that large parts of
electricity demand are inelastic from a short-term perspective, e.g., households have a
fixed rate for energy consumption in combinationwith a base rate tariff (Dütschke and
Paetz, 2013) and, thus, do not actively participate in the volatile wholesale market or
show any reaction even to drastic prices changes (Cramton and Stoft, 2005). Therefore,
the marginal costs of base load and with increasing demand peak load power plants
set the market price until the entire demand can no longer be met by the existing
generation capacity (see Figure 5.1a). For this reason, Lynch and Devine (2017) state
that the price signal for reliable supply and generation adequacy can be considered
weak. Keppler (2017) even argues that many problems regarding security of supply
could be solved if the demand side became more elastic and participated in the
market efficiently. Furthermore, Aalami et al. (2010) claim that the implementation
of demand response programs will lead to the reflection of wholesale prices in retail
prices, especially, if new developments change the need for electric services and
new business models are developed for the demand response measures. However,
currently, the main burden of balancing the system to guarantee the reliable operation
of the electricity grid in the short term and to ensure generation adequacy in the long
term lies on the supply side.
implies an excessively reduced voltage that can result in equipment failure, e.g., overheating of electric
motors (Blume, 2007).
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Figure 5.1 | Price setting in scarcity situations. a) The equilibrium price p∗ is below
the price cap p¯ and an efficient outcome is achieved. b) The equilibrium price p∗is
above the price cap p¯, however, as the resulting price p∗ is equal to the price cap,
welfare losses occur (missing money).
5.1.2 Recently emerging challenges
In addition to the already mentioned long-standing barriers that exist on wholesale
electricity markets, several recent developments revive the debate about mechanisms
remunerating generation capacity, e.g., the rise of intermittent RES or the market-
related and political uncertainties, such as the phase-out of specific technologies. The
aim of the following paragraphs is, thus, to shed light on these developments.
Driven by the introduction of various subsidy programs, RES have experienced a
remarkable rise³.
Due to the dependence on weather conditions, the generation of photovoltaics
(PV) and wind power is highly intermittent, and especially wind generation is hard to
predict (Newbery, 2016b). As their level of electricity generation is semi-dispatchable,
only a reduction is possible (Di Cosmo and Lynch, 2016; Lynch and Devine, 2017),
³ The rise of RES is, for example, illustrated by the fact that between 2006 and 2016, the worldwide
installed photovoltaic (PV) and wind power capacity grew by a compound annual rate of 48% and
21% to a worldwide installed capacity of 303GW and 487GW by the end of 2016 (REN21, 2017).
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Figure 5.2 | The development of day-ahead prices in major European markets. In the
last years prices show a clear downward trend, apart from the years 2009 and 2010,
which can be regarded as outliers due to the impact of the global economic crisis.
The comparison of the figures for 2008 and 2016 indicates a decline of about 50%
in Germany, France, and Italy, whereas the decline in Spain is about 33%. Sources:
ENTSO-E (2018b); EPEX SPOT (2018b); EEX (2017); OMIE (2017).
an additional need for flexibility is created, which, for example, can be provided by
demand response measures, large-scale storage capacities or power plants with the
ability to quickly ramp up or down (Cepeda and Finon, 2013; Pollitt and Anaya, 2016).
Therefore, without further advancements, intermittent RES are currently unable to
replace dispatchable conventional power plants adequately (Doorman et al., 2016;
Hach et al., 2016) and the need for dispatchable generation capacity remains high.
Moreover, as RES are often located away from the demand centers and the locations
of capacities they replace, grid constraints will play a more pronounced role. RES are
already mentioned as the main driver for grid congestions (Bruninx et al., 2013), and
in the future, supply and demand need to be balanced at different geographical levels,
e.g., at the local, the national or supranational level.
Finally, investors face different uncertainties regarding fuel and electricity prices
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and the regulatory framework, e.g., the nuclear phase-out decision, fossil fuel reduc-
tion or carbon emission targets. Even though the phase-outs affect supply security,
Becker et al. (2016) claim that neither politicians nor scientists discuss lowering the
level of security of supply to achieve a sustainable and affordable system. Beyond that,
in case of an investment decision, the prompt commissioning of generation capacity—
especially for controversial technologies (e.g., carbon capture and storage)—proves
to be another obstacle, as the licensing process is tedious and adds another layer of
uncertainty (Doorman et al., 2016).
5.1.3 The optimal functioning of energy-only markets and the necessity
of capacity remuneration mechanisms
One, maybe the most persuasive, argument in favor of an EOM is that—even in the
absence of an active demand response—resulting market prices are efficient and, thus,
lead to sufficient long-term investments guaranteeing the least-cost long-term system
if several key assumptions are met (Caramanis et al., 1982; Oren, 2005; Schweppe et al.,
1988; Stoft, 2002): (1) the market is perfectly competitive, (2) market participants have
rational expectations and (3) follow a risk-neutral strategy. However, in the light of
the present state of electricity markets that feature several imperfections (Cepeda
and Finon, 2011), these assumptions seem rather unrealistic, maybe even impossible
to realize in practice. In real-world markets, a small number of producers often
dominate the market, resulting in a duopoly or oligopoly (e.g., Schwenen, 2014), and
invest strategically (Grimm and Zöttl, 2013; Zöttl, 2010). Furthermore, investors
are usually rather risk-averse, i.e., building less capacity than risk-neutral investors
would (Neuhoff and Vries, 2004). Moreover, market participants may not always
have rational expectations, and in the presence of the large uncertainties, e.g., about
the development of electricity prices, and the long lead times for new investments,
electricity markets are prone to suffer investment cycles (Arango and Larsen, 2011;
Ford, 2002; Olsina et al., 2006). The alternation between overcapacity and under-
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capacity results in inefficient market allocations, i.e., in the former case, unprofitable
investments and, in the latter case, an excessive risk of load curtailment and high costs
for consumers (RTE, 2014). Moreover, Vries and Hakvoort (2004) argue that even
long-term contracts do not provide a solution as they offer consumers the opportunity
to free-ride.4 In addition, Keppler (2017) shows two other independent problems of
an EOM. On the one hand, demand-side externalities in the form of transaction costs
and incomplete information ensure that the social willingness-to-pay is greater than
private willingness-to-pay for additional capacity. On the other hand, investments in
generation capacities are not arbitrarily scalable, but rather take discrete values. In
combinationwith dramatically lower revenues in the transition fromunderinvestment
to overinvestment, investors have strong asymmetric incentives and, thus, tend to
underinvest rather than to overinvest. Besides, Joskow and Tirole (2007) argue that
scarcity rents are very sensitive to regulatory changes and that even minor mistakes
are likely to have a significant impact on market prices.
Some of the more critical voices stress that market imperfections, especially the
lack of demand response, will always persist in EOMs, and lead to the exercise of
market power, which results in high price peaks. Thus, a different framework or
additional measures, e.g., CRMs, are required to help to ensure generation adequacy
efficiently (Cramton and Stoft, 2005; Joskow and Tirole, 2007). Others reply that
the main problem of EOMs is the lack of political will to allow for unconstrained
electricity prices5 and periodic shortages (Besser et al., 2002; Hogan, 2005).
However, often it is argued that CRMs are inefficient and according to Oren (2000)
4 A problem with long-term contracts is that they are not contracted directly between consumers
and utilities, but rather through load-serving entities as intermediaries. However, rational consumers
prefer the cheapest retailer, which by avoiding long-term contracts does not contribute to the financing
of peaking capacities.
5 Although price caps are frequently mentioned as a source of the missing money problem, the data
on market prices often tells a different story, e.g., since the establishment of the EEX in 2000, the upper
price limit of the German spot market (3000 EUR/MWh) was not once hindering the price formation
(EPEX SPOT, 2018b), the same seems to be the case in several USmarket areas from 2000 to 2006
(Joskow, 2008).
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the least desirable instrument or according to Hogan (2017) only the third best option
to ensure reliability, with the first option being the elimination of the leading underly-
ing causes, e.g., incentivizing a flexible demand6, and the second-best option being
an administrative price curve for the usage of reserve energy. Wolak (2004) even
claims that the rationale for CRMs is essentially a holdover from the regulated regime
of the energy sector that encourages over-investment and is highly susceptible to mar-
ket power, thus, frequently requiring regulatory intervention to set a non-distorted
capacity price. In a recent publication, Wolak (2017) instead argues that generation
adequacy can be ensured by establishing a market for standardized forward contracts
and mandating retailers to participate in order to provide sufficient liquidity. He
states that in this way generation adequacy can be ensured at the lowest possible
cost, as scarcity is reflected in the forward prices and investors are provided with the
necessary financing.
Summing up, whether the EOM is able to guarantee generation adequacy, is still
discussed intensively in the literature. It is apparent that the efficient allocation of
resources by an EOM is a highly challenging task, given the particular combination of
the unusual characteristics of the electricity market. Here, the utilization of real-world
experience to draw general conclusions is of limited use. In case, some analysts argue
that the developments on a particular market serve as an example for the inherent
shortcomings of an EOM, advocates respond that the market has not been able to
function well due to regulatory mistakes (Doorman et al., 2016). Beyond that, Hogan
(2017) states that the financial distress present in many European as well as North
American electricity markets, can be attributed to overcapacities. Nonetheless, recent
developments have raised serious doubts on the effectiveness of an EOM so that many
politicians deem the introduction of CRMs necessary.
6 In the future, if end consumers start to participate directly in the market via smart meters, they
could specify in detail what price they are willing to pay for each consumption level. If the price is too
high, the smart meter will switch off individual consumers directly, for example, the washing machine,
while leaving others connected, e.g., the lights and refrigerator. Thereby, the missing money problem
could be avoided (Newbery, 2016a).
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5.2 Market design options and current status of real-world imple-
mentations
In order to highlight the practical relevance of the market design concepts devel-
oped in the literature, an overview of several CRMs currently implemented or in the
planning stage around the world is provided in the following. These real-world imple-
mentations are classified with respect to some key characteristics. Then, conclusions
and implications for future implementations are presented. Thereby, this section
provides a helpful backdrop for a deeper understanding of the literature reviewed in
Section 5.3.
5.2.1 Generic types of capacity remuneration mechanisms
Typically, CRMs are designed to incentivize investments and thus improve generation
adequacy, i.e., avoid shortage situations. This is implemented by offering capacity
providers income on top of the earnings from selling electricity on themarket (Hawker
et al., 2017). Yet, the mechanisms vary in the way the required quantities that are
supplied and the corresponding capacity prices are determined (Hach et al., 2016).
The European Commission (2016b) distinguishes between volume-based mecha-
nisms, where a specific capacity sufficient to guarantee the desired level of generation
adequacy is set and then results in a market-driven price, and price-based mecha-
nisms, where the amount of the procured capacity is steered by setting a target price.
Both categories can also be subdivided into market-wide and targeted approaches.
Whereas market-wide mechanisms provide support to all capacity in the market,
targeted mechanisms aim at supporting only a subset, e.g., newly built capacity or
capacity expected to be required additionally to the one already provided by the
market. More specifically, six different types of mechanisms can be differentiated (for
typical characteristics, see Table 5.1):
(1) Tender for new capacity. Financial support is granted to capacity providers in or-
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Table 5.1 | Typical characteristics for different types of CRMs. Whereas the typical
characteristics are shown here, due to specific requirements, the actual specifications
may sometimes vary, e.g., a strategic reserve can also be procured bilaterally. Sources:
European Commission (2016b); Hancher et al. (2015); Neuhoff et al. (2016, 2013).
Type Category Procure-
ment/
Market
type
Partici-
pation
in other
markets
Product Main
regulatory
parameters
Tender for
new capacity
volume-
based/
targeted
central-
ized/
auction
yes firm
capacity
capacity
volume
Strategic
reserve
volume-
based/
targeted
central-
ized/
auction
no reserve
capacity
capacity
volume,
activation
rule, trigger
event
Targeted
capacity
payment
price-based/
targeted
central-
ized/
auction
yes firm
capacity
capacity
price,
eligibility
criteria
Central buyer volume-
based/
market-wide
central-
ized/
auction
yes call
option
capacity
volume,
strike price
De-central
obligation
volume-
based/
market-wide
decentral-
ized/
bilateral
yes reliabil-
ity
certifi-
cate
security
margin,
penalties
Market-wide
capacity
payment
price-based/
market-wide
central-
ized/
auction
yes firm
capacity
capacity
price
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der to establish the required additional capacity. Different variations are possible, e.g.,
financing the construction of new capacity or long-term power purchase agreements.
(2) Strategic reserve. A certain amount of additional capacity is contracted and held
in reserve outside the EOM.The reserve capacity is only operated if specific conditions
are met, e.g., a shortage of capacity in the spot market or a price settlement above a
certain electricity price.
(3) Targeted capacity payment. A central body sets a fixed price paid only to eligible
capacity, e.g., selected technology types or newly built capacity.
(4) Central buyer. The total amount of required capacity is set by a central body
and procured through a central bidding process so that the market determines the
price. Two common variants of the central buyer mechanism include the forward
capacity market (Cramton and Stoft, 2005, 2006) and reliability options (Batlle et al.,
2007; Pérez-Arriaga, 1999; Vázquez et al., 2001).
(5) De-central obligation. An obligation is placed on load-serving entities to individ-
ually secure the total capacity they need tomeet their consumers’ demand. In contrast
to the central buyer model, there is no central bidding process. Instead, individual
contracts between electricity suppliers and capacity providers are negotiated.
(6) Market-wide capacity payment. Based on estimates of the level of capacity
payments needed to bring forward the required capacity, a capacity price is determined
centrally, which is then paid to all capacity providers in the market.
5.2.2 Current status of implementation around the world
While the first CRMs in the US date back to the 1990s, European countries only rather
recently started implementing such mechanisms or are currently evaluating tailored
solutions. However, the European trend towards applying CRMs stands in contrast
to the European Commission’s preference for the EOM as an approach to trigger
new investments and provide signals for decommissioning in case of overcapacities
(Petitet et al., 2017). Some further countries outside of Europe and the US, such as
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Australia and Colombia, are also relying on CRMs in order to guarantee generation
adequacy.
An overview of several real-world implementations of CRMs as well as planned
mechanisms is provided in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3. The country-specific approaches
differ not only with regard to the chosen type of the mechanism but also with regard
to the respective administrators and the eligible technologies. Further characteristics
of some currently active mechanisms can be found in Section 5.5.
The European Commission has already recognized the issue of cross-border effects
and, thus, continuously assesses the conformity of planned and implemented mecha-
nisms with EU State aid rules (for an overview of the cases see European Commission,
2017c). For a lawful public intervention in the market, the European Commission
(2013) requires the respective member state to demonstrate the essential need for
any capacity remuneration. Moreover, any mechanism must ensure that distortions
of competition are minimized and technology neutrality is guaranteed. The latter
aspect includes the eligibility of demand-side measures or foreign generation capacity,
which, for example, has led to several adjustments of the French decentralized capacity
market mechanism.
5.2.3 Discussion and implications for future implementations
An expert survey conducted by Bhagwat et al. (2016b) reveals that the CRMs imple-
mented in the US have effectively—but likely not efficiently—contributed to reaching
the different regions’ respective reliability goals. For this reason, the experts generally
advise the EU to rely on EOMs and not implement CRMs. If, however, CRMs are to be
implemented in Europe, they recommend using consistent and transparent rules with
minimum subsequent modifications. Moreover, based on the US experience, it seems
advisable to base the capacity remuneration on the availability of the respective re-
sources in actual scarcity conditions. Since these recommendations are quite generic,
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Table 5.2 | Capacity remuneration mechanisms around the world. Several CRMs
have already been established in the last years. Differences in the implementation
of these mechanisms, particularly exist with regard to the technologies eligible for
funding, such as intermittent renewable energies or interconnectors.
Admin- Eligible
istrator technologies
Type Country Start TSO RA TPP VRES DSM IC
Strategic
reserve
Belgium 2014 x x x x
Germany1 20182 x x x x
Sweden 2003 x x x
Central
buyer
Colombia 2006 x x x
Ireland3 20172 x x x x x x
Italy3 20182 x x x x x
Poland4 20182 x x x x x x
UK 2014 x x x x x x
US – ISO-NE 1998 x x x x x
US – MISO 2009 x x x x x
US – NYISO 1999 x x x x x
US – PJM 2007 x x x x x
De-
central
obligation
Australia – SWIS 2005 x x x x x
France 2015 x x x x x
US – CAISO 2006 x x x x x x
US – SPP 2018 x x x x x
Targeted
capacity payment Spain
5 2007 x x
Abbreviations: DSM—demand side management, IC—interconnector, RA—
regulatory authority, TPP—thermal power plant, TSO—transmission system op-
erator, VRES—variable renewable energy sources
1 In Germany, two separate mechanisms have been discussed that can be classified
as a strategic reserve. In 2016, a security stand-by arrangement for lignite-fired
power plants with a total capacity of 2.7GW was introduced in order to attain
national climate targets. Furthermore, an additional so-called capacity reserve
was supposed to be active in winter of 2018/19 to ensure generation adequacy,
however, the planned schedule was not met.
2 Year of planned implementation.
3 To date, targeted capacity payments are used.
4 Currently, a strategic reserve is implemented.
5 This refers to the now in place “availability service” mechanism. An additional
mechanism named “investment incentive” was abolished in 2016.
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a) b)
Strategic reserve Central buyer Tender for new capacity
Targeted capacity payments De-central obligation Reserve demand curve
Figure 5.3 | Current and future implementation of CRMs in Europe and in the US.
Overview of a) the future situation of CRMs in Europe when all planned mechanisms
are implemented and b) the current situation in the US. The situation is more diverse
in Europa due to uncoordinated national approaches and diverging interests. Whereas
only two different types of CRMs are found in the US, a specific case is the Texas ER-
COT market, where the EOM is supported by an artificial reserve demand curve that
produces high price signals to incentivize investments or DSM. Sources: ACER and
CEER (2017); Chow and Brant (2018); EirGrid plc and SONI Limited (2017); European
Commission (2014b, 2016a,b); Hancher et al. (2015); Midcontinent Independent Sys-
tem Operator (2019); Roques et al. (2016); U.S. Government Accountability Office
(2017).
they are also applicable to any country outside of Europe which is considering the
implementation of a CRM.
Bhagwat et al. (2016b) further state that cross-border inefficiencies are currently
not considered a major issue in the US, even though the introduction of the PJM
mechanism has likely been a key driver for the subsequent implementation of a CRM
in the neighboringMISO region. In this respect, the situation is different in Europe,
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where the European Commission (2011b) considers a single European electricity
market—also termed “internal electricity market”—essential in order to ensure com-
petitive, sustainable and secure energy supply in the future. This is contrasted by
several European countries already using or currently implementing individual mech-
anisms to increase generation adequacy on a national level (see Section 5.2.2). Yet, in
a highly interconnected electricity system like the European one, the uncoordinated
implementation of local mechanisms might lead to numerous potentially adverse
cross-border effects, which are described in detail in Section 5.3.6.
5.3 Findings on capacity remuneration mechanisms in the litera-
ture
After analyzing real-world implementations of CRMs, the findings in the literature
are discussed below. In view of the large number of studies, the findings have been
structured based on the specifically investigated topics. This allows to compare similar
studies and to derive common results. In many of the analyses, e.g., for evaluating
dynamic long-term effects—such as the occurrence of investment cycles—the use
of models is highly suitable (Hary et al., 2016). Table 5.3 gives a quick overview
of the existing approaches available in the literature including the regarded market
characteristics or the considered research topics. For example, this allows determining
which model type is particularly suitable for the assessment of specific research
questions.
The summary of all the findings in the literature, including but not limited to the
mentioned models in the table, is structured by the economic implications of CRMs in
the following subsections. At first, the design elements of CRMs are briefly discussed.
Then, it is examined how CRMs are affected by market power, risk aversion, and
investment cycles. Subsequently, it is analyzed how CRMs influence market welfare
and neighboring market areas. Finally, the impact of CRMs in an electricity market
characterized by a higher share of RES and a more flexible demand side is evaluated.
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Table 5.3 | Modeling approaches for capacity remuneration mechanisms. Summarized
overview of modeling approaches regarding the development of electricity market design with
a focus on capacity remuneration mechanisms.
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Research subject
Aalami
et al.
(2010)
analytical interruptible
technologies
Iran x impact of capacity market
programs on the load level
and shape
Abani et al.
(2018)
system
dynamics
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
hypo-
thetical
x impact of risk aversion on
the performances of
capacity remuneration
mechanisms (competitive
EOM, capacity market and
strategic reserve) with
investors facing an
uncertain peak load
Abani et al.
(2016)
system
dynamics
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
hypo-
thetical
x x impact of investors’ risk
aversion on investments in
generation capacity in a
competitive EOM and a
capacity market
Assili et al.
(2008)
system
dynamics
electricity dispatch,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x influence of capacity
payments on market prices
and the reserve margin
Bajo-
Buenestado
(2017)
analytical
(perfect
competition,
subgame
perfect Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
Texas
(ERCOT)
x x welfare effects of
introducing capacity
payments in a competitive
market and a market with
dominant firms
Bhagwat
and Vries
(2013)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market,
investments,
transmission
constraints
Ger-
many,
Nether-
lands
x effect of a strategic reserve
in Germany on investment
behavior and leakage of
reserve benefits to the
Netherlands
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Research subject
Bhagwat
et al.
(2014)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market, decom-
missions/investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
based on
Germany
x cross-border impact of a
capacity market and a
strategic reserve on
consumer costs and on
investments in the affected
markets
Bhagwat
et al.
(2016a)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
based on
Germany
x x x effectiveness strategic
reserve in the presence of a
high RES share
Bhagwat
et al.
(2017a)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
based on
Germany
x x x effectiveness of a capacity
market in the presence of
imperfect information and
uncertainty, declining
demand shocks resulting in
load loss, and a growing
share of RES
Bhagwat
et al.
(2017b)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
hypo-
thetical
based on
the
United
Kingdom
x x effectiveness of a forward
capacity market with
long-term contracts in the
presence of a growing
share of RES
Bhagwat
et al.
(2017c)
agent-based
(EMLab)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
based on
Germany
x cross-border effects of a
capacity market and/or a
strategic reserve
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Research subject
Briggs and
Kleit
(2013)
analytical
(Ramsey
optimum)
spot market,
investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
x x efficiency of capacity
payments
Bublitz
et al.
(2015a)
agent-based
(PowerACE)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments,
operating reserve,
transmission
constraints
Germany x x effects of the proposed
strategic reserve in
Germany on security of
supply and costs
Cepeda
and Finon
(2011)
system
dynamics
spot market,
investments,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
x x cross-border effects of an
EOM (with/without price
cap) and a forward capacity
market
Cepeda
and Finon
(2013)
system
dynamics
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
based on
France
x x effects of large-scale
deployment of wind power
generation on spot prices
and reliability of supply
Creti and
Fabra
(2007)
analytical
(perfect
competition,
monopoly)
spot market,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
x firms’ optimal behavior and
market equilibrium in
capacity markets with the
possibility to sell to a
foreign market under both
perfect competition and
monopoly
Ehrenmann
and Smeers
(2011)
stochastic
equilibrium
electricty dispatch,
investment
hypo-
thetical
x x effects of risk (fuel prices,
carbon market) on
investment decisions in
generation capacity
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Research subject
Fabra et al.
(2011)
analytical
(Nash
equilibrium)
investments hypo-
thetical
x x effects of price caps and
auction formats (uniform-
price/discriminatory) on
investments and the
capacity ratio between two
firms
Fan et al.
(2012)
stochastic
equilibrium
electricity dispatch,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x effects of uncertainty and
risk aversion on
investments in high and
low-carbon capacities
Franco
et al.
(2015)
system
dynamics
electricity dispatch,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
Great
Britain
x effect of central buyer
capacity market on
investment cycles and
long-term market stability
Genoese
et al.
(2012)
agent-based
(PowerACE)
spot market,
investments, operating
reserve, transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
based on
Spain
x impact of a capacity
payment mechanism on the
long-term development of
investments in conventional
capacities and on electricity
prices
Gore et al.
(2016)
single-firm
optimization
spot market,
transmission
constraints
Finland,
Russia
x x short-term effects of an
EOM and an
energy-plus-capacity
market on cross-border
trade and efficient
allocation of transmission
capacity
Grave et al.
(2012)
single-firm
optimization
(DIME)
electricity dispatch,
decommissions (based
on age)/investments
Germany x development of security of
supply under the increasing
penetration of intermittent
RES and the need for
backup capacity and
electricity imports
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Grimm and
Zöttl
(2013)
analytical
(perfect
competition,
Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
Germany x influence of spot market
design on firms’ investment
decision for different
regimes of spot market
competition (competitive
prices and Cournot-Nash
equilibrium)
Hach et al.
(2016)
single-firm
optimization
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
Great
Britain
x affordability, reliability, and
sustainability of a central
buyer capacity market (for
new or new/existing
capacity)
Hach and
Spinler
(2016)
real options
for single
investor
spot market,
investments
Europe x x effect of capacity payments
on investments in gas-fired
power plants under rising
renewable feed-in
Hary et al.
(2016)
system
dynamics
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
hypo-
thetical
x x x dynamic effects of a
capacity market and a
strategic reserve
mechanism on investment
cycles
Hasani-
Marzooni
and
Hosseini
(2013)
system
dynamics
electricity generation,
investments, operating
reserve, transmission
constraints
Iran x x effect of a (regional)
capacity payment
mechanism and a price cap
on investments in Iranian
electricity market
Herrero
et al.
(2015)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x effects of the implemented
pricing rule (linear and
non-linear) on long-term
investment incentives
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Research subject
Hobbs et al.
(2007)
agent-based
(single
agent)
investments hypo-
thetical
x x effects of alternative
demand curves in the PJM
market on reserve margins,
generator profitability, and
consumer costs
Höschle
et al.
(2017)
analytical
(Karush-
Kuhn-
Tucker)
electricity dispatch,
investments, green
certificates
Belgium x effect of central buyer
capacity market and
strategic reserve on the
reserve margin and
non-participating RES
Jaehnert
and
Doorman
(2014)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
investments,
transmission
constraints
Nether-
lands,
Germany
x effect of a capacity
mechanism or an increased
price cap on generation
capacity under rising
renewable feed-in
Joskow
(2008)
analytical
(Ramsey
optimum)
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x sources of the missing
money problem in
imperfect markets
Joskow
and Tirole
(2007)
analytical
(Ramsey
optimum)
spot market,
investments, operating
reserve
hypo-
thetical
x x x efficiency of capacity
obligations
Keles et al.
(2016a)
agent-based
(PowerACE)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments,
operating reserve,
transmission
constraints
Germany x generation adequacy in
different market designs
(EOM, central buyer
capacity market, strategic
reserve)
Kim and
Kim (2012)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
investments,
transmission
constraints
South
Korea
x effects of zonal forward
capacity markets on
investments across market
zones
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Research subject
Laleman
and
Albrecht
(2016)
statistical electricity dispatch Belgium x occurrence of electricity
shortages and surpluses in
the presence of a high
share of nuclear combined
with a high share of
intermittent RES
Lara-
Arango
et al.
(2017a)
analytical
(joint maxi-
mization,
Nash
equilibrium,
perfect
competition)
combined
with scenario
experiments
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x economic welfare of a
central buyer capacity
market and a strategic
reserve
Lara-
Arango
et al.
(2017b)
agent-based electricity dispatch,
decommissions (based
on age)/investments
hypo-
thetical
x x influence of uncertainty on
producer surplus and
market stability in case of
capacity payments and a
capacity auction
Léautier
(2016)
analytical
(two-stage,
Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x x optimal investment in
different market designs
(financial reliability options,
physical capacity
certificates, single market
for energy and operating
reserves)
Le Coq
et al.
(2017)
analytical
combined
with scenario
experiments
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x relationship between prices,
market power and
investment under three
different regulatory regimes
(low price cap, high price
cap, capacity market)
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Research subject
Levin and
Botterud
(2015)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
investments,
spinning-up and
non-spinning reserve
Texas
(ERCOT)
x ability of three different
market mechanisms
(Operating Reserve
Demand Curves, Fixed
Reserve Scarcity Prices and
fixed capacity payments) to
provide generator revenue
sufficiency and resource
adequacy with increasing
amounts of renewable
energy
Lueken
et al.
(2016)
statistical spot market PJM x x resource adequacy
requirements in the PJM
market area assuming plant
failures are either
independent or correlated
Lynch and
Devine
(2017)
analytical
(Karush-
Kuhn-
Tucker)
spot market,
decommissions
(retirement based on
higher maintenance
costs)/investments,
refurbishment
hypo-
thetical
x impact of refurbishment
under capacity payments
and reliability options
Maere
d’Aertrycke
et al.
(2017)
stochastic
equilibrium
electricity dispatch,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x impact of incomplete risk
trading (Contracts for
Difference, Reliability
Options with and without
physical back-up) on
investments
Mastropi-
etro et al.
(2016)
agent-based
(two-stage)
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x impact of penalty schemes
for under-delivery on
capacity mechanisms’
effectiveness and unit
reliability
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Research subject
Meunier
(2013)
analytical electricty dispatch,
investment
hypo-
thetical
x effect of risk and
risk-aversion on the
long-term equilibrium
technology mix
Meyer and
Gore
(2015)
analytical
(Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x x influence of competition
and market power on
market welfare of CRMs
(strategic reserve and
reliability options)
Milstein
and Tishler
(2012)
analytical
(Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
Israel x the rationality of
underinvestment if
profit-seeking, non-abusive
producers construct and
operate either one—base
or peaking—generation
unit (or both)
Mohamed
Haikel
(2011)
analytical
(three stage,
Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker,
Nash
equilibrium)
spot market,
investments
hypo-
thetical
x x x comparison of three CRM
(reliability options, forward
capacity market, and
capacity payments) in
regard of efficiently
assuring long-term capacity
adequacy in Cournot
oligopoly, collusion, and
monopolistic situations
Neuhoff
et al.
(2016)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
x x x benefits of coordinated
cross-border strategic
reserves
Ochoa and
Gore
(2015)
system
dynamics
electricity dispatch,
investments,
transmission
constraints
Finland,
Russia
x x effects of maintaining a
strategic reserve in Finland
in combination with the
different scenarios of
interconnection expansion
and trading arrangements
with Russia
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Research subject
Osorio and
van Ackere
(2016)
system
dynamics
electricity dispatch,
investments,
transmission
constraints
Switzer-
land
x x impact of the nuclear
phase-out and the
increasing penetration of
variable RES on security of
supply
Ozdemir
et al.
(2013)
single-firm
optimization
(COMPETES)
electricity dispatch,
decommissions (based
on age)/investments,
transmission
constraints
Europe x cross-border effects
(investments, electricity
generation, market prices,
and importexport flows) of
a unilateral introduction of
a German capacity market
Park et al.
(2007)
system
dynamics
spot market,
investments
South
Korea
x effects of capacity incentive
systems—loss of load
probability or fixed capacity
payments—on investment
in the Korean electricity
market
Petitet et al.
(2017)
system
dynamics
(SIDES)
electricity dispatch,
decommissions
(retirement of
unprofitable existing
genera-
tion)/investments
hypo-
thetical
x x effects of capacity
mechanisms on security of
supply objectives assuming
risk-averse and risk-neutral
investor behavior in power
markets undergoing an
energy transition
Ringler
et al.
(2017)
agent-based
(PowerACE)
spot market,
investments, operating
reserve, transmission
constraints
CWE
Market
area
x x effects of cross-border
congestion management
and capacity mechanisms
on welfare and generation
adequacy in Europe
(potential development of
the CWE Market)
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Research subject
Schwenen
(2014)
analytical spot market hypo-
thetical
x x x effect of market structure
(duopoly with symmetric
and asymmetric firm size)
on security of supply in a
capacity market and an
EOM
Schwenen
(2015)
analytical capacity auction New
York
(ICAP)
x strategic bidding to
coordinate on an
equilibrium in multi-unit
auctions with capacity
constrained bidders
See et al.
(2016)
single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch,
transmission
constraints
hypo-
thetical
x reinforcing cross-border
competition for the supply
of capacity generation with
the help of a flow-based
forward capacity
mechanism
Tashpula-
tov
(2015)
log-linear
regression
spot market England
and
Wales
x effects of regulatory
reforms on incentive and
disincentive to exercise
market power
Traber
(2017)
analytical
(Karush-
Kuhn-
Tucker)
spot market,
decommissions (based
on age)/investments/
retrofitting,
transmission
constraints
Ger-
many,
France,
and
Poland
x effects of capacity
remuneration mechanisms
on welfare and distribution
(consumers/producers)
with a focus on
conventional power plants
Vries and
Heijnen
(2008)
agent-based spot market,
decommissions (based
on age)/investments,
interruptible
technologies
The
Nether-
lands
x x x effectiveness of different
market designs (an EOM
with and without market
power, capacity payment,
operating reserves pricing,
capacity market) under
uncertainty about demand
growth
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Weiss et al.
(2017)
hybrid
(single-firm
optimization/agent-
based)
spot market,
investments
Israel x x market prices, reliability,
and consumer costs in
different market designs
(EOM, capacity market,
strategic reserve)
Willems
and
Morbee
(2010)
analytical spot market,
investment
Germany x x effects of an increasing
number of derivatives on
welfare and investment
incentives in electricity
market with risk averse
firms
Winzer
(2013)
agent-based spot market,
investments
Great
Britain
x x robustness of various
capacity mechanisms to
welfare losses caused by
regulatory errors
a Here, the column “Model scope” excludes all CRMs as these are mentioned in the column “Research subject.”
b If only marginal costs are regarded to determine, which capacity is operating, the term “electricity dispatch” is used.
However, the term “spot market” is used if the strategic behavior of market participants is explicitly modeled.
5.3.1 Generic design criteria for a capacity remuneration mechanism
The design of a CRM is a complex challenge where the ideal solution depends on
the particular market conditions, e.g., the existing capacity mix and the demand
characteristics (Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Cepeda and Finon, 2011; Keppler, 2017;
Spees et al., 2013). Here only the most important design parameters as well as selected
parameters for specificmechanisms are discussed, for further criteria, e.g., see Ausubel
and Cramton (2010); Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga (2008) for different design criteria,
Herrero et al. (2015) for pricing rules, Neuhoff et al. (2016) for the design of a strategic
reserve or Schwenen (2015) for the design of capacity auctions.
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Target for system availability
Once the decision to introduce a CRM has been made, a system-wide target for
system adequacy is often set, which helps to determine in the case of volume-based
mechanisms the required capacity level or in the case of price-based mechanisms the
targeted capacity price (Hogan, 2017). Here, the loss of load expectation (LOLE)7 is
frequently used and often a value of 1 day in 10 years is targeted (North American
Electric Reliability Council [NERC], 2009), which however has been criticized as
arbitrary and too strict to be economically optimal (Cramton and Stoft, 2006). Taking
into account correlated outages among generators and the expected future demand,
then the required quantity of demand to reach the target for system availability is
derived.
Demand curve
In quantity-based CRMs, a demand curve—usually referred to as the variable resource
requirement demand curve—must be defined that sets the price for each capacity
level.8 Although in theory, it makes sense to rely on the declining marginal value of
capacity (Cramton and Stoft, 2007), in practice, due to the difficulty of estimating this
value, usually, a linear curve based on an upper and a lower price limit is used (Spees
et al., 2013). The upper price cap needs to be high enough to incentivize sufficient
investments when the system is tight and typically equals a multiple of thenet cost of
new entry (NetCONE)9. The lower price cap is usually set equal to zero and marks
7 However, the LOLE is not free of criticism, for example, as it refers only to curtailment and does
not indicate to what absolute or relative extent in relation to the market size the curtailment occurs.
Here, the unserved energy (UE) metric provides more insight (Lueken et al., 2016). An overview of
further reliability target can be found at Milligan et al. (2016).
8 Instead of demand curves sometimes a fixed capacity is set. However, Hobbs et al. (2007) advise
against this practice as sloped demand curves bear lower risks for consumers.
9 Similar to the determination of the VoLL, the determination of the cost of new entry (CONE) or
the NetCONE, which is usually carried out by the regulator, is also a controversial matter. The choice
or the cost-basis of the reference technology, and, thus, its value is often adjusted over time (Cramton
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the capacity level when the desired reserve margin is reached. However, sometimes,
in order to avoid a total price collapse or prevent market manipulation from large
purchasers of capacity, a higher price is set, e.g., 75% of the NetCONE (Miller et al.,
2012). When setting the upper and lower price limit, it also needs to be taken into
account that a steep demand curve may lead to more volatile prices and, thus, greater
uncertainty for investors (Bhagwat et al., 2017b).
Eligible technologies
In a next step, the definition of the capacity product needs to be established, and it
has to be decided which capacity resources are eligible. Sisternes and Parsons (2016)
argue that CRMs should be technology-neutral and allow for the participation of all
elements that can reliably provide capacity (conventional and renewable generation,
storage technologies, demand-side measures). If certain technologies were to be
excluded, the mechanisms would introduce hidden subsidies for the technologies
eligible for the CRM, which in turn would lead to higher costs for consumers. At the
same time, however, it must be noted that this can possibly lead to conflicts regarding
the reduction of carbon emissions, for example, in Great Britain highly emission-
intensive diesel-fueled generators received capacity payments (S&P Global Platts,
2015). Moreover, Hach and Spinler (2016) propose to consider the specific policy
targets and only consider a technology-neutral selection if generation adequacy is
to be achieved at the lowest possible cost. However, if particularly flexible capacities
are required or an ambitious emission reduction target needs to be achieved, this
should be reflected in the selection of technologies. Although it is cheaper to only pay
for new generation capacities, it must be noted that this strategy works only once as
investors will adjust their behavior onwards and demand additional protection and
risk premiums (Cramton et al., 2013).
and Stoft, 2007, 2008; Jenkin et al., 2016). Regarding the related uncertainty, Spees et al. (2013) propose
to better set a higher value to avoid unreliable outcomes.
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Verification system
In order to enhance the performance of CRMs, a performance incentive system is
required, which ensures that the capacities actually provide the contracted capacity
when the system is tight (Mastropietro et al., 2016; Vázquez et al., 2002). This can
either be implemented through a financial penalty for non-compliance (Cramton and
Stoft, 2005) or by restricting the amount a resource can provide to its firm capacity
(Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008). The experiences from the United States show that
despite the existence of explicit penalties, underperformance has occurred, which
underlines the importance of designing and implementing a performance incentive
system (Mastropietro et al., 2017). If a financial penalty is chosen, it needs to be
high enough to incite investors to compliance, which, however, increases the risk of
investors and this is reflected in their bids. For the exact amount of the penalty, it is
possible to rely on the VoLL, the capacity price or the NetCONE.
5.3.2 Potential and effects of market power
Central buyer mechanisms, e.g., reliability options, are able to lower the potential for
market power in wholesale electricity markets (Le Coq et al., 2017; Léautier, 2016)
and thereby improve the efficiency and reduce the total bill of generation, which is
defined as the sum of the revenues realized by the electricity generators (Hach et al.,
2016). By contrast, compared to an EOM, Bhagwat et al. (2016a) claim that a strategic
reserve increases the possibility to exercise market power as the opportunities to
withhold capacities, which can result in an activation of the reserve and extreme
market prices, become more frequent compared to an EOM where market power is
primarily exercised during capacity shortage hours.
In addition, as Mohamed Haikel (2011) points out, market power might be exerted
when introducing non-market based mechanisms, e.g., capacity payments. However,
the possible entry of a new competitor makes them less vulnerable to market power
than, e.g., day-ahead markets, where in the short term no additional competition can
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emerge (Schwenen, 2014). Therefore, it seems unlikely that the additional potential
of market power within a CRM will compensate for the lower potential in the whole-
sale markets. Nonetheless, Joskow (2008) advocates that the capacity price could
be reduced by the quasi-rents earned by a hypothetical peaking unit, thereby disin-
centivizing the exercise of market power. Furthermore, Cramton and Stoft (2008)
argue that only new investments could be allowed to set the capacity price to mitigate
market power, existing capacity must either submit a zero bid or is not allowed to
participate at all. The rationale behind this approach is that although established
market players might possess market power, they are unable to exercise it if there is
competitive new entry and only new investments set the price.
5.3.3 Influence of uncertainty and risk aversion
In the majority of the considered analyses, it is assumed for simplification purposes
that all decision-makers act risk-neutral, although several theoretical arguments
(Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani, 2006; Neuhoff and Vries, 2004) as well as real-world
observations suggest that decision-makers in the energy sector are usually risk-averse
or at least behave accordingly (Meunier, 2013). This seems to be the case not only for
economic but also for political decision-makers (Finon et al., 2008; Neuhoff et al.,
2016). However, several studies explicitly consider risk-aversion and their findings
are described in the following.
As the electricity market reacts very sensitively to the level of risk aversion of the
investors (e.g., Petitet et al., 2017), risk aversion causes the market to deviate from the
installed capacity in the welfare optimal case (Winzer, 2013). Given the high social
costs of capacity shortages and the uncertainty associated with the development of
the electricity market, Vries and Heijnen (2008) point out that the socially optimal
level of generation capacity is higher than the theoretical optimum under perfect
foresight. Moreover, Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) find that in an EOM with a low
price cap as well as in a CRM, uncertainty and risk aversion aggravates the generation
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adequacy problem, which in turn can dramatically increase the costs for end con-
sumers. This is caused by delaying investments and shifting from high- to less-capital
intensive investments. Similar findings are made by Vries and Heijnen (2008) who
state that CRMs can contribute to a more balanced generation portfolio by reducing
the investment risk and, thus, counteracting the tendency of risk-averse investors
towards low-capital technologies with short lead times. Fan et al. (2012) conclude that
a CRM could prove to be beneficial as their findings indicate that risk aversion tempts
investors to adopt the decisions that would have been taken if the worst-case scenario
had materialized thereby avoiding investments in new uncertain technologies, e.g.,
concentrating solar power.
As part of an analytical analysis, Neuhoff and Vries (2004) investigate the influence
of weather- and demand-related uncertainty and risk aversion on the investment
decisions of electricity generators having a unique technology at their disposal. Their
results indicate that an EOM will provide insufficient investment incentives to ensure
generation adequacy if investors or final consumers are risk-averse and unable to
hedge their portfolio adequately via long-term contracts. Maere d’Aertrycke et al.
(2017) analyze the effect of two reference long-term contracts as well as the impact of a
long-term forward capacitymarket and find that even though long-term contracts and
a highly calibrated forward capacity market are able to improve welfare substantially,
they also entail severe drawbacks. In all cases, traded volumes need to be far higher
than in current energy markets as illiquidity can severely impair the effectiveness of
these instruments and increase the risk premiums demanded by investors by about
10%. Besides, Willems and Morbee (2010) find that the liquid trade of derivatives
provides sufficient incentives for a risk-averse producer to invest. Here, forward
contracts mainly lead to an increase of investments in base load capacity, and if also
options are offered in the market, the investments in peak-load plants will increase as
well. In some cases, if no suitable financial substitutes are traded for an investment
option, however, overinvestment can occur.
Furthermore, Abani et al. (2016) state that considering the risk aversion of the
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decision makers involved is crucial when comparing different market designs. Their
results demonstrate that when comparing the implementation of a central buyer
mechanism and an EOM, the difference in shortage situations increases if investors
are regarded as risk-averse instead of risk-neutral. In a more recent study, Abani et al.
(2018) investigate an EOM and two CRMs (central buyer, strategic reserve) and find
that in case of risk aversion, investors tend to extend the lifetime of existing generation
capacity instead of building new, which in turn leads to higher total generation costs.
Similarly, Petitet et al. (2017) show that in an EOM the amount of economically
motivated decommissions of thermal plants or the level of scarcity prices is dependent
on the risk aversion of the investors. However, CRMs are comparatively insensitive to
the risk aversion of the market participants due to the fact that the required quantity
is directly specified by the regulator and the risk aversion of the market participants is
reflected in their bids affecting the total costs. This proves to be a substantial benefit
for policy makers as market developments are more predictable.
5.3.4 Effects of investment cycles
Although fixed or variable capacity payments are unable to abolish investment cycles,
they reduce the cycles’ amplitude resulting in a high level of market price stability
and a reasonable reserve margin (Assili et al., 2008; Ford, 1999). Moreover, Cepeda
and Finon (2011) demonstrate that investment cycles can effectively be dampened by
capacity obligations, in turn leading to smoother annual average electricity prices
and higher reliability.
In case of a strategic reserve, Bhagwat et al. (2016a) and Sisternes and Parsons (2016)
find that investment cycles, e.g., caused by uncertainty about the future electricity
demand, may still occur. Similarly, Hary et al. (2016) show that although underin-
vestment is avoided, overinvestment is not prevented by a strategic reserve as the
regulator cannot influence the perceived value of additional generation capacity or
enforce investors to postpone their decisions. However, a central buyer mechanism is
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able to positively influence investor behavior and, therefore, reduce the occurrences
of under- and overinvestment. Moreover, Bhagwat et al. (2017a) find that in case
of a forward capacity market boom and bust cycles may still occur if the electricity
demand drops sharply, consequently leading to the decline of capacity prices and
multiple decommissions of existing capacity so that only a high reserve margin ini-
tially set by the regulator prevents loss of load situations. In reaction to the resulting
shortage, capacity prices spike again, and investments are made. Similarly, Bhagwat
et al. (2017b) state that in a forward capacity market investment cycles still exist, but
in comparison with an EOM, they extend over longer periods and feature smaller
amplitudes. Also, by decreasing the investor risk and reliability risk for consumers,
forward reliability markets can prevent boom-bust cycles (Cramton and Stoft, 2008).
Beyond, Franco et al. (2015) claim that the implementation of a CRM together with
long-term contracts for low-carbon generators prevent any fluctuations in the price
and reserve margin in the British electricity market. However, sudden shocks seem
not to be taken into account in the analysis. Also, Hasani and Hosseini (2011) state
that a hybrid CRM (periodically using capacity payments and a forward capacity
market) is able to prevent over- and underinvestment efficiently.
In summary, the presented results support the assertion that investment cycles,
which are caused by uncertainties, e.g., regarding the demand growth, can be damped
by CRMs (Vries and Heijnen, 2008). However, most often they cannot be completely
prevented and a sufficient reserve margin mainly depending on market uncertainties
needs to be determined by the regulator.
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5.3.5 Efficiencyandmarketwelfareof capacity remunerationmechanisms
As a strategic reserve allows the use of all contracted capacities only for a single
purpose, inevitably inefficiencies occur, and additional investments are needed to
replace the lost flexibility (Höschle et al., 2017). Further, the dispatch of the strategic
reserve at any other value than the VoLL can reduce the market welfare analogous to
the price caps in the EOM (Finon et al., 2008). Besides, a strategic reserve does not
appear to improve the market stability or increase the expected economic surplus
in the long term (Lara-Arango et al., 2017a). Therefore, it seems advisable to use
a strategic reserve as a short-term solution and replace it by other mechanisms in
the long term. However, the distributional effects of a strategic reserve seem to be
relatively small (Neuhoff et al., 2016).
Creti and Fabra (2007) state that in order for a CRM to maximize social welfare,
gains from reducing load loss situations must exceed the additional capacity costs
and the secured capacity procured should be equal to the peak demand. Furthermore,
they argue that the price limit should be defined as the opportunity costs of providing
full capacity commitment as different parameterizations would lead to a reduction
in welfare through either overcapacities or scarcity prices. In a case study for Great
Britain, Hach et al. (2016) find that through deliberate overcapacity and, thereby,
avoiding extreme prices and lost load occasions, a central buyer mechanism can
effectively lower the total bill of generation. Similar results are obtained by Bhagwat
et al. (2017b), Höschle et al. (2017), and Keles et al. (2016a) in case studies of the
electricity market in Great Britain, Belgium, and Germany respectively. However,
Schwenen (2014) argues that in a framework with two firms, in equilibrium capacity
prices are non-competitive due to capacity constraints and signals for the entry of
new firms are likely being distorted by the regulator.
By employing an analytical model, Briggs and Kleit (2013) find that capacity pay-
ments for base load power plants are never optimal. In the short term, capacity
payments will cause prices to fall and competitive base load power plants to be sup-
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pressed, and in the long term incentives to invest in peak load power plants and
generation adequacy will decline. Also, the positive short-term price effect might
be lower than theoretically expected (Genoese et al., 2012), and the payments might
even fail to ensure an adequate reserve margin (Kim and Kim, 2012; Park et al., 2007).
Likewise, Milstein and Tishler (2012) find that targeted capacity payments for the
peaking technology, which account for 25% of the associated capacity costs, only
increase the social welfare by 0.02%. Furthermore, Bajo-Buenestado (2017) show that
the benefit of capacity payments depends on the intensity of competition and is less
if the market is controlled by dominant companies as in many real-world markets.
Joskow and Tirole (2007) state that if market power is present in a market with more
than two states of nature, i.e., peak and off-peak, capacity payments are an insufficient
instrument.
As results from the literature are not always coherent and often only applicable
for specific cases, the question of which CRM is most efficient remains open. For
example, often a central buyer mechanism seems to yield significantly better results
than a strategic reserve (Hary et al., 2016; Höschle et al., 2017; Keles et al., 2016a), but
sometimes the results are ambiguous (Traber, 2017). Most likely, this can be attributed
to the fact that the results depend among other things on the existing generation
structure and their development in time (Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Traber, 2017) as
well as the taken assumptions, e.g., the consideration of uncertainty (Lara-Arango
et al., 2017b) or the risk aversion of investors (Petitet et al., 2017). Nevertheless, there
seems to be a consensus in the literature that market-based mechanisms are usually
advantageous compared to interventionistmechanisms, e.g., capacity payments (Batlle
and Rodilla, 2010; Lara-Arango et al., 2017a; Mohamed Haikel, 2011).
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5.3.6 Influence on neighboring markets through cross-border effects
One of the difficulties encountered in the study of cross-border effects is the large
number of influence factors such as the regarded markets, generation technologies,
different interconnector capacities or asymmetric market sizes. Furthermore, cross-
border effects are strongly influenced by competition between market participants
and the possibility of exerting market power (Meyer and Gore, 2015). Thus, deriving
common conclusions is extremely challenging.
One major short-term cross-border effect is the occurrence of market distortions
if a CRM does not adequately consider generation capacities abroad. In this case,
through additional capacity payments, domestic producers gain a competitive edge
over foreign producers (Hawker et al., 2017). However, the primary focus of the
scientific research is on long-term effects, i.e., the development of generation adequacy,
distributive effects, and price effects, as CRMs will mainly drive investment decisions
(e.g., Ozdemir et al., 2013). For example, with the help of an agent-based electricity
marketmodel Bhagwat et al. (2014, 2017c) find that in case of a forward capacitymarket
and strategic reserve in two neighboringmarkets, the forward capacitymarket appears
to have a negative spillover effect on the strategic reserve. However, a neighboring
EOM does not limit the ability of a national forward capacity market or strategic
reserve to achieve its objectives. Indeed, vice versa, two effects can be observed. On
the one hand, the neighboring EOM operates as a free-rider and benefits from the
additional foreign generation capacities. On the other hand, the dependence of the
EOM on imports increases, which can be particularly disadvantageous in critical
situations. Similar results are obtained by Ochoa and Gore (2015), who show in a case
study for the Finnish and Russian electricity market, that if Russian imports were
reliably available, abolishing Finland’s strategic reserve could lead to lower costs for
Finnish consumers. However, as this is not the case, the advantages of maintaining
a strategic reserve outweigh the disadvantages, and the interconnection expansion
should be avoided—instead, the development of local capacities should be given
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preference. Furthermore, Cepeda and Finon (2011) find that in the long term an EOM
will only marginally benefit from a CRM in an adjacent market. Also, for the EOM, the
unilateral introduction of a price cap leads to a reduced level of security of supply as
suppliers prefer to offer their generation capacity in neighboring markets. Moreover,
by using a simulation model to investigate the unilateral introduction of a strategic
reserve and reliability options in a two-country case, Meyer and Gore (2015) show
that the overall cross-border welfare effect is most likely negative.
In addition, it can be concluded that the introduction of a CRM in a neighboring
country creates considerable pressure on the national regulator to introduce a ded-
icated CRM as a safeguard against possibly harmful consequences (Bhagwat et al.,
2017c; Gore et al., 2016). Therefore, Hawker et al. (2017) are advocating the cross-
border coordination of CRMs to provide sufficient new investment in generation and
transmission capacities and Neuhoff et al. (2016) claim that a coordinated strategic re-
serve in Europe should be feasible and, among other things, would have the following
advantages: On the one hand, capacities from abroad could be used at times of maxi-
mum stress and, on the other hand, the joint calculation of the reserve volume would
reduce the required quantity as individual demand peaks usually occur at different
times. Furthermore, with the possible expansion of cross-border capacity and the
associated strong influence on prices (Osorio and van Ackere, 2016), a coordinated
approach seems to be increasingly advantageous. However, solving the dilemma of
choosing between a coordinated or national approach is complex. Especially when
time is a critical factor, a co-ordinated solution might not be implemented early
enough due to the increased need for coordination (Vries, 2007).
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5.3.7 Impact of a high share of intermittent renewables
One of the central questions associated with the rapid expansion of RES is whether
they exacerbate the adequacy problem. First of all, Cramton et al. (2013) point out
that price caps present in most EOMs are unaffected as the level is neither lowered nor
increased by RES. Nonetheless, increasing low price caps might become more relevant
as large investments in peak-load generation capacity are likely to be required as a
backup for intermittent RES. However, this could be prevented by a price cap set too
low (Cepeda and Finon, 2013; Jaehnert and Doorman, 2014). As RES, due to their
marginal costs close to zero, can be regarded as a price-inelastic demand—with the
exception of situations where the prices are negative—Cramton et al. (2013) argue that
RES increase the volatility of and the uncertainty about the demand and market prices
and, thereby, exacerbate the adequacy problem. Similarly, Newbery (2017) claims
that a high share of intermittent RES, on the one hand, and the uncertainty about
the development of the carbon allowances price, on the other hand, likely require
long-term capacity contracts—beyond a horizon of three to four years—for ensuring
reliability efficiently.
Jaehnert and Doorman (2014) investigate the development of system adequacy
and find that the capacity reserve margins decrease with an increasing share of RES
leading to several occurrences of load curtailment. Also, the merit-order effect caused
by large-scale employment of wind energy is more relevant in an EOM than in a
market with a CRM, where thermal generation capacities are better able to recover
the fixed costs of their investment (Cepeda and Finon, 2013). However, in reverse, a
CRM that only takes into account the secured available capacity can have a negative
impact on the market-driven development of wind power. Still, in a world with 100%
renewable energy, Weiss et al. (2017) argue that an EOM can adequately function if
market prices take into account the opportunity costs of flexible resources. However,
in such a scenario, RES probably still require a dedicated funding mechanism. Besides,
a CRM might be necessary to minimize the associated risk of underinvestment in
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flexible capacities.
5.3.8 Incentives for flexible resources
As with increasing shares of RES supply fluctuations in the electricity market become
more frequent, flexible resources are required (Grave et al., 2012; Nicolosi, 2010), e.g.,
demand-side management or short-term and long-term storage options that have not
yet been sufficiently remunerated in the market design to date (Cepeda and Finon,
2013; Joskow, 2008). An adequate market design needs to pay sufficient attention to
flexible resources in order to fully capitalize on their potential (Neuhoff et al., 2016;
Weiss et al., 2017). Although flexible resources do not automatically guarantee a
reliable level of investment, they ensure reliability under different levels of installed
generation capacity and induce an efficient electricity dispatch (Cramton and Stoft,
2005).
Whereas the concept of firm or reliable capacity is already well defined and, more-
over, constant, regardless of how the future electricity system develops, the term
flexibility is still vague and furthermore has a critical temporal dependency. Some-
times flexibility is required for a few seconds or minutes, but other times for several
hours or even days and usually the most suitable options for short-term flexibility are
not coherent with those for long-term flexibility (Hogan, 2017). In order to reliably
determine the need for and value of flexibility, it is best to compare the value of energy
in scarcity with that in abundance situations, which depends on the current state of
the electricity system.
In a well-functioning EOM, market participants are exposed to extremely high price
signals at times of scarcity or negative prices in times of oversupply, thus, creating
incentives for long-term investments in storage technologies as well as incentives
for consumers to directly react to price developments (e.g., Hu et al., 2017). For this
reason, EOMs can especially benefit from increased flexibility, e.g., through demand
response, as the market is then able to react to extreme price peaks and consumers
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are no longer exposed to the excessive market power of suppliers, thereby reducing
the need for regulatory price caps (Schwenen, 2014). Yet, if the market design is
severely different, e.g., by a forward capacity market, price spikes will decrease in
frequency and amplitude, thus, diminishing the value of flexible resources (Hogan,
2017). Auer and Haas (2016) even argue that the introduction of capacity payments
ruins market competition, meaning that flexibility options would not be exploited,
thus, leaving their development only in the hands of the regulator. Even though these
theoretical findings pose a clear disadvantage for CRMs, practical experiences indicate
that decision makers seem to be aware of this issue as, for example in the US, CRMs
explicitly include financial support for flexible resources, which in turn lead to a rise
of these capacities (Rious et al., 2015).
5.4 Conclusions and policy implications
Electricity markets are in many respects similar to most other markets; however, they
require a specific regulatory framework due to a number of peculiarities such as the
physical characteristics of the commodity electricity, an inelastic volatile demand
and the missing-money problem. In combination with the transformation from a
centralized system with primarily fossil-fuel power plants to a decentralized system
with a high share of renewable energies and the sharp decline in electricity prices,
concerns among policy makers about generation adequacy have grown and led to
the implementation of various CRMs. However, the necessity of CRMs remains the
subject of ongoing discussion, and it is often argued that an EOM already offers an
efficient solution whereas CRMs tend to be inefficient. To better grasp the arguments
of both sides, an up-to-date overview of the debate was given. Subsequently, a clas-
sification of the different mechanisms was shown, the current status of real-world
implementations was presented, and initial experiences were discussed. Whereas
only two types of mechanisms (central buyer and de-central obligations) are used in
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the United States, the situation is much more diverse in Europe due to uncoordinated
national approaches.
The findings in the literature reveal that CRMs can improve generation adequacy,
but also bring along new challenges. One major advantage of CRMs is that they are
able to effectively reduce or even to solve different problems of existing markets. For
example, fluctuations caused by investment cycles can be dampened—even though
usually not fully abolished—and, thereby, extreme scarcity events can be prevented.
Also, the adverse effects of the abuse of market power can be mitigated, and some
mechanisms, for example, a forward capacity market, are able to solve the missing
money problem. Also, CRMs usually make market developments less dependent on
the risk profile of the investors, thereby, making them more predictable and reducing
deviations from the long-term optimum that can be caused by risk-averse decision-
makers.
Determining the optimal market design, however, remains an ongoing challenge.
As the adequate design depends on a variety of factors such as the existing capacity
mix and demand characteristics, no general advantageousness of single mechanisms
could be determined so far. For example, often a central buyer mechanism seems to
yield significantly better results than a strategic reserve, which is inefficient by design
as contracted capacities are used for a single purpose only. However, in exceptional
cases the results are ambiguous. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that market-based
mechanisms, e.g., a forward capacity market, are usually advantageous compared to
interventionist mechanisms such as capacity payments.
Furthermore, the implementation of a CRM can lead to market distortions, e.g.,
through cross-border effects. Even though cross-border impacts are diverse and the
results in the literature are sometimes conflicting, there seems to be a consensus that a
one-sided implementation of CRMs leads to negative spillover effects on a neighboring
market without a CRM. This increases the pressure in the neighboring market either
to introduce a domestic mechanism or to pursue a coordinated approach. Compared
to an EOM, the value of flexible resources is diminished in the presence of a CRM.
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Therefore, their expansion is largely independent of market forces and left in the
hands of the regulator.
Even though a large number of studies has already been carried out, the compara-
bility of the results is often limited and, thus, it is difficult to select the best mechanism
to implement. It would therefore be helpful if common criteria or specific scenarios
are used to evaluate different market designs. Furthermore, especially the efficiency
of the mechanism is all too often neglected. Also, the behavior of market participants
as learning, risk-averse agents that interact with each other often does not seem to
be adequately addressed and rarely verified by studies or experiments. However, as
the investors’ risk profile can directly influence the results and the relative advanta-
geousness of different CRMs, it would thus be advisable to explicitly consider risk
aversion.
5.5 Details on selected real-world implementations of CRMs
In the following, some details on real-world implementations of CRMs additional to
the information already presented in Section 5.2.2 is provided. Not all mechanisms
active around the world are described, but the focus rather lies on the mechanisms
currently active in Europe as well as the different central buyer implementations in
the United States, which is the most common type of CRM used in Northern America.
Strategic reserve (Belgium/Sweden)
Both Belgium (since 2014) and Sweden (since 2003) have set up strategic reserves to
support demand peaks during the winter season (Elia, 2015; Svenska Kraftnät, 2016).
In Belgium, the capacity is procured through a competitive tendering process, in
which market participants intending to shut down capacity are obliged to participate
(Hancher et al., 2015). Thus far (until October 2017), the reserve has not been activated
(Elia, 2017a,b). Contrary, the Swedish reserve has already been used a few times, with
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yearly costs in 2013 and 2014 amounting to about 14 respectively 13 million Euro. This
is significantly lower than the estimated costs of a shortage situation (90 million Euro)
(Cejie, 2015).
Central buyer (United Kingdom/US – ISO-NE/US – MISO/US – NYISO/US – PJM)
In order to maintain generation adequacy, in 2014, the United Kingdom introduced
central capacity auctions with the first delivery to take place in winter 2018/2019. The
capacity payments are determined via descending clock auctions four years (T–4) and
one year (T–1) before the respective delivery period. Despite the technology-neutral
approach, the incentives for demand response (0.4–2.5% of the contracted capacity)
and new investments (4.2–6.5%) have been limited in the first three T–4 auctions
(Ofgem, 2015, 2016, 2017). However, in the latest T–4 auction (2016), existing and
new storage capacities won contracts for the first time, accounting for around 6% of
the contracted capacity (Ofgem, 2017).
ISONew England (ISO-NE) and New York ISO (NYISO) were the first market areas
in the United States to use central capacity auctions as early as 1998 and 1999, respec-
tively. A few years later, PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM) (2007) and Midcontinent
ISO (MISO) (2009) also introduced such mechanisms in their market areas. All four
implementations have in common that capacity is procured in multiple zones in order
to account for intra-zonal transmission constraints (Byers et al., 2018). The auction
design, however, differs among the mechanisms. While uniform pricing is applied
in PJM and NYISO, ISO-NE andMISO use descending clock auctions (Bhagwat et al.,
2016b). Moreover, ISO-NE is the only mechanism bundling capacity options with
financial call options (similarly to the reliability options model proposed by Vázquez
et al., 2002), while NYISO, PJM and MISO conduct forward capacity markets. An
overview of the historical capacity prices of the four markets is provided in Byers et al.
(2018), although the authors state that clear trends could not be identified due to the
limited amount of data points as well as differences and changes in markets rules.
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De-central obligation (France)
In 2015, France implemented a de-central obligationwith the first delivery to take place
in 2017. All load-serving entities are obliged to hold a certain number of certificates
reflecting the share of electricity consumption of their consumers during times of peak
demand, e.g., when extreme winter conditions occur. Certificates can be obtained
by certifying own generation and demand-side capacities, which afterward can be
traded in a market or using bilateral arrangements (European Commission, 2016a).
Within Europe, the Frenchmechanism is the first to explicitly include and remunerate
foreign capacities in neighboring countries, however, limited by the expected capacity
of the respective interconnectors at peak times (European Commission, 2016d). In
the first three auctions, a total volume of 34GW has been contracted with all auctions
resulting in capacity prices close to 10 000 EUR/MW (EPEX SPOT, 2017d,e,f).
Targeted capacity payments (Spain)
The Spanish mechanism, initially introduced in 1997, was substantially redesigned
in 2007 to adapt to the then valid European law (Hancher et al., 2015). The new
system was designed to reduce investment risk by offering fixed capacity payments
for a period of ten years (investment incentive). Securing generation adequacy in
the medium-term (availability service) through contracts of one year or less with
peak-load power plants was the other main target. However, to estimate the required
generation capacity and long-term capacity payments was made significantly more
difficult by unforeseen events like the economic crisis and the resulting low electricity
demand, which together led to the reduction of long-term capacity payments for
investments in 2012 and ultimately to the abolition of the investment incentive in
2013. Nonetheless, the availability service is still active.

Chapter6An agent-based model ofthe German day-ahead market
Since the deregulation of electricity markets that in Europe started in 1996 basedon the Directive 96/92/EC, national markets gradually evolved from integrated
monopolies to liberalized markets. Although at that time optimizing models were
widespread and used to assess electricity system related questions in monopolies,
these models did not account for market aspects, which brought forward the develop-
ment of agent-based electricity market models, in which players like companies or
the government are represented by agents that continuously interact with each other,
autonomously pursue their own goals and possess their own set of private information
(Tesfatsion, 2002). Thus, results from agent-based are evolved step-by-step and are
the outcome of all interactions between the different agents. Initially, agent-based
models were limited to rather simplified cases, but with the increasing availability
of computational resources, researchers were enabled to develop large-scale models
with a high degree of flexibility and the detailed consideration of techno-economic
restrictions (Weidlich and Veit, 2008). Agent-based models are able to analyze imper-
fect markets such as oligopolies that often times occur in electricity markets, e.g., in
Germany where currently four companies—Energie Baden-WürttembergAG (EnBW),
E.ON SE (E.ON), RWE AG (RWE) and Vattenfall GmbH (Vattenfall)—own more than
80% of the thermal generation capacities (Bundeskartellamt, 2011). In Germany, the
electricity market has undergone major changes due to the phase-out of nuclear en-
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ergy and the rise of renewable energies, which have been promoted via the Renewable
Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) that provides fixed feed-in tariffs
based on the renewable technology and guarantees priority feed-in into the grid.
Especially the capacities of wind and photovoltaic power plants have experienced a
sharp rise which poses a challenge to the generation companies that have to cope with
the uncertain feed-in from these sources. With a total installed capacity of 33GW of
photovoltaic and 31GW of wind power plants in 2012, the highest difference between
the official day-ahead forecast on a national level and the real-feed in was 6GW and
7GW respectively (EEX, 2018b). In the current market design, these deviations have
to be taken care of by the transmission grid operator who first tries to balance the
deviations by trading in the intraday market and afterward by requesting balancing
energy.
There already exist numerous large-scale electricity market models. One of the
first models was already developed in 2001 for the electricity market of Wales and
England and already included a forward market as well as balancing mechanism but
only a single day was modeled (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001). An application for the U.S.
electricity market can be found in Li et al. (2011b). Recent models also contain grid
restrictions, e.g., for the German market area (Veit et al., 2009). Whereas in most
model uncertainties are not explicitly regarded, in Li and Shi (2012) an agent-based
model is presented where generation companies have to cope with the uncertain feed-
in from wind power plants in a locational marginal pricing scheme. The generation
companies learn from their past experience and try to improve their bidding strategy.
Other uncertainties apart from the wind feed-in are not regarded.
A critique often stated in regard to the agent-based modeling approach is that
only few guidelines exist to validate agent-based models and therefore models lack
proper empirical validation on an aggregate level. Also, not enough information
about key parameters is provided so that results are not reproducible (Weidlich and
Veit, 2008). Nevertheless, the explanatory power of agent-based models has been
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proved when validation is performed. Thus, agent-based models are a valuable tool
to assess electricity-market related question (Sensfuß et al., 2008).
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 6.1 the model is introduced
with its main characteristics. Then, in Section 6.2 an overview of the input data of the
model, such as power plants or demand is given. Section 6.3 reports the simulation
results and the model validation. Finally, Section 6.4 summarizes the main results
and concludes.
6.1 An agent-based model with uncertainty factors
In this model, the German day-ahead electricity market with its relevant players, e.g.,
traders, generators and market operators, is replicated. Generators and consumer are
called by a market operator to submit their bids for the next day. The hourly demand
is bidden by the demand trader; whereas the generation companies submit bids for
their thermal generating capacities and the expected renewable feed-in is bidden by
the grid operator. After all agents have submitted their bids, the market is cleared,
and each agent receives its accepted bids as well as the hourly market price. In the
following, the different parts of the model are described in detail.
6.1.1 Demand
Although the short-term electricity demand can be regarded as rather inelastic, in
this model, a limited elasticity of the demand has been used. This is due to the
fact that the model is restricted to the German market area. The supply or demand
of neighboring countries is included as a static hourly value whereas in reality the
exchange is influenced by themarket price, e.g., if the demand in Germany is relatively
low, additional generation capacities may be available which run at lower costs than
power plants a neighbor country and therefore additional electricity is exported.
Hence, the demand is also influenced by the market price. In the model, the elastic
demand is defined as:
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Dt (Pt) = D∗t ⋅ (P∗tPt )є (6.1)
with D∗t , P∗t and є denoting the historical demand, the historical price, and the price
elasticity. Similar to Traber and Kemfert (2011), an elasticity parameter of є = 0.9 has
been used for the simulation in Section 6.3.
6.1.2 Supply
In order to account for start-up costs, generation companies have to forecast how
long their power plants will be in the market. The bidding algorithm can be divided
into several steps (see Figure 6.1), where each main step is described in the following
paragraphs.
Price forecast
Three factors mainly influence the uncertainty in the day-ahead market: First, the
exact demand of the next day, second, the renewable feed-in and third, unexpected
outages of power plants. In the model, each uncertainty factor is represented by
different scenarios. For the demand and the renewable feed-in, three scenarios for
the next day are created: high, medium and low. For the unexpected outages, two
scenarios are created. In one scenario, all power plants are available, and in the other
scenario, different randomly selected power plants are unavailable. Each combination
of scenarios is then used as a scenario for which a price forecast is performed.
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Hourly bids
Based on the different price forecasts and the variable costs of a power plant for each
hour it is assumed that the power plant is in the market if the power plant’s variable
costs are below the price forecast and otherwise out of the market. The variable costs
are defined as:
cvard ,i = pfueld ,iηi + EF iηi ⋅ pcerd ,i + cotherd ,i (6.2)
where pfueld ,i , pcerd ,i , EF i , ηi , and cotherd ,i denote the fuel price, the carbon price, the fuel
emission factor, the efficiency and the variable operation and maintenance costs.
The start-up costs consist of two parts. One part is related to the fuel and carbon
certificates needed for the ramping process, and the other part is related to the dep-
recation caused by the ramping process. Hence, the start-up costs can be expressed
as:
cstartd ,i = ri (pfueld ,i + EF i ⋅ pcerd ,i) + di (6.3)
with ri and di denoting the ramping parameter and the deprecation parameter. The
start-up costs also depend on the hour of the start-up and the last running hour. In
the model three different start-up costs—hot, warm, and cold—are distinguished:
cstartd ,h,i = 0.3 ⋅ c
start
d ,i h ≤ 8
0.5 ⋅ cstartd ,i 8 < h ≤ 48
1.0 ⋅ cstartd ,i h > 48 (6.4)
where for the warm and hot start-up costs a fraction of the cold start-up costs were
chosen similar to Grimm (2007). Whereas the variable costs are the same in all
scenarios, the start-up costs can differ for each scenario. In order to determine how
the start-up costs are included in the bids, first, for each scenario the start-up costs
are evenly distributed over the period where the power plant is expected to be in
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Figure 6.1 | Sequential diagram of the bidding process. After the electricity price
scenarios are forecasted, first hourly bids based on the variable costs of each plant are
prepared. If a power plant is not expected to be on the market at all, block bids are
made to ensure that the start-up costs are earned in the event of unexpected short-
term operation. For an expected operation with shorter interruptions, block bids can
be created, which allow a continuous operation and avoid start-up costs.
the market based on the variable costs, e.g., if a power plant is supposed to be in the
market for three hours in one scenario, each hour contains one third of the total start-
up costs. Second, the expected distributed start-up costs are calculated as the average
value over all scenarios. Then, for each hour where the power plant is expected to be
in the market at least once, an hourly bid is submitted:
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bid(h, p, v) (6.5)
where h denotes the hour, p price and v the volume of the bid. The price of the bid is
equal to the variable costs and the expected distributed start-up costs.
Avoided turn-off bids
If a power plant is expected to be out of the market for a short period of time, in order
to avoid a shutdown a market price below its variable costs might be accepted. This is
even more relevant when a power plant due to technical constraints is not flexible
enough to ramp down and up in the out-of-market period. In the model, each power
plant i has a minimum downtime. For the electricity generator, it is important that an
attempt to avoid a shutdown is either entirely successful or completely unsuccessful.
A partial success would result in shutting down the power plant as well as producing
below variable costs. Therefore, a block bid is submitted by the generation company
which only can be fully accepted in each hour or not at all:
bid(hs , he , p, v) (6.6)
where hs, he , p, and v denotes the first hour, last hour, hourly price and volume of
the bid. The hourly price p of the block bid equals the variable costs cvard ,i minus the
avoided start-up costs:
cavoidi (h) = cstartd ,h,i ⋅ 1h if h > hminicstartd ,h,i ⋅ 1h ⋅ hmini ⋅ch else (6.7)
with h, hmini , c denoting the number of hours the unit is out of the market, the
minimum downtime and a cost parameter. Although the minimal out-of-market time
does not represent a hard technical limit, it can be seen as an economic limit, as the
generating company wants to avoid excessive thermal stress that would significantly
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Table 6.1 | Mark-up actions and scarcity states. To ensure effective learning, the
action and state space must be restricted. In this case, five actions and states are
permitted. For each state, agents can choose between no markup at all up to the
maximum value of 15 EUR/MWh.
Actions [EUR/MWh] 0 3 6 9 15
Scarcity states [-] (0.5,0.6] (0.6,0.7] (0.7,0.8] (0.8,0.9] (0.9,1.0]
lower the unit’s lifetime. In case the out-of-market period is shorter than the minimal
out-of-market time, the generation company is willing to lower its bid price by an
amount greater than the start-up costs. This amount is related to the ratio of minimal
and expected out-of-market time as well as the cost parameter c. For the simulation
in Section 6.3, the parameter c takes a value of two, with which historical results could
be reproduced adequately.
Learning and Mark-up
The generation companies can increase their bids by a markup. The markup is chosen
from a list of discrete values and depends on the hourly scarcity of the market. The
scarcity is expressed as the ratio of demand to capacity for which five different states
are distinguished. In all states all actions can be chosen; only if the scarcity ratio is
less than 0.5 no markup is applied. The different actions and states can be found in
Table 6.1. The actions are then determined via a reinforcement learning algorithm
based on Nicolaisen et al. (2001).
6.1.3 Market clearing
In a first step, all bids—hourly bids and block bids—are aggregated into linearly
interpolated supply and demand functions, where the volume and price of each bid is
taken into account. Block bids that either have to be accepted or rejected in each hour
are split into hourly bids that can be accepted or rejected independently from each
other. The preliminary market price then results from the intersection of the supply
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Figure 6.2 | Market clearing. Three different situations can be distinguished: volume
indeterminacy, unambiguous result and price indeterminacy. In the case of volume
indeterminacy, the set of possible volumes is limited to the interval [q∗1 , q∗2]; in the
case of price uncertainty, the interval [p∗1 , p∗2] can be specified. In these situations, the
model proceeds as follows: In the first case, the traded volume is maximized, whereas
in the second case, the center of the price interval is selected. Source: EPEX SPOT
(2011a).
and demand function. As a second step, the profit for each block bid is calculated
based on the preliminary market prices. The block bid that shows the highest loss
is rejected. In case two block bids share the same loss, only the block bid with the
lower volume is excluded. Afterward, the preliminary market prices are recalculated
as described in the first step and another block bid is excluded. This procedure is
repeated until all block bids are profitable. If the intersection of the supply and demand
function is not a single point but an interval, the market outcome is indeterminate,
and specific rules need to be defined. For the model, rules of the market clearing
mechanism at the EEX were adopted (see Figure 6.2).
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6.2 Required data
Due to the fact that reliable input data are central to obtain reliable results, all data
has been carefully selected. In the following paragraphs, the different data sources are
described in detail.
For Germany, the Federal Network Agency provides a list of all power plants of
a capacity larger than 10MW. This list contains useful specifications such as the net
capacity and owner of each power plant, but not all parameters relevant for the applied
model, e.g., the efficiency are included. Therefore, the missing parameters need to be
researched. In particular, for newer power plants plenty of information is publicly
accessible, but in case some parameters were not retrievable, an estimation based on
the technology and initial date of operation was performed similar to Genoese (2010).
According to the EuropeanNetwork of Transmission SystemOperators (ENTSO-E),
the yearly consumption in Germany in 2011 amounted to 544.2 TWh (ENTSO-E,
2018b). Consumption values are available on a monthly level only, but for the model
hourly values are required. Hourly load values are available which, however, are not
as precise as the monthly consumption values. Therefore, the hourly load values were
taken and scaled so that they represent the total yearly consumption.
In 2011, Germany exported more electricity than it imported with a resulting net
exchange of 6.2 TWh (ENTSO-E, 2018b). This equals 1.1% of the national consump-
tion. As the model’s spatial resolution is restricted to Germany, the exchange with
neighboring countries has to be given exogenously. The hourly exchange values were
taken from electricity transparency platform of the ENTSO-E and correspond to the
cross-border physicals flows (ENTSO-E, 2018b). The cross-border commercial sched-
ules would have been an even better choice to represent the exchange the generation
companies expect when bidding in the day-ahead market, but those values were not
available consistently for the year 2011.
In this model, daily prices for emission allowances, hard coal, natural gas and oil are
integrated. Natural gas, hard coal, and allowances prices are taken from the EEX. The
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Table 6.2 | Start-up costs. The start-up costs
vary considerably from technology to technol-
ogy in terms of both the deprecation and fuel
factor. Of these factors, the fuel factor is de-
cisive one, which means that the technologies
with the lowest value, i.e., Gas GT/IC and Oil
IC, usually exhibit the lowest start-up costs.
Source: Traber and Kemfert (2011).
Deprecation Fuel Factor
[EUR/MW] [MWh/MW]
Coal New 5.0 6.2
Coal Old 1.5 6.2
Gas CC 10.0 3.5
Gas GT 10.0 1.1
Gas ST 10.0 4.0
Gas IC 10.0 1.0
Lignite New 3.0 6.2
Lignite Old 1.0 6.2
Nuclear 1.7 16.7
Oil GT 5.0 1.1
Oil ST 5.0 4.0
Oil IC 5.0 1.0
daily oil price is provided by the European Central Bank. Whereas for the allowances
and natural gas daily spot prices are available at the EEX, this is not the case for hard
coal, which is only traded via futures as coal cannot be delivered fast enough in larger
quantities. Thus, the daily coal price is approximated via the coal future for the next
month whose trading date is closest to the simulated day.
The parameters for the start-up costs in Equation (6.3) are not publicly available
on the plant level and, hence, have to be estimated. Here, the values from Table 6.2
are used, which are based on Traber and Kemfert (2011).
The expected and actual generation of wind and photovoltaic power plants is taken
from EEX (2018b). The feed-in of other renewable technologies, though not publicly
available, is based on selected profiles whereas the total yearly production equals the
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Figure 6.3 | Annual price curve. The sorted simulated and historical price curves show
high similarity. Deviations are mainly noticeable in the range below 40 EUR/MWh
when only base-load power are running and, in the model, prices decrease compara-
tively late. Sources: EPEX SPOT (2018b).
values from BMWi (2018c).
6.3 Simulation and validation of the results
The proposed computational model described in Section 6.1 enables to thoroughly
analyze the German electricity market. In the following, a simulation for each hour
of the year 2011 is discussed, and an empirical validation of the results is performed at
an aggregate level. As valid input data are crucial to achieve reliable model results,
data were carefully selected as described in the previous section. However, some data,
e.g., the outages of power plants, is not publicly available at the plant level. Thus,
deviations between input data and historical data can negatively impact the quality of
the results. Figure 6.3 gives an overview of the sorted historical and simulated hourly
prices showing that the proposed model is well capable of reproducing historical
prices. In Figure 6.4 the simulated and historical hourly prices of the first fourteen
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Figure 6.4 | Chronological price development. The simulated and historical prices for
the first fourteen days of January in 2011 show a similar daily pattern. Whereas the
upper price peaks are usually reached or even exceeded, not all negative price peaks
are matched in the simulation. Sources: EPEX SPOT (2018b).
days of the year 2011 are depicted, which exhibit a similar structure. To further validate
the model, different statistical figures are calculated which can be found in Table 6.3.
Themean in themodel of 50.56 EUR/MWh is slightly lower than the historical mean
of 51.12 EUR/MWh, but their difference is comparatively small. Also, the standard
deviation in the model is slightly slower than the historical standard deviation. This
is related to the number of prices below 30 EUR/MWh, which is less than in historical
prices. Low prices are influenced by must-run power plants that for example provide
heat supply and therefore cannot be shut down. This is currently not accounted for in
the model. Furthermore, the assumption that there exists potential to increase the
export into foreign market areas may not hold to be true at all times. This potential
can increase the load in low load situations and, hence, as well increase market prices.
The historical and simulated minimum prices differ by 26.95 EUR/MWh. Given
that the fourth lowest historical price equals −10.1 EUR/MWh, the minimal simulated
price of −9.86 EUR/MWh seems to be reasonably close. The same is the case for the
maximum prices, where the difference between historical and simulated values equals
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Table 6.3 | Statistical figures. For the year 2011, the simu-
lated and historical figures closely resemble each other. How-
ever, as it is often the case, the fundamental model can
well represent typical situations, but cannot explain the most
extreme values, some of which might be caused by non-
fundamental factors such as human behavior.
Figures Unit Historical Simulated
Mean EUR/MWh 51.12 50.56
Standard deviation EUR/MWh 13.60 11.86
Minimum EUR/MWh −36.82 −9.86
Maximum EUR/MWh 117.49 98.84
Correlation – 0.77
MAEa EUR/MWh 2.25
RMSEa EUR/MWh 2.93
a These figures are calculated based on the sorted historical
and simulated prices.
18.65 EUR/MWh, but only thirteen historical prices exceed the maximum simulation
price.
The Pearson correlation coefficient of the unsorted hourly prices equals 0.77. This
value indicates a high dependence of the price paths as it can also be seen in Figure 6.4,
where the correlation equals 0.79. The MAE of 2.25 EUR/MWh and the root-mean-
square error (RMSE) of 2.93 EUR/MWh can be considered as very low. In comparison,
aMAE of 4.26 EUR/MWh and a RMSE of 8.91 EUR/MWh are considered to be excellent
for a bottom-up electricity market model (Barth et al., 2004). Likewise, for a German
electricity-market model, aMAE of 7.00 EUR/MWh and a RMSE of 8.83 EUR/MWh is
reached for the year 2010 (Genoese, 2013).
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6.4 Conclusions and implications
In this chapter, an agent-based model for the German electricity market has been
introduced that accounts for short-time uncertainty factors such as power plant
outages and fluctuating renewable sources. The model is based on detailed input
data such as daily prices for carbon, hard coal, natural gas, and oil as well as hourly
values for the national demand and the renewable feed-in. The model’s database
also contains each power plant with a capacity of more than 10MW. A simulation
for each hour of the year 2011 was performed. The validation shows that the model is
able to adequately simulate historical peak and off-peak market prices. Although the
range of simulated prices is a slightly smaller than the historical price range, negative
prices do occur due to start-up costs and technical restrictions of power plants, e.g.,
start-up times or minimal out-of-market times. In order to account for start-up costs,
generation companies need to forecast when their power plants will be in the market.
Here, the integration of uncertainty via different residual load scenarios enables
the generation companies to better cope with deviations from their expectations.
Due to the increasing share of fluctuating renewable energies in Germany, short-
term uncertainties are having a growing impact on the day-ahead market, and the
importance of explicit consideration in fundamental models is further increasing.
Compared to the historical values, the number of hours in which base-load power
plants determine the market price is significantly lower within the performed simula-
tion. As base-load power plants determine the market price in low demand situations,
these cases must be analyzed in greater depth. In this context, it is critical to account
for must-run capacities that for example supply heat to the local industry or housings
and therefore cannot be shut down. Another important area for future research is the
interdependence of day-ahead markets and other markets, such as reserve markets
and intraday markets.

Chapter7Analysis of design options for theelectricity market: The German case
After intensive discussions in the past years, some European countries, e.g., Bel-gium, France, and the UK have implemented capacity mechanisms. Germany
decided to adjust the design of its electricity market (EOM) by introducing a capacity
reserve, which is similar to the strategic reserve mechanisms found in some other Eu-
ropean countries (e.g., Belgium, Sweden). Major changes such as the implementation
of a capacity market are rejected under the current proposal of the electricity market
act (in German: “Strommarktgesetz,” see BMWi, 2018c). However, the appropriate
market design remains a controversial issue.
The reason for that are ambiguities regarding whether the current EOM can provide
sufficient incentives for investments in flexible generation technologies to ensure the
long-term security of supply. The wholesale electricity prices have been comparatively
low, which can be explained by different factors. Firstly, there are surplus capacities
originating from times before the liberalization of the energy market. The surplus
increased due to the large-scale introduction of renewable energies in addition to the
coupling of European market areas. And secondly, the currently low price for carbon
emission certificates and natural coal lead to low electricity prices, thereby favoring
coal-fired power plants and causing gas-fired power plants to be less competitive.
As the electricity feed-in from intermittent renewable energy sources rises (e.g., Ed-
erer, 2015), the operating hours of conventional power plants subsides. Their revenue
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situation worsens considerably. However, flexible conventional backup capacities
might still be necessary, especially when peak load times overlap low feed-in from
PV and wind power. This raises the question whether the marginal cost based EOM
provides enough incentives for investments in new power plant capacity or whether
a capacity market should be introduced as a new market segment for the product
secured capacity.
Besides providing sufficient capacity in peak load times, the new market design
also aims for other objectives. This includes both the elimination of local supply (grid)
bottlenecks within Germany and the conversion of the electricity system towards a
more flexible one with sufficient power generation and storage capacity. The latter is
especially important concerning the objective of the federal government to generate
80% of electricity from RES by 2050. Predominantly, flexible capacity such as gas
turbines and energy storages, or demand-side management (DSM) measures will be
required in the future, in addition to the volatile generation of renewable energies.
These different objectives also influence the configuration of the future market design
and the parameterization of a capacity mechanism (Mastropietro et al., 2016).
The need for more significant changes to the EOM design and the introduction of
a capacity market are still not sufficiently analyzed, especially based on simulative
approaches. Existing studies are based on optimization or Cournot equilibrium
models (Léautier, 2016; R2B, 2014), focusing on a system analysis from a central
planner perspective. However, the electricity system changes to a more decentralized
one with differentmarket players that follow their own targets. This can differ from the
objectives of a central planner or the regulator. Besides, market players have to make
decisions with limited foresight of future developments. This study, therefore, focuses
on individual decisions and investment behavior of market players. The agent-based
analysis of the effectiveness and cost efficiency of different market design options is
done by paying attention to the specific decisions of stakeholders and their limited
foresight (especially of the major power plant operators and the regulator). Another
advantage of agent-based simulation is that it allows the determination of market
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failures, especially possible capacity gaps (e.g., the power plant operators do not realize
sufficient investments to cover peak demand). In contrast to optimizing energy or
electricity system models, there is no restriction in the agent-based approach that the
demand has to be met in each time step (energy balance constraint). Therefore, in this
approach, the total capacity derived from the single investment decisions can be lower
than the required capacity to meet the peak demand consistently. This characteristic
of the agent-based simulation approach allows for the analysis of generation adequacy,
as a possible lack of generation capacities due to less investment activity of market
agents can be directly determined from the output of the model.
This chapter introduces a powerful method to analyze the effectiveness and cost
efficiency of market design regulations that are intensively discussed not only in
Germany but also in other European countries like France, Belgium, and the UK.
The effectiveness of a market design is defined by its ability to trigger investments
in power plants or other flexible capacity and to serve the demand for electricity
through generation capacity in every point of time. Besides, the effectiveness and cost
efficiency (the overall system costs of electricity supply) in each market design are
also analyzed in this chapter.
The analysis of various market design options can support policy makers in their
decisions on new regulations for the electricity market. It primarily provides insights
about circumstances under which an EOM still can guarantee the security of supply,
especially generation adequacy, and at which time the introduction of a capacity mar-
ket could be more advantageous. This study may also help energy supply companies
to recognize the impact of different market regulations on their investments and
to understand at which point of time new investments could become economically
feasible.
To achieve these goals, the chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.1 gives an
overview of themost recent literature on the security of supply, in particular regarding
the required power plant capacity to meet the demand. The focus here is also on
market designs that are favored to guarantee generation adequacy. This is followed by
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a detailed overview of the proposed market design options for the German electricity
market (Section 7.2).
Section 7.4 describes the applied agent-based modeling approach for the German
electricity market. In the case of an EOM market design, it focuses on investment
agents, who make their decisions based on their expected income on the futures and
spot market. However, if the underlying market design contains a capacity market
or strategic reserves, then the assessment of investments is carried out considering
incomes from the capacity remuneration as well. Section 7.5 focuses on the results,
especially on the question whether the EOM can provide sufficient investments and
guarantee generation adequacy. Parameters that are essential to improve the effec-
tiveness of the EOM are also highlighted. Furthermore, it is described how much
capacity remuneration mechanisms can improve generation adequacy ant to which
costs. Finally, the main conclusions drawn from the results are summarized in the last
section that also critically reflects on the applied modeling approach and discusses
possible improvements going forward.
7.1 Literature review about security of supply and market design
analyses
There is a wide range of research covering the issue of market design analysis and
security of supply. Some of the literature follows a rather theoretical approach (e.g.,
Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Cramton and Stoft, 2005; Stoft, 2002). However, few have
conducted a model-based analysis that quantifies the effect of capacity mechanisms
on electricity system and prices (Cepeda and Finon, 2011; Genoese and Fichtner, 2012;
Vázquez et al., 2002).
Stoft (2002) states that price spikes are necessary for ensuring generation adequacy.
These price spikes are required to cover all fixed costs of the generation capacities.
Theoretically, a capacity market is not needed, but real markets have two failures: the
mostly inelastic demand due to missing real-time metering, and the impossibility of
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excluding consumers not willing to pay for security of supply. Thus, capacity markets
are necessary to encourage sufficient investment in new capacity. Cramton and Stoft
(2005) argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets,
and present a design that avoids the many problems found in the early capacity
markets. They propose a capacity market, which induces supply to invest in sufficient
generation that is in the right location, satisfies a reliability standard at low costs and
is of the right type. They state that the market structure is imperfectly competitive,
especially during times of peak load.
Genoese et al. (2012) use the agent-based model PowerACE to compare the impact
of capacity payments (similar to that in the Spanish market) on electricity prices and
new investments. The results show that a system with fixed capacity payments suffers
from overcapacity and lower spot prices. The capacity payments overcompensate the
lower electricity prices spot market.
With regards to security of supply, there are several studies that have been carried
out recently. The Pentalateral Energy Forum (framework for regional cooperation in
Central Western Europe) has published an analysis of the European electricity system
until 2021 (Pentalateral Energy Forum, 2015) in which they have stated that there still
will be enough capacity in the Germanmarket¹by applying aMonte-Carlo simulation
of a cost-minimizing dispatch model. In contrast, Borggrefe et al. (2015) conclude
that there could be a capacity deficit between 2018 and 2022 in Germany, France,
and Poland. The difference between these approaches is the input data: Whereas
Pentalateral Energy Forum (2015) assumes significant investments in new capacity,
Borggrefe et al. (2015) only consider projects, which are already in a more advanced
stage, i.e., at least under construction.
¹ The calculated load serving probability for Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland is 100%.
Loss of load is only expected for Belgium and France.
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7.1.1 The German discussion about market design options
Several studies focusing the German and European market have been carried out to
analyze different design options. Frontier Economics (2014) andR2B (2014) concluded
that an EOM is sufficient to ensure generation adequacy. The authors argue that
there is still overcapacity in the European market, as the continuously improving
European grid extension balances both renewable and load at different locations.
Öko-Institut (2015) argues that the assumed DSM potential in these two studies is
relatively optimistic. Moreover, by using a perfect foresight approach as done in these
studies, it is not possible to reliably determine generation adequacy, as in practice
investors face considerable uncertainty about the development of price peaks.
Agora Energiewende (2014) addresses the market power problem in EOMs. It
argues that price spikes can theoretically cover fixed costs; however, they can only
arise in a non-competitive market environment. The risk is that such situations occur
too often, and the price level will become too high in an EOM. Also, it is argued
that the electricity market is not a contestable market due to barriers such as sunk
costs and long lead times. It concludes that an EOM is an interesting, but also a very
hazardous game. Weber et al. (2014) claim in their study that the risks due to price
volatility in an EOM can be very high, as the demand is very price inelastic and power
plants need long construction time. Therefore, they regard a capacity market as more
advantageous in the long term.
An analysis from Praktiknjo and Erdmann (2016) indicates that under the current
market design, investments in new flexible capacities are economically unviable
and the long run supply security could be in danger. EWI (2012) states that specific
attributes of liberalized energy markets permanently challenge the security of supply.
Therefore, it suggests the implementation of a market for security of supply contracts.
Furthermore, the implementation of a strategic reserve is dissuaded as inefficiencies in
the dispatch can occur, causing power plants in the reserve to be requested more often
than necessary. A study about international experiences in capacity remuneration
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mechanisms in the context of supply security and cost efficiency has been carried
out by Beckers et al. (2012). They claim that a strategic reserve is an effective option
for short-term problems in supply security, but it is not necessarily price efficient.
Notably, an EOM with a strategic reserve raises the question of sufficient investments
into new power plants. Thus, Beckers et al. (2012) suggest establishing a capacity
market, e.g., central or decentralized, but not a focused one.
7.1.2 Research gap in market design analysis
The literature review shows that there are plenty of studies on the theoretical aspects
of the necessity of capacity markets. There are also some quantitative studies using
mainly energy system models based on overall cost minimizing and focusing on the
system view of design options. However, these studies do not take into account the
behavior of investors with regard to different design options for the electricity market.
Furthermore, existing quantitative approaches mainly use optimization models with
perfect foresight that do not adequately reflect investment uncertainties. Investment
uncertainties and imperfect market view of investors could hinder new power plant
investments. Hence, these factors have a substantial impact on the security of supply,
especially on generation adequacy, and have to be adequately captured within model
analyses.
Therefore, to the best knowledge of the authors, an agent-based modeling approach
has been developed and applied to analyze the market design for the first time. With
the help of this approach, investments under different market design options (EOM,
strategic reserve, capacity market) are evaluated. The decisions of single market partic-
ipants (e.g., power plant operators) will be incorporated into the approach as market
agents behavior. In contrast to optimizing system models, this approach considers
investment decisions based on limited foresight and imperfect market information of
agents in the electricity market. However, before the modeling approach for the EOM
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and other market designs is introduced in Section 7.3, the design options proposed
for the German electricity market are described in detail below.
7.2 Market design options for the German energy market
With growing concerns that the EOM could not give sufficient incentives for invest-
ments in flexible power plants, several proposals are made for an alternative design
of the electricity market, besides smaller changes to the existing EOM. The federal
ministry already decided to introduce a capacity reserve in its proposal for the new
electricity market act (see BMWi, 2018c). Table 7.1 summarizes all discussed propos-
als in Germany. Before analyzing selected approaches, the discussed proposals are
described in the following section.
7.2.1 Strategic reserve
A strategic reserve can be designed in different forms but typically consists of several
power plants that do not regularly participate in the electricity market. These power
plants are still operated by their respective owners but are exclusively dispatched by
the TSO, usually in extreme situations when the market price is close to the so-called
VoLL². The size of the strategic reserve is determined by the regulator whereas the
price is settled in the market. The capacity is usually procured via uniform price
auctions or bilateral contracts. By lowering the available capacities in the electricity
market via the strategic reserve, market prices should increase, which in turn should
incentivize new investments.³ Over time, the available capacities in the market should
reach a similar level as before, except for the inclusion of an additional reserve (Vries,
2007).
² The exact VoLL is difficult to determine and in practice a different value, e.g., the maximum allowed
market price, might be used.
³ In case of significant surplus capacities, the effect of the reserve on market prices will be negligible.
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Table 7.1 | Proposed capacity mechanisms. The capacity mecha-
nisms for the German electricity market differ in terms of the level
of regulation, the technologies eligible for participation and the
remuneration of contracted capacities.
Mechanism Characteristics
Strategic reserve
(BMWi, 2015;
R2B, 2014)
• Central procurement of
strategic reserve by TSO
(about 5% of the peak load)
• Usage only if market does not clear
• No way back for power plants
Central
capacity market
(EWI, 2012;
Frontier Eco-
nomics, 2014)
• Secured power plant capacity
is prequalified
• Regulator determines demand
for capacity
• RES receive capacity credits
according to their availability
Decentralized
capacity market
(VKU, 2013)
• Decentralized procurement of capacity
certificates by supply companies
• Penalty for missing certificates
Focused
capacity market
(Öko-Institut,
2012)
• Only selected technologies
are allowed to participate
• Distinguish payment duration for
existing and new power plants
One of the advantages of a strategic reserve is that it is easy to implement as well
as to adapt to changing market conditions. Also, the impact on existing markets
should be marginal. However, a strategic reserve also has certain drawbacks, one of
them is the inefficient dispatch under normal market conditions, as the capacity in
the strategic reserve is withheld from the regular electricity market. Determining
the optimal volume of the strategic reserve is difficult because the available future
capacity is subject to uncertainty. Moreover, the price at which the strategic reserve
bids into the market needs to be determined carefully, as a lower price can reduce
scarcity rents and lead to fewer investments (Cramton et al., 2013). Furthermore, a
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strategic reserve does not reduce investment related risks, such as price volatility, or
address the missing money problem.
In Europe, several countries have already established a strategic reserve, namely
Belgium, Finland, Poland, and Sweden (see Table 7.7 in the appendix). Sweden
implemented a strategic reserve in 2011 but already announced that this reserve will
be phased-out by 2020. The size of the strategic reserve in Sweden is currently around
1.50GW. The costs in 2011 amounted up to 10.2 million Euros (Ministry of Enterprise,
Energy and Communications Sweden, 2012). Similar to Sweden, Finland introduced
a strategic reserve in 2011 with an initial capacity of 600MW. However, in 2013 the
capacity was reduced to 365MW (Energy Market Authority, 2014). Belgium also
established a strategic reserve in 2014 with a capacity of 850MW. However, in winter
of 2014, the unexpected unavailability of three nuclear power plants (Doel 3, Doel 4,
and Tihange 2) caused scarcity in the Belgium market. If the unavailability of the
three nuclear power plants were known beforehand, the tendered capacity would
have been at least 2.10GW. Yet, no loss of load occurred due to the mild winter even
though forecasts expected scarcity situations (Elia, 2014). In Poland, according to the
TSO, the required capacity of a strategic reserve ranges from 800 to 1000MW. For the
period between 2016 to 2018, a volume of 830MW has been already procured, with
an option to extend until 2020 (Polish Transmission System Operator [PSE], 2014).
In comparison to other European reserves, the currently proposed volume of the
strategic reserve for the German market4 is relatively large (about 5GW), but to put
things into perspective, the German market is also larger than the markets in the
above-mentioned countries. The strategic reserve is only dispatched at the maximum
market price and hence does not affect scarcity prices.
4 In the German context the proposed strategic reserve is referred to as “Kapazitäsreserve” (capacity
reserve).
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7.2.2 Central capacity market
In a capacity market, derivatives of generation capacity are traded between power
generators and load-serving entities (LSE) or large consumers to ensure generation
adequacy in times of shortages. EWI (2012) suggests a so-called market for security
of supply contracts for the German electricity market. In such a market, a central
instance contracts a certain level of capacity (see Figure 7.1), acting on behalf of LSES
and large consumers, in order to guarantee power supply even in times of peak load.
The central instance estimates the total peak load, and purchases secured capacity
from the power plant operators based on estimated peak load plus an additional
reserve margin (Target). Depending on the contracted and target capacity the height
of capacity payments, e.g., between 0.5 and 2 CONE is set. In the EWI (2012) proposal,
the available secured capacity is partially procured in an auction 5 to 7 years ahead in
order to enable operators to offer units that are planned but have not yet been built.
The demand for conventional power plant capacity depends on the calculated
reserve margin and the assessment of the regulator regarding how much power will
be certainly generated from fluctuating RES. The rate at which the RES contributes to
the secured available capacity is called capacity credit. In Germany, for example in
the case of PV, a capacity credit of 1% is suggested, because of the comparatively low
generation during evening peak load hours in the winter months.
The auction of the comprehensive capacity market is organized as a “descending
clock auction” also referred to as “Dutch auction” (see Figure 7.2). The starting value
of the auction is set to twice the annuity of the investment costs for the cheapest,
newly built conventional power plant, i.e., the CONE. The auctioneer announces
this first price and calls for supply bids. Usually, the high starting price leads to
oversupply, i.e., the volume of supply bids exceeds the capacity demand determined
by the regulator. In the next round, the auctioneer lowers the price and requests
new bids. If an oversupply occurs again, the auctioneer calls for the next round and
repeats this procedure until the cumulated capacity from the supply bids equals the
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Capacity
Price
2 CONE
Maximum Price
Minimum Price
CONE
1/2 CONE
Target
Back-up for
extreme scarcity
situations
± 4%
Figure 7.1 | Capacity demand curve. To be more robust against market power, the
demand curve should be elastic near the targeted capacity level and, ideally, reflects
the marginal value of firm energy. Source: Cramton and Ockenfels (2012).
demand capacity. Another criterion to stop the auction is the floor price. If the
price is lowered after several rounds to the floor price by the auctioneer, the auction
is stopped, and the floor price is announced at the settlement/capacity price. The
capacity in the last round will be chosen as the capacity to be delivered from the
suppliers. Existing plants receive the resultant capacity price from the auction for one
year; new plants, however, can secure the capacity price for several years in order to
decrease the investment-related risks.
Within a market design with a capacity market, investment decisions are based
on the earnings from spot and derivatives markets as well as additional revenues on
the capacity or control reserve markets. The mechanism with capacity options also
protects consumers against high price peaks and represents another incentive for
power generators to be available.
Besides the contracting of secured generation capacity, there is also the concept
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Figure 7.2 | Descending clock auction. In this schematic illustration of a descending
clock auction, it can be observed how the supply of electricity generators and the
demand of the regulator converge. The oversupply in the first round of almost 20GW
is gradually reduced, and completely eliminated in the seventh round, resulting in a
clearing price of 15 EUR/kWa and contracted capacities of 55GW.
of capacity options. In this case, the plant operators get an option premium for
guaranteeing the availability of capacity on the electricity market. Moreover, if the
performing price, e.g., the spot market price, exceeds a determined value (strike
price) the seller of the option (the power plant operator) has to pay back the difference
between strike price and performing price to the option holder, e.g., the system
operator, even if the power plant does not generate any electricity or revenues. This
equates to a penalty charge due to non-availability. Thus, exercising market power
can be avoided considerably. The difference that has to be paid makes retention of
capacity unattractive also to dominant power plant operators. However, the primary
objective of this capacity mechanism is to ensure the availability of power plants,
particularly in times of shortage (ISO New England, 2009).
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7.2.3 Decentralized capacity market
The decentralized capacity market was introduced and proposed in a report by the
VKU (2013). It is a type of comprehensive capacity market, in which operators of
existing or newpower plants and non-volatileRES act as providers of power certificates.
Without any combination of other technologie, e.g., storages, only a very limited
percentage of fluctuating RES nominal capacity can be offered as secured capacity.
In contrast to the central capacity market (see Section 7.2.2), the price and the
demand for power certificates are determined based on the demand and supply of
individual actors, not through a centralized planner. The regulator or a central instance
certifies generation capacities and is therefore only responsible for the emission of
the power certificates. However, the regulator determines neither the price nor the
number of certificates that should be purchased.
Therefore, LSE and distributors (on behalf of their customers) as well as major
industrial consumers determine their peak demand and purchase power certificates
independently on the market. They can apply an additional product differentiation
regarding flexible and non-flexible demand, and if necessary, purchase power certifi-
cates for the non-flexible part of the demand. Electricity consumers are then able to
decide, whether they want to be fully supplied (and pay for certificates) or cut demand
in times of shortages. This would allow charging costs for withholding capacity to the
consumers. If consumers require more electricity in times of shortages than covered
by certificates, they will incur a penalty charge. The penalty should be a multiple of
the certificate price needed to motivate the entities to purchase a sufficient amount of
certificates (BDEW et al., 2013).
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7.2.4 Focused/selective capacity market
Focused or selective capacity markets incentivize predefined generation technologies.
In contrast, comprehensive capacity markets support equally all technologies that are
able to securely provide electrical energy to the system. In a proposal for a new energy
market design, Öko-Institut (2012) suggest a differentiation between the remuneration
of existing and new power plants. The rationale here is to switch a plant portfolio into a
structure that supports the electricity system optimally. Regarding the Germanmarket
with high impacts of fluctuating RES, this would lead to incentives for investments
in flexible and storage technologies. To reach this target, it is possible to vary the
number of payments or the amount of the payment duration. Hence, existing plants
will receive lower payments or payments for a shorter period, whereas new plants or
plants with the required attributes will receive higher payments for a duration up to
several years.
7.3 Modeling energy-only markets and capacity mechanisms
To analyze the impact of different capacity remunerationmechanisms on the electricity
market, different types of electricity market models can be used.
Ventosa et al. (2005) identified three main types of energy market models: op-
timization, equilibrium, and simulation models. Optimization models are able to
find a cost-minimal or profit-maximal solution for an entire energy system from the
perspective of one central planner. They are formulated as an optimization program
by mathematical equations with (at least) one object function subject to technical
and economic constraints. However, they do not integrate the view of individual
market players. Market equilibrium models can consider the market perspectives:
competition between all participants as well as the different market behavior of several
participants. However, these models are difficult to use when the problem is highly
complex. Finally, for modeling highly complex problems especially agent-based simu-
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lation models represent an appropriate approach. In general, they provide flexible
frameworks to integrate different markets, such as day-ahead or capacity markets,
and key market players (as agents) that pursue individual strategies (Tesfatsion, 2002).
In order to address market problems, each agent can receive varying of information,
along with various technical or economic restrictions such as their budget limitations
or feasibility calculations. Furthermore, agent-based models can incorporate the
behavior of investors with regard to different design options. In contrast to other
approaches, agent-based models can adequately reflect investment uncertainties. As
investment uncertainties and imperfect market view of investors could make invest-
ments in new power plant challenging, they should be considered within the security
of supply and market design analyses. That is why agent-based models are well suited
for modeling and analyzing of investments with regard to different design options for
electricity markets.
7.3.1 Agent-based model for the electricity market
In the context of this chapter, an existing agent-based simulation model, which has
already been applied to various electricity-market research questions, e.g., in Sensfuß
et al. (2008) or Bublitz et al. (2014b), is extended by different capacity remuneration
mechanisms. The model includes the key decision makers (generation companies,
TSOs, regulator) and the most relevant market segments, e.g., the day-ahead market
and the futures market. The generation companies are represented by agents that
determine the short-term power plant dispatch and the long-term capacity extension.
Therefore, interactions and feedback loops between short and long-term strategies
can be analyzed. In addition, the model features an hourly time resolution. Thus,
rare situations that only occur under the combination of special circumstances, e.g.,
high demand, low availability from RES and DSM, can be examined.5 An overview
5 However, implementing an hourly time resolution has the disadvantage of increasing the computa-
tional runtime, which takes up to two hours on a state-of-the-art workstation.
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Figure 7.3 | The main elements of the agent-based model. This simplified diagram
describes the connections between the individual agents and markets at the center of
the model. In particular, the various supply bidders play an exposed role, as they par-
ticipate in all markets and, thus, have a significant influence not only on the resulting
prices but also on the investments made.
of the main elements of the model and the different interactions between the agents
is depicted in Figure 7.3. A more in-depth description of the model can be found in
Genoese (2010).
For the analysis in this chapter, the modeling of the day-ahead market and the
investment decisions is of central importance and is described below.
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Simulation of the day-ahead market
The day-ahead market is simulated in detail: Before the market clearing is carried
out, all agents prepare their ask and supply bids. Bids for electricity generated from
RES are sent by the TSOs to the spot market.6 The calculation of the bid price for the
supply bids is based on the variable costs cvara,h, j of each power plant j, which include
the costs for fuel, carbon emission allowances, and operation and maintenance:
cvara,h, j = pfuela,h, jη j + EF jη j ⋅ pcerd + cotherj (7.1)
where
pfuela,h, j: Fuel price in hour h of year a for power plant j
pcera,h: Carbon emissions allowances price in hour h of year a
cotherj : operation and maintenance costs of power plant j
EF j: Emission factor of power plant j
η j: Efficiency of power plant j
In order to adequately include the start-up costs, each agent forecasts the hourly
day-ahead market prices of the next day d and estimates the operating hours of his
power plants. If for a power plant j the variable costs are lower than forecasted hourly
price, the agent assumes that this power plant will be in the market. Then, the agent
calculates the expected start-up costs cstarta,h, j for each power plant:
cstarta,h, j = r j ⋅ (pfuela,h, j + EF j ⋅ pcera,h) + d j (7.2)
where
d j: Deprecation factor of power plant j
6 This is a simplification of RES electricity sales to the wholesale market, as in reality large RES
suppliers directly sell their RES electricity.
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r j: Ramping factor of power plant j
For each hour h in a period H where a power plant is expected to be continuously
in the market, the agent submits a bid bh, j to the market operator that includes the
start-up costs, the variable costs and a mark-up factor markup mh, j that depends on
the market scarcity:
bh, j = cvara,h, j + cstarta,h, j∣H∣ +mh, j (7.3)
For each hour of the next day, the market operator cumulates the ask bids and the
supply bids. These bids are compiled to generate the total demand and supply curve.
The intersection between both curves equals the market clearing price and volume.
Based on information about the accepted bids, the suppliers determine their power
plant dispatch. Later DSM agents schedule their shiftable and sheddable loads.
Modeling of investment decisions
Once a year, all supply agents have the opportunity to extend their power plant
portfolio. The investment decisions are part of an iterative process, in which the
decision of one agent subsequently influences the decisions of the other agents. In
order to avoid a preferential treatment to a particular agent, the order of the agents in
the investment process is randomized each time. The process is stopped after each
agent has evaluated his investment options by calculating the expected cash flows.
The investment options, which are exogenously given to the agents, change over time
and can differ for each agent, e.g., only agents who already own lignite-fired power
plants can invest in new lignite capacities.
In order to estimate the short-term and medium-term cash flows from year a0 to
an, the agent regards hourly market prices pmarketa,h . Additionally, hourly forecast prices
pforea,h are used in the calculation of the long-term cash flows applying a merit-order
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model that takes into account, among others, the expected capacity investments and
demand:
pa,h = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
pmarketa,h a0 ≤ a ≤ an
pforea,h a > an (7.4)
One of the major difficulties is the long-term prediction of prices, which rely
on different uncertainties, such as future investment decisions of the agents. To
incorporate future investments of other agents and their impact on cash-flows into
the decision of an agent, the investment process could be reiterated in each time step7
until a stable outcome is found for the investment decisions. In this equilibrium state,
the agents are not willing to change their investment strategy, as no agent benefits from
deviating. Taking into account the hourly time resolution for market simulation, the
yearly time resolution for investments, the model horizon of several decades, and the
numerous decisions of the agents, the resulting problem would be very computation-
intensive. Therefore, a simplified approach is used where the first agent considers
only the information on investments and decommissions available at the time of his
decision. However, the next agent receives information about the investment decision
made by the previous agent. If the next agent decides to construct an extra power
plant, it is likely that the first agent has overestimated the value of his investment,
owing to the price impact of this new capacity. The simulation results show that this
primarily affects extreme peak prices, which can be lower than the forecast of the first
agent.
In order to avoid such an overestimation, a model-endogenous price limit pˆ is
introduced into the investment calculation of the agents, to prevent that a few overes-
timated price peaks from distorting the investment evaluation8. This price limit leads
to lower deviations between expected and realized cash flows.
7 Investment decisions are made annually, so that for each yearly decision point of time the process
has to be iterated.
8 The technical price limit at the EEX day-ahead market is 3000 EUR/MWh.
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CMa, j = 8760∑
h=1 min{pˆ, pa,h} − cvara,h, j (7.5)
CMa, j: Contribution margin in year a for technology option j
Based on the calculated cash flows for different investment options, the economic
feasibility is evaluated based on theNPV. If there are investment optionswith a positive
NPV, the agent decides to carry out the investment option with the highest NPV. Later,
the agent continues with the evaluation the next investment option and can carry out
further investments. However, a limitation on the investment volume in one period
needs to be introduced without which the first agent would construct until further
investments became economically unfeasible, and the other agents would have no
options for feasible investments. This constraint prevents an agent from achieving a
market-dominating position. It also takes into account the financial limitations of
the energy suppliers. The limitation, therefore, allows the agents to invest only in as
much is necessary to keep their market share of conventional capacity, so that they
stop their investment activity even if it is still feasible.
NPV j = −I0, j + n j∑
t=1
CMt, j − cfixj(1 + i)t´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
expected income
(7.6)
Where:
NPV j: Net present value of technology option j
I0, j: Investment expenses in t0 for technology option j
cfixj : Fixed expenditure per year for technology option j
i: Discount rate
n j: Investment horizon for asset j
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After an agent has made its decisions, the other agents evaluate their investment
options considering the information about the investments of the first agent. The
process is then repeated for all other supply agents. Figure 7.4 illustrates the whole
investment process.
7.3.2 Modeling capacity mechanisms
Although several capacity remuneration mechanisms are currently discussed for the
German electricity market, the focus will be set on the modeling and evaluation of
the strategic reserve and central capacity market. The strategic reserve is close to
acceptance by the political authorities and is expected to be installed very soon. For
the central capacity market, the proposals contain detailed parameterization options.
Therefore, these approaches can be evaluated with a robust modeling approach and
thus the analyses will concentrate on these options in the following.
Strategic Reserve
Once a year, the transmission systemoperators put out a tender for the strategic reserve
via a uniform price auction. The total procured capacity equals to 5GW (about 5% of
the current peak load). The upper price threshold is by the CONE (55.70 kEUR/MW)9
and the lower threshold equal to the lowest yearly fixed costs among all available
power plants. As the operation of the strategic reserve is determined on a daily basis,
only power plants with a low cold start-up time (less than 10 hours) are eligible.
If a power plant is part of the strategic reserve, it is not allowed to participate in
other markets even after the contract expires. Therefore, all costs of such a plant have
to be earned in the strategic reserve. The generation companies submit a bid b for
each eligible power plant j to the market operator of the strategic reserve based on
fixed costs cfix and opportunity costs copp:
9 For this analysis, the CONE is set by a gas-turbine with the following characteristics: a specific
investment of 400 EUR/kW, yearly fixed costs of 9 EUR/kWa, an investment horizon of 15 years and
an interest rate of 8%.
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Figure 7.4 | Sequential diagram of the investment decisions process. In order to
obtain the best-possible estimate, a new forecast is generated after each investment
decision of each agent. In addition, to avoid excessive market power, the capacity
expansion is limited per agent.
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b j =max{cfixj , coppj }. (7.7)
The opportunity costs are composed of the return from each market m and the
option value of participating in other markets:
coppj =∑
m
returnm, j + option valuem, j (7.8)
As preliminary results show that mainly old power plants with only few remaining
operation years enter the strategic reserve, the value is assumed to be zero in the
analysis in Section 7.4.
Whereas the power plants, which are part of the strategic reserve, still belong to the
generation companies, their dispatch is determined by the TSOs. The strategic reserve
is only used in extreme cases, i.e., when the day-ahead market cannot be cleared. In
these situations, the TSOs offer the total available capacity of the strategic reserve at
the maximum day-ahead market price of 3000 EUR/MWh (EPEX SPOT, 2015). The
accepted volume is then assigned to the different power plants of the strategic reserve
based on a dispatch model that accounts for different technical restrictions. First,
the plant with the lowest variable costs generates electricity, followed by the plant
with the next lowest costs and so on. If a power plant is dispatched, the owner of the
power plant is reimbursed for the occurring costs. Nevertheless, due to the large gap
between variable costs and maximum market price, the TSO is able to retain at large
share of the income thereby lowering the total yearly costs caused by the strategic
reserve auction.
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Central capacity market
The applied modeling approach follows the forward capacity market, which is cur-
rently being implemented in the ISO New England market area (ISO New England,
2009), and is comparable to the suggested design from EWI (2012).
As the first step, the regulator determines the amount of secured capacity and
the reserve margin in year a to ensure a defined generation adequacy ratio. This is
described by the equation:
ConCapa = (1 + Ra)(Dpeak,a − REa − Impa) (7.9)
Where:
ConCapa: Required secured capacity in year a
Ra: Reserve margin in year a in [%]
Dpeak,a: Forecasted peak load in year a
RE: Secured available capacity of renewable generation plants in year a
Impa: Imports in the hour of peak load in year a
The reserve margin R can be chosen freely and controls the defined adequacy
ratio. Next, the regulator determines the required capacity for each single LSE. This
is accomplished by identifying the demand served by the particular LSE in the peak
load hour. The capacity obligation of the respective LSE for the year a is then obtained
by multiplying the values for ConCap and the share of demand at the peak load time.
After determining the input parameters, the investment agents of the energy sup-
pliers are asked for their respective bids. They can offer existing capacities (for a price
of 0 EUR/kW) and new power plants (for a price within the floor and start price of
the auction).
For the determination of the capacity price for new installations, the investment
agents first estimate the NPV of the available technology options j. Subsequently, the
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offer price is determined for the option that has the highest NPV. The agents calculate
the offer price based on Equation (7.10). The offer price is chosen so that the NPV
becomes exactly 0 EUR/kW. New installations receive this calculated offer price for x
years and a forecast price for all other y years in which they must participate in the
capacity market.
NPV j = −I0, j + n j∑
t=1
CMt, j − cfixj(1 + i)t´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
expected income energy
+ pcapoffer x∑
t=1
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expected income capacity
!= 0 (7.10)
Where:
x: Period for fixed offer price
y: Overall capacity market participation period
pcapoffer: Capacity offer price
pcapfore: Forecasted capacity price
After calculating the offer price, the investment agents submit the bids to the ca-
pacity market. The capacity auction is carried out as a descending clock auction (see
Figure 7.2). Floor and starting price are determined by the regulator depending on
the CONE. The capacity price should exactly cover the NetCONE at the optimum
capacity. NetCONE corresponds to CONEminus the expected profits from the elec-
tricity markets. That can be explained as follows: When a peak load power plant
generates electricity, all available power plants with lower marginal costs benefit from
the uniform prices. A well-designed capacity market should, therefore, provide the
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Table 7.2 | Investment options. The selected investment options are available to all,
or in the case of lignite, only to specific agents. Over the years, the efficiency of the
investment options continues to improves, but the costs and capacity remain the same.
Size Efficiency [%] Investment Fixed costs
[MW] 2015 2020 2030 [EUR/kW] [EUR/kWa]
Gas open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 150 34 35 37 400 9
Lignite 1000 45 47 49 1700 42
Gas CCGT 800 56 58 60 800 18
Hard Coal 800 46 48 50 1300 34
precise fixed costs of a reference peak load power plant and could avoid a double
compensation.
Finally, all bids are sorted in ascending order according to their offered capacity
price, and the descending clock auction rounds are executed until the needed ConCap
is reached. The final capacity price equals to that one at which demand and supplied
capacity are equal. Whereas new plants receive this price for a longer period, all
existing plants receive it for only one year.
7.3.3 Relevant model assumptions
Due to the in-depth representation of the German electricity market, detailed data is
required for the model, which has been acquired from official public sources where
available. For example, each power plant with a size greater than 5MW is integrated
based on BNetzA (2014). Historical hourly electricity feed-in of wind power and PV
are taken from EEX (2015).
Themodel data, especially the one related to the future development of main energy
market parameters, are derived from established energy scenarios. For instance, the
development of carbon prices is based onmarket futures prices until 2020, after which
the reference scenario of the European Energy Roadmap is used as the data source
(European Commission, 2012). Fuel prices are based on (Sensfuß and Pfluger, 2014).
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Table 7.3 | Central model assumptions. The model assumptions are based on
publicly available data as European Energy Roadmap and in case no consistent data
were available, the outcome of different energy system models was used. Sources:
Elsland (2016); European Commission (2012); Sensfuß and Pfluger (2014).
Unit 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal prices [EUR/MWh] 13.7 15.4 17.0 18.7
Gas prices [EUR/MWh] 28.7 30.8 31.1 31.8
CO2 Emission Allowances [EUR/(t CO2)] 7.3 23.5 47.9 51.0
Total annual demand [TWh] 610.8 597.5 668.9 667.4
Export [TWh] 53.8 15.8 −11.3 −15.4
PV [GW] 47.5 47.4 80.7 80.7
Wind (onshore + offshore) [GW] 47.9 60.8 81.7 104.8
Themain power plant technologies modeled as investment options for the agents are
listed in Table 7.2.
The input values of import and export flows, as well as the development path of
renewable energies, are input data from an optimization model that calculates in
advance the capacity expansion and power plant dispatch in all European countries
based on the same assumptions for demand, carbon, and fuel prices. Germany
continues to be a net exporter of electricity until 2030 due to the comparatively high
penetration of renewable energies. After 2030, neighboring countries with lower costs
of electricity generation from RES, increase their export of electricity and Germany
switches from being a net exporter of electricity to a net importer.
The input values for PV and wind capacities are results from the applied optimiza-
tion model (as it is for the export/import flows) of the European energy system. In
the optimization model, the PV capacity is not expanded as long as the capex of PV
is higher than the one of competitive technologies like wind power. This is why a
further uptake of PV occurs only between 2030 and 2040 when the PV capex becomes
competitive. The optimization model is applied without RES support after 2020 (see
Sensfuß and Pfluger, 2014).
The development of the total annual demand is based on the assumption that
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energy efficiency measures will reduce energy demand in the next few years. This is
already observable in the historical data for the total electricity demand in Germany
between 2011 and 2015. However, due to an uptake of electric mobility in the long
term, it is expected that electricity demand will increase from 2030 (see Table 7.3). The
values for the demand development are calculated by the FORECASTmodel (Elsland,
2016).
DSMmeasures play a crucial role when evaluating the security of supply, as they can
actively reduce the peak load demand. Therefore, different DSM technologies (Paulus
and Borggrefe, 2011; R. D’hulst et al., 2015) are considered via hourly potentials. Two
categories are distinguished: at first shiftable technologies, primarily from households
such as washing machines or heat pumps with low activation costs, whose operation
can be pre- or postponed by several hours (Gils, 2014; Klobasa, 2007; Klobasa and
Ragwitz, 2006). Secondly, sheddable loads that mainly stem from different industrial
processes, such as aluminum or chlorine electrolysis, but have higher activation costs,
e.g., several hundred Euros, see Table 7.4. Due to the importance and the related
uncertainty of the future development of DSM capacities, two scenarios are analyzed:
a scenario with a moderate volume of available sheddable loads (EOM reference
scenario) and one with an optimistic volume (EOM flexibility scenario).
7.4 Evaluation of market design options
The EOM and the other market designs, which provide a capacity remuneration
mechanism, will be evaluated in the following section, especially focusing on their
cost efficiency and ability to guarantee generation adequacy in the electricity sector.
As it would be extensive to go into the details of all market design options, the analyses
focus on the performance of the EOM, specifically the EOM extended with a strategic
reserve and the central capacity market.
To evaluate their ability in terms of security of supply, an objective criterion is
introduced to measure this ability. The first measure is the so-called adequacy ratio
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Table 7.4 | Demand side management capacities. The shiftable capacity shows
a constant growth over the years. In contrast, the sheddable capacity shows no
significant development in both the low and high scenario. Furthermore, the
activation costs remain the same over the entire considered period. Sources:
(Gils, 2014; Gobmaier et al., 2012; Growitsch et al., 2013; Klobasa, 2007).
Unit 2020 2030 2040 2050
Shiftable capacity [GW] 5.56 6.66 8.46 12.53
Shiftable activation costsa [EUR/MWh] 11–475
Sheddable capacity (low) [GW] 2.33 2.14 2.50 2.49
Sheddable capacity (high) [GW] 7.56 6.44 7.41 7.39
Sheddable activation costsa [EUR/MWh] 400–1300
a The activation costs depend on the corresponding technology, e.g., a pulp
grinding machine has activation costs of 11 EUR/MWh and a hot rolling mill
possesses activation costs of 475 EUR/MWh.
AR, which is the minimum hourly ratio in each year y between available capacity AC
and the residual demand RD in hour h:
AR (y) =min
h∈y AC (h)RD (h) (7.11)
However, as in the very extreme case of market failure—without enough available
capacity meeting the demand—the withheld control reserve capacity contracted in
the control reserve energy market would be used to avoid supply deficits and outages.
The adjusted adequacy ratio AR′ is calculated adding the reserve capacity to the term
of the available capacity:
AR′ (y) =min
h∈y AC(h) + reserves (h)RD (h) (7.12)
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Figure 7.5 | Newly constructed capacities in reference scenario. In the beginning,
lignite power plants are chosen as the most profitable investment. However, starting
in 2021, investments in OCGTs and CCGTs are also favorable. With the rising carbon
prices in mid-2030’s, lignite-fired power plants are no longer being built and gas-fired
power plants remain as an economically favorable technology.
7.4.1 Performance of the energy-onlymarket in providing investment sig-
nals
Although the EOM is still able to stimulate investments in flexible power plant capaci-
ties in the model simulation, it seems that no market player in Germany is willing
to invest in these capacities. However, if power plant capacity is getting scarce (the
model results indicate this to be the case until 2023), electricity prices start to peak
again, and the agents start to invest in different power plant capacities. Figure 7.5
shows that from 2021 on, the actors in the market start to invest again in power
plants.Although a substantial reduction in the total capacity can be observed until
2023, the new investments lead to amore or less balanced amount of flexible capacities
(in total about 70GW) between 2023 and 2050 (see Figure 7.6).
A slow increase in the electricity demand is assumed in the model frommid-2020’s
(due to the growing market penetration of electric vehicles and other technologies
relying on electricity). Therefore, the nearly constant level of flexible capacities does
not mean that the demand can be met within the day-ahead spot market all the
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Figure 7.6 | Dispatchable capacities in the reference scenario. The capacity devel-
opment shows that coal-fired power plants are steadily being replaced by CCGTs.
However, lignite power plants remain highly profitable mainly due to the low fuel
costs and only slightly increasing carbon certificate prices in the reference scenario.
time. Figure 7.7 depicts the development of the adequacy ratio for the EOM reference
scenario with a moderate potential for sheddable loads of about 2.10GW by 2050.
An adequacy ratio above 1.0 means that the demand can be completely served by
the supply capacity in each hour of the analyzed year. Moreover, an adequacy ratio
under 1.0 means that the demand cannot be covered entirely with the capacities
in the spot market at least in one hour. By this measure, brownouts which are not
favored could be avoided. However, market clearing on the spot market can hardly be
guaranteed without additional measures in several scenarios. Hence, without capacity
mechanisms or the activation of higher potentials of sheddable load capacities, the
generation adequacy cannot always be guaranteed by the EOM itself.
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Figure 7.7 | Adequacy ratio in the reference scenario. Between 2030 and 2040, the
adequacy ratio decreases steadily, although amarket clearing is still feasible at all times.
However, from 2040 onwards, control power is required in selected situations of each
year in order to avoid an undersupply of the demand.
Influence of demand-side-management
As mentioned, the total volume of available sheddable loads is assumed as 2.10GW in
the EOM reference scenario, whereas the potential for the shiftable load is given in
Table 7.4. To determine the impact of DSM and especially that of sheddable loads an
additional scenario – the EOM flexibility scenario – is introduced for the analyses. In
this scenario, a much higher available potential of sheddable loads is assumed (max.
7.6GW), whereas the shiftable loads remain unchanged. The development of the
adequacy ratio in the EOM flexibility scenario is significantly higher (see Figure 7.13 in
the appendix) than in the reference scenario. This is why only in 2047 control reserve
power is required to avoid an undersupply. In the years after 2047 market clearing
can be guaranteed again. Thus, demand flexibility, particularly as sheddable loads,
can make a significant contribution to the security of supply in future (Zimmermann
et al., 2016).
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Impact of a phase-out of lignite power plants
Furthermore, a scenario is analyzed in which new investments or retrofits of existing
lignite capacity are prohibited by law. This scenario reflects the ongoing discussion
about the lignite phase-out in Germany. The scenario results show that the devel-
opment of total capacity in the market barely differs from the scenarios in which
investments in lignite power plants are allowed. Decommissioned lignite and coal
plants are mainly replaced by OCGT and CCGT plants. Although fewer investments
are made in total, fewer power plants are shut down for economic reasons. As the total
capacity remains nearly the same as in the scenario with lignite investments, there are
only little differences in the development of the adequacy ratio (see Figure 7.15 in the
appendix). Similar to the EOM reference scenario, the day-ahead market cannot be
cleared from 2040 unless the available volume of sheddable loads cannot be increased
drastically.
7.4.2 Enhancing securityof supply via capacity remunerationmechanisms
After the strategic reserve is procured for the first time in 2015, it takes the generation
companies several years to adapt completely. Afterwards, the overall capacity of
thermal power plants is on average about 5GW (equal to the total capacity of the con-
tracted strategic reserve capacity) larger than in a scenario without a strategic reserve.
Additional gas-fired peak load power plants are primarily built by the investment
agents. This effectively increases the generation adequacy as shown in Figure 7.11 and
prevents brownouts that may occur in simulations where capacity is not enumerated.
The strategic reserve is dispatched for the first time in 2035 and a peak dispatch of
more than 60 hours is reached in the following years (see Table 7.8 in the appendix).
Further, in an ex-post consideration of stochastic outages the reserve is already dis-
patched in the 2020s. Nonetheless, the total capacity of the strategic reserve is never
fully dispatched, and the maximum dispatch volume amounts to 4.3GW (usually this
volume is between 1 and 2GW).
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Figure 7.8 | Capacities in the strategic reserve. As the fixed costs represent a large
percentage of the total costs of power plants in the strategic reserve, the reservemainly
consists of gas- or oil-fired peak load power plants with low fixed costs. Only a few
old coal-fired plants, which are not competitive anymore due to their comparably low
efficiency and low opportunity costs, become a part of the strategic reserve.
The capacities of the strategic reserve are dominated primarily by gas-fired power
plants, which feature the lowest fixed costs compared to all other technologies (see
Figure 7.8). Even though new power plants are eligible for the strategic reserve, they
represent only a small share of the total capacity in the strategic reserve. This is
because the new power plants, which directly enter the strategic reserve have to earn
their fixed costs as well as their investment expenses, in contrast to an already existing
power plant for which the investment expenses can be regarded as sunk costs.
The costs of the strategic reserve amount to nearly 5 billion EUR, which can be split
up into about 3 billion EUR that are incurred before 2030 and about 2 billion EUR that
are incurred between 2031 and 2050. Although the auction prices reach the price limit
of the CONE after 2040 (see Figure 7.14 in the appendix), the total yearly costs of the
strategic reserve are on average lower than before, which originates from high profits
in hours in which the reserve has to be dispatched. Nevertheless, this result must be
viewed with caution. For a holistic comparison, the results from other energy markets
have to be taken into account as well. These can then lead to overall higher costs for
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the consumers compared to a capacity market.
The auction prices and the capacity surplus are interrelated. When a deficit is
expected, power plants are more profitable in the regular markets. Therefore, the
power plant owners bid higher prices to the strategic reserve auction, in some cases
higher than the CONE. In case of surplus capacities, generating companies expect low
profits from other markets and are therefore willing to accept low markups on their
variable cost to cover the fix costs. In these years, the strategic reserve might not even
be dispatched.
Central capacity market
Compared to the EOM, a central capacity market leads to a higher volume of power
plant capacity, especially after 2025 (see Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.9). However, because
of the reserve margin of 5% and low capacity credits for RES, the development of
installed conventional capacity seems to indicate overcapacities of thermal power
plants. The simulation results show that reducing the reserve margin or increasing
the capacity credits for renewable energies can significantly decrease the installed
conventional capacity and vice versa.
New investments benefit from the capacity market. However as the CONE has a
substantial impact on the bids in the capacity market, technology options with low
investment expenses benefit from capacity cash flows and the investment agents invest
in these options. The new investments are in most cases profitable. Considering that
the German energy sector has a high capacity of fluctuating renewable energies and
flexible usage of gas turbines, they are a preferred complement to the fluctuating
generators to maintain a sufficient adequacy ratio (see Figure 7.10).
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Figure 7.9 | Capacities in the capacity market scenario. The central capacity market
leads to a high volume of power plant capacities, whereby the differences compared
to the reference scenario are almost exclusively due to a higher investment in OCGTs.
This is due to the fact that these additional power plants are rarely used or, in extreme
cases, are not used at all and, therefore, their low fixed costs are decisive.
7.4.3 Comparison of the different design options
The adequacy ratio of the different market designs is shown in Figure 7.11. The shape
of the adequacy ratio development in the scenario with a strategic reserve is similar
to the one in the EOM reference scenario, the difference being that the capacity of
the strategic reserve leads to a higher adequacy ratio. With high values of the reserve
margin applied to the demand curve of the capacity market, there is always sufficient
generation capacity available. This means that the probability of a black or brownout
is lower than in other market design options. The loss of load expectation (LOLE)¹0 is
indeed zero in the capacity market design, whereas the LOLE is quite high after 2035
in the EOM design and EOM with a strategic reserve (see Table 7.9 in the appendix).
Furthermore, the comparison of the differentDSM scenarios (EOM reference and EOM
¹0 The LOLE is calculated here without considering operating reserves. Although operating reserves
might be used to avoid loss of load, its original role is balancing load fluctuations and grid failures.
That is why in this case the definition of the LOLE is equal to the number of hours in which the spot
market cannot be cleared.
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Figure 7.10 | Adequacy ratio in the capacity market scenario. With the defined capac-
ity credits for RES, the adequacy ratio is continuously over 1.10, which indicates the
existence of slight overcapacities and the necessity of a recalibration of the design pa-
rameters. The low value of the security factor at the beginning is mainly attributable
to the fact that in particular the required base load power plants have long construc-
tion times and therefore do not have an immediate effect. However, as a result in the
medium term, fewer peak load power plants are required and built.
flexibility) shows that the LOLE can be strongly reduced with the help of interruptible
loads.
However, this high ratio does not necessarily lead to an (cost) efficient market
design. No clear conclusion about the most efficient market design can be drawn
due to existing uncertainties regarding the parameterization and regulatory decisions
(Mastropietro et al., 2016). The average spot market price is considerably higher in
the EOM and strategic reserve design than in a market design with a capacity market
during scarcity periods (see Figure 7.12). However, as in the capacitymarket, payments
are made to the electricity producers, it cannot directly be derived that the total costs
of the capacity market design are actually lower.
Whereas the EOM needs price spikes to cover all fixed costs of power plants that are
on the right side of the merit order, capacity markets generate additional payments to
generators. Therefore, the average price is lower than in the EOM almost all of the
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Figure 7.11 | Comparison of the adequacy ratios. The shape of the adequacy ratio
development in the scenario with a strategic reserve is similar to the reference scenario.
However, the difference remains that the capacity of the strategic reserve leads to
a higher adequacy rate similar to the flexibility scenario, which, is approaching but
does not fall below the critical value of 1 towards the end. If, however, a centralized
capacity market is introduced, the adequacy ratio is continuously high, i.e., over 1.10
after 2022.
time. However, analyzing the total costs of thermal electricity generation, it can be
observed that the cumulative costs by 2030 are lower in the EOM than in the market
designs with a capacity mechanism. This cost advantage diminishes until 2050, and
the cumulative costs with a capacity market are similar to the ones of the EOM (see
Table 7.5).
Furthermore, the cost comparison shows that in an EOM, in which a higher level
of DSM, especially sheddable loads with high activation prices, are available (EOM
flexibility), the total costs for electricity generation (except funded RES) are lower
than in the low DSM-scenario (EOM reference). This is due to the fact that the higher
volume of DSM activation does not only ensures market clearing at scarcity times
but also sets the price between 400 to 1000 EUR/MWh avoiding price settlement at
pmax (3000 EUR/MWh in the day-ahead market). Hence, the total system expenses
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Figure 7.12 | Comparison of the average market clearing prices. With the exception
of the capacity market, all prices show a similar pattern which is related to the fact
that, in the capacity market, no scarcity signals are required to stimulate investment
and a constant overcapacity is maintained. Therefore, no price spikes occur. However,
the price difference is negligible in non-scarcity times, e.g., between 2027 and 2035.
are lowered by more than 20 billion EUR.¹¹
7.5 Critical reflection and outlook
Although the entire German electricity market and various design options are mod-
eled with a bottom-up agent-based approach, some limitations of the methodology
remain. One of the limitations is that electricity exchange with the neighboring Euro-
pean electricity markets is incorporated with static export/import profiles. Hence,
dynamic reactions from abroad to specific market situations in Germany are not
regarded. In a dynamic approach, the available capacities from the neighboring coun-
tries may be different. Therefore, the nextmodeling steps should expand the described
approach to a European market model that allows the simulation of different design
¹¹ The cost comparison does not consider investments that enable the availability of DSM. Therefore,
the cost advantage can at least partly diminish due to investments in information and communication
technology (ICT) or in other technologies required to activate more DSM potentials.
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Table 7.5 | Cumulative payments to the generation companies under dif-
ferent market designs. The flexibility scenario has the lowest total values
as additional flexibility is available, but its development is regarded as ex-
ogenous. Thus, possible investments are not included in numbers below.
However, if only the second period from 2031 to 2050 is considered, a
central capacity market is preferable, especially if few flexible capacities
are available.
[Bn EUR]
EOM
reference
EOM
flexibility
Strategic
reserve
Central
capacity
market
2015–2030 393.8 394.9 413.5 420.1
Capacity remuneration – – 2.9 61.6
Day-ahead market 393.8 394.9 410.6 358.5
2031–2050 479.1 457.8 494.6 454.1
Capacity remuneration – – 2.6 60.7
Day-ahead market 479.1 457.8 492.0 393.4
Total sum 873.0 852.8 908.2 874.2
options for European electricity markets. In this case, for example, the introduction
of the French capacity market (which was recently installed) and its interaction with
the German electricity market could be analyzed in detail. Besides, the exchange
flows, the available DSM capacity is also incorporated as an exogenous variable. This
approach does not enable the analysis of investments in DSM capacity considering
capacity payments. Therefore, within future research investments in DSM capacity
could be also endogenously modeled.
Furthermore, the existing study analyses only the development of the national
capacities and the peak demand that has to be served. Thus, the generation adequacy
question is answered only in general (without considering stochastic outages of
power plants or grids). Moreover, possible bottlenecks for specific regions in the
country are not taken into account by this approach. This is a reason to implement
the transmission grid or at least the main transport restrictions into the introduced
market model, which allow the analysis of the regional generation adequacy.
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Finally, it is important to mention that some methodological improvements could
be also done in future studies. The learning of agents could be renderedmore precisely
so that for example, agents are affected by their former misinvestments or by the
ones of their competitors thereby making their decisions not only based on economic
assessments, but also based on their soft skills.
All in all, it can be stated that with the existing modeling approach important
analyses and conclusions could be derived regarding the effectiveness of the EOM
and other market design options to incentivize investments in flexible power plant
technologies and thus to guarantee generation adequacy.
7.6 Conclusions
The proposed application of agent-based modeling is an appropriate approach to
investigate imperfect market conditions, as it incorporates the limited foresight of
market players and enables to detection of possible electricity market failures in
the future. The approach is used to analyze, whether the current market design in
Germany is able to incentivize investments into power plants, so that generation
adequacy is guaranteed, or if capacity remuneration mechanisms are needed.
The results indicate that the existing EOM leads to a market equilibrium in the short
and medium term. The generation adequacy is ensured as adequacy ratio is always
above 1.0, which means the supply side can deliver the required capacity in every hour
to meet the electricity demand. However, this is a result of surplus capacities existing
in the current German electricity market originating mainly from the period before
liberalization and the coupling of European electricity markets. Furthermore, it is
worth mentioning that these results also rely on the condition that at least a moderate
level of sheddable loads (2GW) can be activated during peak load hours.
In the long run (beyond 2030), the results show that generation adequacy cannot be
fully guaranteed in the EOM. The demand cannot be completely met in several hours
by the available capacity in the spot market, and at least spinning and non-spinning
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reserve power has to be dispatched in order to avoid brownouts. Due to uncertain
cash flows and price peaks only occurring in a few hours, the agents do not make
sufficient investments. The functionality of the EOM can be improved, if the available
capacity of sheddable loads is increased to about 8GW or if a capacity reserve with a
capacity of 5GW is implemented. Hence, the capacity reserve proposed by the Federal
Ministry for Economics can provide long-term generation adequacy in Germany.
Thereby, it can be derived from the results that this reserve mainly consists of existing
lignite, gas and oil-fired power plants and rarely of newly built power plants. Apart
from these findings about the EOM, it is shown that the ban on the construction of
new or renewal of existing lignite capacities would not have a significant effect on the
generation adequacy ratio in the EOM.¹²
Regarding DSM, sheddable loads can increase the generation adequacy also in the
long term, as they set price peaks at several hundred EUR/MWh, which are necessary
in the EOM to refinance investments. In contrast, shiftable loads with bidding prices
between 11 to 475 EUR/MWh (Table II) do not set such high prices and even avoid
price peaks, as they lead to a more balanced demand curve. A smooth demand
curve means less peak load and therefore reduced or minimal price peaks. Missing
price peaks, in turn, lower the profitability of power plants and can lead to fewer
investments so that the availability of shiftable loads can improve the security of
supply in the short term, but not in the long term. Furthermore, the shifted demand
is not able to cause a considerably higher price level in off-peak hours due to a flat
merit-order curve, which again does not improve the conditions for new investments.
The analysis of capacity remuneration mechanisms indicates that a central capacity
market can ensure nearly constant investments during the whole period until 2050
without generating higher total system costs. The capacity payments are compensated
by avoided price peaks, on which the EOM relies. It can be concluded that the capacity
level in total is noticeably higher in the capacity market design than in the EOM. The
¹² This does not hold for a swift phase-out of lignite capacities.
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highest investments are made in OCGTs followed by CCGTs. Based on the proposed
capacity credits for renewable energy technologies, an adequacy ratio of more than
1.10 can be reached with the help of a capacity market. This means that a reserve
capacity of at least 10% is available during the whole period.
In summery, an EOM extendedwith a strategic reserve capacity of 5GW can provide
generation adequacy. The EOM can also guarantee generation adequacy if sheddable
load potentials can be strongly activated. However, a pre-defined adequacy ratio can
be more easily achieved with a capacity market. The main challenge of a capacity
market remains the appropriate parameterization to avoid overcapacities (and related
costs) and the adequate integration of RES technologies.
As the EOM can guarantee generation adequacy in the short and medium term
without higher costs and does not require major political intervention, the authorities
are recommended to keep the existing market design until the early 2020ies. However,
in the middle of the next decade, the introduction of a comprehensive capacity market
should be prepared and implemented. A strategic reserve seems to be more expensive
in the long term. To increase the security of supply in the EOM, a strategic reserve
can be an option for the next ten years; however, in the long run, a capacity market is
more favorable.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the introduction of capacity markets in the
European electricity markets should be coordinated. In contrast to EOMs, capacity
markets can slow down inner-European electricity trade and hinder the development
of an integrated European market, especially if capacities are bounded locally.
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Figure 7.13 | Adequacy ratio in the flexibility scenario. Between 2030 and 2040, the
adequacy ratio decreases steadily, but its value is still greater than 1.05. From 2040
the adequacy ratio stabilizes in the range of 1.00 to 1.05 and in 2047 control reserve
power is required to avoid an undersupply.
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Figure 7.14 | Yearly auction prices for the strategic reserve. Annual capacity prices are
highly volatile and are limited by the lowest fixed annual costs, here 9.0 kEUR/MW,
and by the CONE of (55.7 kEUR/MW). The upper limit is reached mainly towards the
end of the examined period of examination, where investors invest only to a small
extent.
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Figure 7.15 | Development of the conventional capacities with a lignite phase-out.
In this phase-out scenario, the construction of additional lignite-fired power plants is
prohibited, but existing plants may remain in operation. Compared to the reference
scenario, lignite capacities are largely replaced by additional gas-fired power plants.
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Table 7.6 | Goodness of fit for the linear regression model.
Almost all coefficients of the selected fundamental variables
are highly significant, except for the coefficients of the gas
price for several hours on weekends and the coal price in
some night hours on weekends. As the load is typically lower
on weekends and during the night, gas-fired power plants
usually do not run on weekends and thus, is it not surprising
that the gas price is not affecting the electricity price. The
same holds true for the coal price as during very low load
situations only base load plants are operating.
R2 R2 adj RMSE
Hour WD WE WD WE WD WE
0 0.767 0.745 0.766 0.741 4.502 5.915
1 0.740 0.744 0.739 0.740 4.683 5.753
2 0.726 0.723 0.724 0.719 4.960 5.981
3 0.711 0.716 0.710 0.712 5.078 5.991
4 0.724 0.699 0.722 0.694 4.743 6.237
5 0.770 0.703 0.769 0.698 4.916 6.444
6 0.695 0.712 0.693 0.708 6.010 6.811
7 0.712 0.746 0.710 0.742 6.054 6.479
8 0.739 0.772 0.738 0.768 6.192 6.326
9 0.784 0.788 0.783 0.785 6.080 6.197
10 0.793 0.801 0.791 0.798 6.129 6.163
11 0.817 0.798 0.816 0.794 5.838 6.296
12 0.829 0.798 0.828 0.795 5.570 6.119
13 0.838 0.785 0.837 0.782 5.314 6.063
14 0.834 0.764 0.832 0.760 5.005 5.965
15 0.815 0.755 0.814 0.751 4.941 5.852
16 0.788 0.758 0.787 0.754 5.125 5.851
17 0.770 0.767 0.768 0.763 5.611 5.914
18 0.714 0.771 0.712 0.767 7.074 6.145
19 0.690 0.763 0.688 0.759 6.962 5.977
20 0.741 0.794 0.739 0.791 5.306 5.025
21 0.741 0.822 0.739 0.819 4.860 4.657
22 0.791 0.790 0.789 0.787 4.349 4.923
23 0.800 0.751 0.799 0.747 4.152 5.643
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Table 7.7 | Strategic reserves in selected Eu-
ropean countries. The size of the strategic re-
serve depends on the peak load and is close to
5 percent in the countries listed in 2015. All
values correspond to historical figures with the
exception of Germany, where until now only
plans for the implementation of a strategic re-
serve exist. Source: (ENTSO-E, 2018b).
Peak Strategic Percentage
load reserve of peak
2015 capacity load
Country [GW] [GW] [%]
Belgium 13.13 0.85 6.47
Finland 13.58 0.60 4.42
Germany 77.50 5.00 6.45
Poland 23.07 0.83 3.60
Sweden 23.40 1.50 6.41
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Table 7.8 | The dispatch of the
strategic reserve. Starting in 2035,
the strategic reserve with capacity of
5GW is increasingly being used. How-
ever, considerable fluctuations occur
over the years. Sometimes almost the
entire reserve is used, sometimes only
a small fraction.
Number Total Max.
of hours usage usage
Year [-] [GWh] [GW]
2035 0 0.0 0.0
2036 0 0.0 0.0
2037 2 0.3 0.2
2038 0 0.0 0.0
2039 9 6.2 2.1
2040 36 42.9 3.2
2041 37 43.5 3.5
2042 35 43.5 3.4
2043 60 73.6 4.0
2044 11 8.7 1.7
2045 6 3.1 1.1
2046 6 3.8 1.1
2047 62 80.0 4.3
2048 54 63.8 4.1
2049 9 8.3 2.3
2050 2 1.0 0.9
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Table 7.9 | Loss of load expectation. The LOLE varies widely
from scenario to scenario. Only in case of the capacity market,
sufficient capacity is available at all times. Interestingly, despite
similar additional capacities, the LOLE is considerably lower in
the flexibility scenario than in the scenario with a strategic re-
serve. This is related to the fact that higher prices occur at an
earlier stage, thereby signaling shortage signals and incentiviz-
ing new investments.
EOM EOM Strategic Central
year reference flexibility reserve capacity market
2035 0.6 0.0 6.2 0.0
2036 3.4 0.0 3.8 0.0
2037 15.6 0.0 14.6 0.0
2038 10.9 0.0 5.4 0.0
2039 21.8 0.0 17.1 0.0
2040 39.6 1.0 25.8 0.0
2041 40.0 1.4 25.2 0.0
2042 52.0 5.8 23.7 0.0
2043 46.7 5.2 27.6 0.0
2044 14.8 0.0 13.4 0.0
2045 22.5 0.1 10.4 0.0
2046 28.6 0.3 10.5 0.0
2047 79.4 17.6 26.4 0.0
2048 69.1 10.8 22.7 0.0
2049 29.7 0.6 12.5 0.0
2050 31.0 0.5 7.5 0.0
Chapter8Agent-based simulation ofinterconnected electricity markets
Today’s liberalized wholesale electricity markets are considered to be highly com-plex systems. This is due to, among other things, the specific characteristics of the
commodity electricity, e.g., instantaneous balancing of supply and demand, limited
storability, and the fact that electricity can only be transported via transmission lines
with limited capacities. Other factors that increase the complexity are the various in-
terrelated markets where electricity or related products can be traded, e.g., day-ahead
market or derivatives market, and the influence of other volatile markets such as the
market for carbon emission allowances.
One important aspect of electricity systems is the reliability, which should be
ensured at all times. In liberalized Europeanmarkets electricity generation companies
are not obliged to invest in new power plants. Consequently, electricity markets
need to be designed in such a way that there are sufficient incentives for adequate
investments. The currently often discussed concept to ensure reliability in Europe is
called energy only because power plant operators generate their profits mainly from
the produced energy but are not compensated for only providing generation capacity
that ensures reliability.
In Germany and several other European countries the spot market for electricity,
in particular, the day-ahead market auctions organized by electricity exchanges, plays
an essential role as it provides a market place to sell or buy electricity and its price
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serves as a reference for other markets, e.g., future markets or bilateral contracts. In
addition, reserve markets are implemented to ensure the short-term reliability of the
electricity system.
Two important developments currently altering the economics of European elec-
tricitymarkets are the increasing electricity generation from renewable energy sources
and the European market integration. While for a long time mainly nuclear, coal
and oil power plants had been installed in Europe, governments have recognized the
decarbonization potential of the electricity sector, and there has been a continuous
trend to move towards renewables and gas. In particular, the introduction of the
EU-ETS and the creation of various policy programs to support the use of renewable
energy sources have contributed to this development.
However, the feed-in of electricity generated from photovoltaic and wind power
poses challenges to the electricitymarkets in their current formbecause in comparison
with thermal power plants the generation from these sources is neither projectable
nor precisely predictable and typically enjoys a guaranteed feed-in and compensation,
respectively. Consequently, operators of conventional power plants are faced with
another source of uncertainty that needs to be considered within the unit commitment
problem, where an optimal balance of demand and supply under the various technical
constraints of the power plants is to be determined. After determining the day-ahead
operation schedule, the intradaymarket, where electricity can be traded at short notice,
offers a possibility to adjust the schedule based on updated information, e.g., a recent
forecast of renewable generation. The intraday market is likely to gain importance
in the next years, as the generation from renewable energy sources is expected to
increase further.
Another significant development in the electricitymarket is that the current borders
of the national markets are subject to change; there are ongoing efforts to achieve a
single European market. One aspect thereof is the implementation of market-based
mechanisms to allocate limited cross-border capacities between European countries.
The Central Western Europe (CWE) Market Coupling between Germany, France,
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Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg serves as one of the most prominent
examples. Market coupling maximizes social welfare, leads to price convergence and
helps to balance different supply and demand situation in the interconnected market
areas. The integration of markets is a matter-of-fact, thus influencing market prices
and profitability of power plants in Europe.
Given the electricity system’s complexity, the relevant actors rely on different types
of models for decision support. For instance, models are used by regulatory entities
to analyze questions related to market design, which is necessary to guarantee system
reliability on different levels. Similarly, generation companies rely on electricity
market models, for example, in order to examine investment cases. Naturally, market
changes need to be reflected appropriately in modeling techniques.
In this chapter, the main elements of the detailed bottom-up agent-based simu-
lation model are described and current extensions to adjust the model to relevant
electricity market developments are presented. The aims of this chapter are to present
a comprehensive overview of the applied modeling framework for electricity markets
and how it can be used to analyze different research questions.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.1 provides a brief overview of the
different types of electricity market models and shows the general suitability of agent-
based simulation in the context of electricity markets. In Section 8.2, the model’s
main elements with a focus on agents and markets are described. Exemplary results
are presented in Section 8.3. Finally, Section 8.4 concludes with a summary and an
outlook.
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8.1 Techno-economic models for interconnected markets
Themodels used for electricity markets can be classified into several categories. Ven-
tosa et al. (2005) identify three major categories in electricity market modeling: opti-
mizationmodels, equilibriummodels, and simulationmodels. Distinguishing features
include the mathematical structure, market representation, computational tractability
and main applications.
While in Europe the liberalization of electricity markets started in 1996, electricity
market models developed beforehand had been mostly optimizing models incorpo-
rating the perspective of a single planner, i.e., the government. Through the liberaliza-
tion, the integration of a market perspective in models has gained importance, which
brought forth the development of alternative models such as agent-based models
that are able to adequately represent the current market situation where not one
central decision maker is found, but several market players pursue their individual
goals. In general, agent-based models, which have been developed in quite different
disciplines, can provide a flexible environment, which allows considering inter alia
learning effects, imperfect competition including strategic behavior and asymmetric
information among market participants (Tesfatsion, 2006).
Nowadays, there exists a large number of agent-based electricity market models.
Depending on the research focus, the models in the literature will differ from each
other with respect to various criteria.
Each agent-based model features a certain agent definition and architecture, which
can include several dimensions. In the first place, it is essential to define conceptually
what the agent represents in the model. In the field of agent-based computational
economics agents generally are defined as having a set of data and pre-defined behav-
ioral rules within a computationally constructed world (Tesfatsion, 2006). The agent
architecture includes the design of specific agent decision models including adaptive
learning algorithms. Market modeling is another large building block of agent-based
models. Given the complex nature of wholesale electricity markets and the electricity
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supply chain, different types of horizontally and vertically integrated markets exist.
In order to analyze the existing interrelations between markets, one has to consider
these markets with respect to their specific clearing rules. Depending on the spatial
coverage of the model, the coupling of interconnected areas might be considered
as well. Similarly, agent-based models differ with regard to the time resolution as
well as time scale of the simulation. The latter aspects includes, for instance, whether
short-term behavior (e.g., spot market bidding strategies) and long-term aspects (e.g.,
investment decisions) are jointly considered. Another critical aspect of electricity
market models is the representation of the electricity system’s technical constraints
(e.g., techno-economic aspects of generation units, grid constraints.
Three comprehensive reviews showing the large body of agent-based models for
electricity markets and their distinctive features are provided by Guerci et al. (2010);
Sensfuß et al. (2007); Weidlich and Veit (2008). These literature reviews contain a
comparison of the different existing models including the model presented in this
chapter.
Having an integrated agent and market perspective, as well as a high degree of
flexibility, agent-based simulation models can be used for detailed analyses of elec-
tricity markets and interactions therein. Potential applications include market power
analysis or market design studies in consideration of the feed-in from renewable
energy sources and integrated markets concerning products, time and region.
8.2 Main elements of the applied agent-based model
The subject of modeling is the electricity wholesale market, which is simulated for
each hour of a year. Initially, the model was designed for the German market area.
However, Europe’s electricity markets are all liberalized and set up according to the
same fundamental principles, hence, other European market areas can be used to
simulate as well with minor adaptations. Market areas are interpreted as one object in
the programming environment featuring different market elements, agents and input
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data. In order to simulate different market areas, the respective object is repeatedly
instantiated.
One of the key features of the model is the integration of both short-term market
developments and long-term capacity expansion planning. Thereby, interactions and
feedback loops between short-term and long-term output decisions are considered.
Decisions regarding the expansion of capacity, i.e., whether to install a new power
plant are influenced by current and future developments in the daily electricity trading
as the main source of income and vice versa.
The key modules are markets, electricity supply, electricity demand and regulatory
aspects. Themain players participating in thewholesale electricitymarket aremodeled
individually; small companies are represented in an aggregated form. Different types
of market participants are modeled as different types of agents. Each agent takes over
certain roles, makes decisions based on specified functions and either takes part in or
sets rules for a respective market.
In the following sections, the focus is set on the supply side, i.e., on generation
companies, which have to decide on the short-term operation of their existing power
plants and the investment in new ones.
8.2.1 Short-term bidding on electricity markets
The short-term operation of power plants is determined by the SupplyBidder agent.
The agent evaluates the different markets where energy or capacity of thermal power
plants can be offered and determines the operation schedule and dispatch of the
plants. In accordance with the current situation in Central Western Europe, every
SupplyBidder daily submits for each available power plant electricity supply bids to the
day-ahead market. Besides for thermal power plants, also supply bids for generation
from renewable energy sources, e.g., wind or biomass, are regarded. As pumped-
storage units can produce or consume electricity, they submit either buy or sell bids.
The same applies to the electricity exchange with market areas which are not explicitly
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modeled. After receiving the bids, the DayAheadMarketAuctioneer determines a
uniform price for each hour of the next day considering all submitted supply and
demand bids.
SupplyBidders are faced with an economic optimization problem, where the offered
volume and price of their power plants needs to be determined and which is solved
in several steps. Firstly, the available capacity Pi ,d of a power plant i on a day d needs
to be determined. Power plants may not be available at all for a given day due to
unexpected issues (e.g., start-up failure), or expected reasons, (e.g., maintenance).
As power plants act on other markets as well, the reserved capacity Pr,i ,d for these
markets is not available anymore for the day-ahead market bidding and needs to be
subtracted from the net electrical capacity Pneti :
Pi ,d=⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ P
net
i − Pr,i ,d if plant i is available on day d
0 otherwise
(8.1)
Secondly, the bid price is calculated. It consists of three elements: variable costs,
start-up costs and a potential markup. Variable costs cvari ,d represent the direct costs of
producing one unit of electricity and are determined by the fuel price pfueli ,d , the power
plant’s net electrical efficiency ηi , the price of the emission allowances pcerd , the CO2
emission factor of the fuel EFfuel and the costs for operation and maintenance cotherd ,i :
cvard ,i = pfueld ,iηi + EF iηi ⋅ pcerd ,i + cotherd ,i (8.2)
Changing the mode of operation of power plants, i.e., starting up or shutting down,
causes additional costs. Firstly, the material is stressed mainly by temperature changes
reducing life expectancy; secondly, for start-ups, fuel is needed in order to reach
the operating temperature of a power plant. When determining the bid price the
costs from start-up and shutdown processes as an intertemporal restriction can be
considered by power plant operators. In the model, this means that for base load
running power plants also lower market prices are accepted in order to avoid shutting
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down the power plant. In turn, start-up costs are added to the bid price for peak load
power plants in order to earn start-up costs in hours where the plant is expected to
be running. To estimate start-up costs, a price forecast for the next day is made by an
agent. The bid price pi ,h including start-up costs in hour h is defined as follows:
pi ,h=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max (cvard ,i − cs , itu ) if pˆh < cvard ,i ∧ i ∈ BL
cvard ,i + cs , its if pˆh > cvard ,i ∧ i ∈ PL
cvard ,i otherwise
(8.3)
with
Parameters
cs,i ∶ Start-up costs
tu ∶ Number of continuous unscheduled hours
ts ∶ Number of continuous scheduled hours
pˆh ∶ Predicted price for hour h
Sets
M ∶ Set of all operation-ready power plants
BL ⊂ M ∶ Set of base load power plants
PL ⊂ M ∶ Set of peak load power plants
In addition, SupplyBidders can increase the bid price for their power plants by a
markup value. According to the standard economic model of perfectly competitive
markets, market prices for a respective good are determined by marginal prices at all
times. However, in order to cover capital expenditures and fixed costs market prices
need to rise above marginal costs of supply at least in some periods. This reasoning
is based on the peak-load pricing concept (Boiteux, 1960). One potential remedy is
to include an additional markup factor in the bid price of supply capacity. Here, the
value of the markup factor depends on the relative scarcity in the market; a higher
scarcity induces a higher markup, which is added to the bid price:
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pmarkupi ,d = pi ,d +markuph (8.4)
After determining the offered volume and price for each hour of the following
day, the bids are submitted to the day-ahead market auctions. A comprehensive and
formal description of the original short-term bidding algorithm can be found in
(Genoese, 2010).
8.2.2 Coupling of interconnected markets
European electricity markets are interconnected via high-voltage transmission lines.
As electricity flows according to physical laws and interconnector capacities are limited,
these capacities have to be allocated to market participants otherwise, transmission
lines might be congested. Management methods are required to avoid congestion
and to efficiently use cross-border transmission capacities.
Since 2010, a market coupling approach has been implemented in Central Western
Europe, which complies with the European Union’s general principles of congestion
management (e.g., non-discriminatory, market-based). Market coupling describes
the implicit auctioning of interconnection capacity through power exchanges for
predefined zones (market or bidding areas). The market coupling operator clears the
energy markets of the participating market areas simultaneously and determines im-
plicitly the commercial flows between markets areas as well as the prices. The market
coupling approach maximizes the social welfare by optimizing the selection of bids
considering limited transmission capacity. The transmission capacity is determined
up-front based on defined rules (EPEX SPOT, 2010).
In accordance with the CWE Market Coupling architecture, market coupling is
implemented for the day-ahead market, and market participants submit their bid
curves to the local power exchanges based on the described method in Section 8.2.1.
TheMarketCouplingOperator takes over all processes related to themarket coupling.
For that purpose, the operator receives all day-ahead bids from the local power
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exchanges. Market coupling itself can be formulated as an optimization problem
with the objective to maximize social welfare. As currently only hourly bids with a
fixed price are considered, the original algorithm used for the CWEMarket Coupling
(EPEX SPOT, 2011a) can be simplified, and the mathematical problem is formulated
as follows (Meeus et al., 2009):
maximizeqd , qs
∑
m∈M ( ∑d∈Dm (Pbidd ⋅ Qbidd ⋅ qd) + ∑s∈Sm (Pbids ⋅ Qbids ⋅ qs)) (8.5a)
subject to ∑
d∈Dm (Qbidd ⋅ qd)+∑
s∈Sm (Qbids ⋅ qs)+ ∑
m′∈M′ (Fm→m′)− ∑
m′∈M′ (Fm′→m)= 0 ∀m ∈ M
(8.5b)
Fm→m′ ≤ Fmaxm→m′ ∀m, m′ ∈ M (8.5c)
0 ≤ qd ≤ 1 ∀d ∈ Dm ,∀m ∈ M (8.5d)
0 ≤ qs ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ Sm ,∀m ∈ M (8.5e)
with
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Decision variables
q ∶ Bid acceptance rate [–]
m → m′ ∶ Flow from market area m to market area m′ [MWh]
Parameters
Pbid ∶ Bid price [EUR/MWh]
Qbid ∶ Bid volume [MWh]
Fmaxm→m′ ∶ Maximum flow from market area m to m′ [MWh]
Indices
d ∶ Demand bid
s ∶ Supply bid
m ∶ Market area
Sets
M ∶ Simulated market areas
M ′m ∶ Market areas connected to market area m
Dm ∶ Demand bids in market area m
Sm ∶ Supply bids in market area m
The constraints ensure that supply and buy bids do not exceed their maximum
volume (Equation (8.5d) and (8.5e)), that supply and demand including exports as well
as imports in market areas are balanced (Equation (8.5b)) and that the limitation on
the transmission capacity (Equation (8.5c)) is not violated. In this form, the problem
is linear and the optimal solution can be computed with common mathematical
programming solvers.
Optimization results are the acceptance rates for each submitted bid and the com-
mercial utilization of transmission capacity. Furthermore, the algorithm determines
the market prices of electricity one day- ahead of delivery in the coupled bidding
areas and the implicit prices for transmission capacities, which are only different from
zero if lines are congested. Prices are sent to the local market areas and processed by
the supply agents.
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8.2.3 Long-term investment planning
In themodel generation companies can alsomake decisions regarding their long-term
capacity extension through investments in new power plants. The responsible agent
is called InvestmentPlanner.
The basic methodology is based on a discounted-cash-flow valuation of predefined
technology options. For that purpose, the InvestmentPlanner makes a forecast of the
expected hourly electricity prices during the investment period and calculates the
expected yearly gross profit. After accounting for fixed costs and capital expenditures,
the net present value is calculated.
The quantity of the installed capacity is based on the expected development of
market shares within the following five years taking future demand and electricity
generation from renewable energy sources into account. As long as the net present
value of the investment options is positive and there is need for new capacity, new
power plants are built by the InvestmentPlanner. After the construction phase, whose
length depends on the technology option, the newpower plants can generate electricity
that can then be sold in the markets.
8.2.4 Input data and technical implementation
For the considered market areas each thermal power plant with a capacity of at least
10MW is stored together with its main relevant techno-economic characteristics (e.g.,
net electrical efficiency, variable and fixed costs, yearly availability) in the database of
the model.
The model database includes investment options for different power plant tech-
nologies with its relevant characteristics and the electricity feed-in from renewable
energy sources. The electricity demand is represented by the aggregated consumption
of all consumers connected to the public power supply.
For market coupling, transmission capacities between interconnected market areas
are required. As not all neighboring countries are always part of a simulation, the
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electricity exchange with these countries is based on historical values. Prices for
fuel and CO2 emission allowances are required for the calculation of the variable
generation costs. Most time series data is stored with hourly values, but sometimes
only less detailed values, e.g., for lignite prices, are available.
The model’s results include the hourly spot market prices in the simulated whole-
sale markets, the investments in new capacity and the commercial flows between
interconnected market areas. As the model considers the wholesale day-ahead market
as the only trading place for electricity, bilateral day-ahead contracts are not part of
model’s results.
The model is implemented in the object-oriented programming language Java and
can simulate each hour of recent historical years as well as future years up to 2050.
The simulation runs are comparatively quick in terms of computing time. Yearly runs
for one market area last only a few minutes, which is a small fraction of the several
hours that optimization models with a similar amount of details may take.
8.3 Applications
The applied model has already been used for various research analyses in the past. For
instance, Sensfuß et al. (2008) find a considerable impact of the subsidized renewable
electricity generation in the short run on spot market prices in Germany. Futhermore,
the impact of emissions trading on electricity prices is explored by Genoese et al.
(2007). The authors find for the years under consideration that a large part but not the
totality of the emission allowance price is added by the generation companies to the
variable costs during the bidding process. A thorough analysis of the model’s capacity
to adequately reproduce the main characteristics of the German electricity market
can be found, for example, in Genoese (2010). In the following sections, additional
recent analyses are presented.
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8.3.1 Market coupling between Germany and France
Based on the algorithm described in Section 8.2.2, effects from a market coupling
between the German and French day-ahead electricity markets are analyzed. Both
markets represent the two largest in Europe in terms of electricity consumption and
are part of the CWEMarket Coupling. To the authors’ best knowledge this is the first
agent-based approach that includes the coupling of different market areas based on
the current market situation.
The simulation of the model coupling is performed for the year 2012. In the
Single Markets scenario, there is no coupling of the two markets, i.e., no exchange
between Germany and France is considered. TheModel Coupling scenario uses the
optimization routine for the coupling of the German and French market areas. The
electricity exchange with other countries, e.g., between France and Spain, Germany
and Poland, is in both scenarios given exogenously based on historical data.
TheModel Coupling scenario shows lower average prices than the Single Market
scenario, whereas the price decrease is stronger in France than in Germany. The more
pronounced effect for France can be explained, to some extent, by the supply curves’
shapes of the two market areas. The French supply curve has only a gentle slope for
a large part of the country’s capacity because of the low variable operating costs of
nuclear power stations. However, the small part of the remaining capacity consists of
notably more expensive fossil fuel-fired units. These units are often called upon in the
Single Markets scenario. When coupling the markets, the expensive units in France
are less frequently used because cheaper electricity can be imported from Germany.
The change in market prices does not imply that all market participants, buyers
and sellers, benefit. The results of this simulation indicate that mainly the consumers
benefit from the market coupling which is consistent with expectations given a lower
average price. The social welfare, i.e., the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
and congestion revenue, increases with market coupling, which could be expected, as
the clearing algorithm tries to maximize this value.
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In theModel Coupling scenario the available transfer capacity is fully used in 65%
of the cases. The high usage of the full capacities and the price effect of the coupling
can be seen for a period of 100 hours in Figure 8.1. Expanding, e.g., doubling, the
capacity amplifies the price reduction in both countries; whereas the additional effect
is smaller in France than in Germany, the total price reduction is still stronger in
France. In case of sufficient capacity, there are identical prices in all hours, which is
equal to the situation of having one completely integrated market.
Regarding only market coupling between two countries, in this case, Germany
and France, whereas the exchange with other country is based on historical values,
is, of course, a simplification. Germany, for instance, has interconnections with nine
countries whereas France is connected to seven countries. Among those countries
are some that take part in the market coupling as well, e.g., Austria, Belgium or
the Netherlands. Hence, the effects from the market coupling between Germany
and France in this chapter might be overstated, as either country would exchange
electricity with other countries, if this as well is no longer static and less costly than
the exchange with Germany or France, respectively.
The presented results also depend on information which is not publicly available
and therefore needs to be estimated, such as the operation and maintenance costs of
power plants. Deviations between estimated and real-world values could, of course,
alter the results of the simulation.
8.3.2 Role-playing games
Besides the computational model, there exists a laboratory version, where real-life
participants can assume the tasks of software agents. Thus, the core agent-based
simulation model is supplemented by elements from experimental economics and
role-playing games (Genoese and Fichtner, 2012).
In literature, two approaches are distinguished in combining agent-based models
and role-playing games. Barreteau et al. (2001) propose a parallel existence of agent-
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Figure 8.1 | Market coupling. The simulated electricity flow and price difference be-
tween Germany and France for a period of 100 hours in 2012 is depicted. In most
cases, the available interconnecting capacity of up to 2.5GW is used to its full extent,
yet in some cases, the price difference still exceeds 60 EUR/MWh. If the capacity is
not fully utilized, both market areas share an identical price after market coupling.
based models and role-playing games. Hence, the model is rebuilt in a simplified
version as a game. The main goal of this approach is to increase the acceptance of the
model. Guyot and Honiden (2006) develop an agent-based participatory approach,
where real participants are integrated into the model by (partly) controlling the
agents’ actions. For this, user interfaces have to be developed. In the lab version, the
agent-based participatory approach is used.
Currently, in the lab version two modules exist where human participants can
interact. The participants either simulate the power trading or the investments in
new generation capacity. In the trading module, the participants receive the same
information as the computer agents. Each participant has a list of daily available
power plants with all the relevant technical and economic data, e.g., installed capacity,
fuel costs, and efficiency. In addition, a forecast of the day-ahead prices is presented.
Based on this information, the participants submit their bids. When all players have
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successfully completed their task, the market clearing price is computed analogously
to the computational model. The players have the possibility to adapt their strategies
in each round in order to maximize profits. In the investment module, the players can
carry out investments according to the power and fuel price forecast and by taking
into account the decreasing capacities due to the limited technical lifetime of existing
power plants.
The players’ decisions and chosen strategies can be used to improve the behavior
of the computer agents. Computer agents and real participants can coexist as well in
the simulations.
8.4 Conclusions and Outlook
Agent-based simulation in general and the applied electricity market model, in partic-
ular, are helpful means to analyze different aspects of electricity markets. The market
and agent perspective, as well as the flexibility of agent-based simulationmodels, allow
to thoroughly analyze electricity markets and interactions therein. The model is a
detailed bottom-up simulation model, which integrates short-termmarket operations
and long-term capacity planning whereas the most important market participants are
represented by different agents. The model has already been used for various analyses
in the context of electricity markets.
Given the continuously changing economic and regulatory environment in the
power sector, several enhancements to themodel are currently in progress. In order to
reflect the Europeanmarket integration, themodel scope is extended to severalmarket
areas, which can be simultaneously run and coupled. Model coupling clears the energy
and capacity markets simultaneously and determines an optimal solution to the plant
dispatch in the interconnected market areas considering limited commercial transfer
capacities. The model coupling routine presented in this chapter offers a socially
beneficial opportunity to interconnect electricity markets compared to a situation
where no market coupling occurs. The results for Germany and France show that the
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average market price is lower in both countries, whereas the price decrease is stronger
in France than in Germany.
The applied methodological approach has some limitations nonetheless. Regarding
the supply of electricity, additional technical constraints concerning the operation
of power plants, e.g., minimum downtimes or partial efficiency levels, could further
improve the model. Furthermore, the perspective is limited to the supply of electricity,
which differs from the real world situation where also the heat demand influences the
usage of combined heat and power plants.
Given the flexible modeling framework, future model extensions could include the
development of a generally scalable model version to simulate micro-systems as well
as larger system, e.g., Europe, with additional market elements, e.g., intraday market.
Concerning the decision-making process of agents, the refinement of the investment
module and the integration of different aspects of uncertainty is another possibility to
extend the model. Regarding the design of electricity markets, the remuneration of
power plants by capacity mechanisms in order to ensure system reliability is another
topic of research that is currently explored within the model.
Chapter9Cross-border effects ofcapacity remuneration mechanisms:
The Case of the Swiss Electricity Market
European electricity markets are becoming more and more integrated as a conse-quence of the internal market guidelines and the so-called Energy Union strategic
framework of the European Commission (1997, 2003a, 2009). The integration of
the electricity markets is mainly driven by two intertwined processes: On the one
hand, European markets are more tightly linked by implicit auctions and combined
by the so-called Price Coupling of Regions run by eight European power exchanges
(EPEX SPOT, 2018c). On the other hand, the physical transmission grid is expanded,
and in particular, the interconnectors will be further enhanced according to the Ten
Year Network Development Plan (ENTSO-E, 2018a).
As a result, different cross-border effects can be observed: e.g., market clearing is
determined in a way that energy flows from market areas with higher prices to those
with lower prices resulting in a convergence of electricity prices in connected market
areas given that sufficient interconnection capacity is available. The price convergence
stops if the available interconnector does not allow a further flow of electricity and, in
this case, a certain price difference remains. However, an additional interconnection
line between twomarket zones can increase the price assimilation resulting in positive
welfare effects (Ringler et al., 2017).
In the case of a small country neighbored by large markets (asymmetrical mar-
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ket areas), the cross-border price effect can be strong. Therefore, as a case study,
Switzerland serves as a useful example for analyzing the impact of large neighboring
markets on a smaller one. Because the analysis by Dehler et al. (2016) shows a strong
interdependence of wholesale electricity prices of Switzerland and its neighbors (Aus-
tria, France, Italy, and Germany) due to tightly interconnected electricity grids. For
instance, the electricity price decline between 2011 and 2016 in the Central Western
European countries driven by a renewable expansion and low prices for EU-ETS
emission allowance resulted in lower prices also in the Swiss electricity market. This
price decline can be welcomed from the consumer perspective but has a lowering
effect on producer rent and the profitability of power plants (Bublitz et al., 2017; Hirth,
2018; Kallabis et al., 2016). This might yield not only for thermal capacities but also
for the dominant hydropower plants in Switzerland.
These developments are expected to intensify in the near future, as some neighbor-
ing countries changed the design of their wholesale electricity markets in the past few
years, which can put additional pressure on Swiss wholesale electricity prices. For
instance, Germany is planning to introduce a strategic reserve (SR) to ensure genera-
tion adequacy in scarcity times (BMWi, 2017a). Also, France implemented a CRM, a
decentralized capacity market, to ensure generation adequacy and incentivize DSM
measures in peak load times (Bublitz et al., 2019). As the yearly traded volume in the
French and German electricity markets is considerably larger than in other European
markets, their decisions strongly influence the neighboring markets, especially the
comparatively small ones. In this context, the question arises as to whether the Swiss
market also requires new instruments to ensure long-term generation adequacy by
incentivizing national investments and retrofitting.
Therefore, the goal of this study is to investigate the cross-border effects of CRMs
on electricity prices, investments, and thus on the long-term generation adequacy in
such connectedmarket areas by applying a powermarket model based on agent-based
simulation using Switzerland as a case study. This approach allows the consideration
9.1. literature review 255
of individual decisions of market players and the analysis of market equilibria based
on these decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.1 summarizes
the current literature on cross-border effects with regard to CRMs and deduces the
research gap in this context. Section 9.2 describes the applied simulation approach
focusing on modeling CRMs in an electricity market model. The results, including
investments, price impact, and the generation adequacy, are discussed in Section 9.3.
Finally, in Section 9.4, the methodology is critically evaluated, and the main conclu-
sions as well as policy implications are derived in Section 9.5.
9.1 Literature review
One of the difficulties encountered in the analysis of cross-border effects is the large
number of possible influences, such as the number and the market size of the coun-
tries considered. In addition, the levels of competition and the respective market
designs can influence the results (Meyer and Gore, 2015). Thus, it is difficult to derive
general conclusions. This fact might serve as an explanation of why the literature
predominantly focuses on a single market scenario, and the research on spillover
effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms is lagging behind (Lorenczik, 2017).
However, without a sound theoretical framework on cross-border effects, ensuring
generation adequacy at a regional level in an efficient manner remains a major chal-
lenge (Glachant et al., 2017). This is further complicated by the fact that cross-border
effects can emerge in a non-linear manner (Boffa et al., 2010).
A question frequently examined in the literature is whether free-riding occurs if
a neighboring country introduces a CRM. For example, Bhagwat et al. (2014, 2017c)
study cross-border effects in two symmetrical market areas differing only in their
design. Whereas an EOM does not limit the effectiveness of the neighboring capacity
market or SR, vice versa, two effects can be observed: On the one hand, the consumers
in the EOM are free-riding on the consumers in the neighboring market where a CRM
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is implemented. On the other hand, the dependence of the EOM on the neighboring
markets is increasing. Similarly, Meyer and Gore (2015) find that the unilateral
implementation of a CRM, either in the form of reliability options or a SR, weakens
investment incentives in the neighboring market. Cepeda and Finon (2011) analyze
the cross-border effects of three different market designs (EOM, price-capped EOM,
forward capacity market). They find that in the long-term, the market area with an
EOM does not benefit from the adjacent market area where a price-capped forward
capacity market is implemented, and even negative externalities can arise in the form
of a higher average price and lower reliability.
Lorenczik (2017) observes that the negative effect of price caps intensifies if a
market is connected to neighboring markets and, thus, generation capacity and
welfare further decrease. Yet, vice versa, national price caps do not seem to have
a significant adverse effect on neighboring countries. Contrary to other studies, it
is claimed that capacity payments do not exert a significant positive effect on the
security of supply in neighboring countries.
Not only between a market with and without a CRM, spillover effects can occur,
but also between markets with different CRMs. In a scenario where a SR is introduced
in one market and a capacity market in the other, Bhagwat et al. (2014, 2017c) observe
negative spillover effects of the capacity market on the SR resulting in, e.g., a lower
reserve margin in the market with the SR. Elberg (2014) investigates two symmetrical
market areas in which either a SR or capacity payments have been implemented.
On an isolated basis, both mechanisms lead to an efficient outcome. However, in a
combined evaluation, the SR shows worse results due to redistribution effects, as the
consumer welfare decreases in the area of the SR, whereas it increases in the adjacent
area.
In some cases, CRMs are also investigated in real-world case studies. For example,
Ochoa and Gore (2015) investigate the welfare and security of supply in the Finnish
electricity market under consideration of potential benefits and risks arising from the
connection to the Russian market. In case the electricity imports from Russia were
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reliably available, the expansion of transmission capacities would be recommended.
However, as their reliability is doubtful, it is recommended to build up national gener-
ation capacities and maintain a SR. In another analysis, Ochoa and van Ackere (2015b)
examine cross-border effects in Colombia–Ecuador and France–Great Britain. They
conclude that the potential benefits are strongly linked to market complementarity
and that policy measures to exploit these benefits without distorting market signals
must be carefully evaluated, especially if large seasonal storage capacities exist, which
might be used extensively during shortage situations in the neighboring country and
subsequently are unavailable for national usage. In a follow-up study, Ochoa and
van Ackere (2015a) once again analyze the markets of Colombia–Ecuador and find
that the relative market sizes and the size of transmission capacities have a significant
influence on potential cross-border benefits.
One of the remaining key challenges in evaluating generation adequacy is to assess
the contribution of neighboring countries in order to avoid over- or undercapac-
ity. Mastropietro et al. (2015) investigate possibilities to remove barriers preventing
foreign participants in Europe from participating in external capacity mechanisms
without reducing the short-term efficiency of the electricity market. They propose
that capacities should be procured via zonal auctions, which take into account the
maximum transmission capacity of the interconnection, and that capacities should
not be allowed to participate in different national CRMs. Finon (2014) investigates
the differences between explicit and implicit cross-border participation. In the long
term, he states that excluding cross-border participants does result in neither a signif-
icantly lower efficiency nor a distortive effect on the competition. From a European
perspective, however, the explicit consideration of capacities can be advantageous.
Furthermore, it can be noted that the introduction of a CRM in a neighboring country
considerably increases the pressure to introduce a national mechanism, in order to
protect the market against possible harmful consequences (Bhagwat et al., 2017c; Gore
et al., 2016). Another possibility is to focus on supranational coordination (Hawker
et al., 2017; Neuhoff et al., 2016; Osorio and van Ackere, 2016).
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At this point, it needs to be emphasized that the uncoordinated introduction of
CRMs in a tightly interconnected continental electricity system, such as the European
system, can distort price signals and even impair the security of supply in a neighbor-
ing market. However, despite existing research, cross-border effects of CRMs have not
yet been fully explored and, in particular, the impact on tightly connected real-world
markets remains to a large extent unknown. Therefore, to deepen the understand-
ing and identify adverse cross-border effects of CRM, a case study is carried out, in
which the Swiss electricity market is analyzed. The Swiss market has two unusual
characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the analysis: On the one hand, as
a small market, it is strongly influenced by large neighboring markets (Dehler et al.,
2016) and, on the other hand, it possesses mainly complementary and opportunity
cost-based generation technologies, i.e., a significant share of hydro storage capacities
(Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018a). As the opportunity costs are often based on
results from neighboring markets, the cross-border influence is particularly strong.
9.2 The agent-based modeling approach
In this section, the methodology for analyzing the cross-border effects of different
market designs is presented. To this end, an agent-based simulation model with the
focus on Switzerland and adjacent countries has been developed further and applied
(Section 9.2.1–9.2.3). Section 9.2.4 outlines the modeling of CRMs that are newly
introduced or have already been implemented in the considered market areas. In
order to take into account the specific characteristics of the Swiss electricity market,
extensions had to be made in particular for hydropower plants, which are presented
in Section 9.6.1.
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9.2.1 Overview
In order to model the regarded electricity markets, an agent-based simulation ap-
proach is used and extended (e.g., Ringler et al., 2017). To analyze electricity markets
in a dynamic environment, agent-based simulation has already been applied widely
(Guerci et al., 2010; Ventosa et al., 2005; Weidlich and Veit, 2008) as it offers the
possibility of integrating the individual market participants with a high level of detail
(Tesfatsion, 2003). The behavior of the agents can be best described with the concept
of bounded rationality (Simon, 1986), which states that all decisions are made on the
basis of the agents’ limited knowledge about the present and imperfect information
about the future. Therefore, the result of the model is not a long-term, optimal equi-
librium determined by a central decision-maker, but depends on the decisions of all
agents, who pursue individual strategies to reach their goals. Thereby, the market
development under consideration of the complex interactions can be investigated
even in non-equilibrium situations, and new insights can be gained (Epstein, 1999).
For instance, this also means that the demand may not be met by the supply capacity
as agents can invest less than the required capacity in the case of an expected negative
NPV of new investments. Besides, it is also possible for power plant operators to
submit strategic bids above the variable costs.
In the applied agent-based bottom-up simulation model, individual agents are
major national and international actors representing the main generation companies.
The model integrates the short-term dispatching of generation units with an hourly
time resolution (Section 9.2.2) and the long-term capacity planning with regard to
conventional power plants (Section 9.2.3).
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Figure 9.1 | Market coupling with sufficient transmission capacity. As sufficient trans-
mission capacity between the two interconnected markets is available, prices converge
to PABMC and the economic welfare increases. However, this does not imply that each
market participant is better off. For example, consumers in market A have to pay a
higher price than they would pay without market coupling.
9.2.2 Day-ahead market
In order to analyze in particular the interactions of the different market areas, each
market is implemented as an optional module and interconnected to its neighboring
markets via the available transmission capacities. In recent years in Europe, market
coupling hasmade steady progress and, in 2015, a flow-based approachwas introduced
(EPEX SPOT, 2016), replacing the ATC-based approach used before (EPEX SPOT,
2011a). As cross-border effects are strongly influenced by the way market coupling is
implemented, an algorithm was chosen that resembles the actual market design and
can be divided into the following steps:
First, in each area, agents are called upon by a national market operator to submit
bids for the day-ahead market for each hour of the following day. The bids are based
on the variable costs of the generation capacity units but can also include a markup in
scarcity hours (Keles et al., 2016a). Next, all national bids are submitted to a central
operator that applies a welfare-maximizing market clearing algorithm subject to the
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Figure 9.2 |Market couplingwith insufficient transmission capacity. As there is lower-
cost generation capacity available in Market A, Market B imports electricity. Thereby,
a smaller part of its local demand DBMC has to be covered by its own supply S
B and
the price in market B decreases. In market A, the situation is exactly the opposite.
Generation capacities from market A serve an overall higher demand DAMC, thus more
expensive capacities are required, and the price in market A rises. However, as only
insufficient transmission capacity is available, no uniform price is reached, but a price
difference of ∆P remains.
available interconnection capacity as well as the balance of supply and demand in
each market area.¹ As shown in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2, the algorithm leads to
a convergence of market prices and, in the case of sufficiently large transmission
capacities, identical prices.
9.2.3 Capacity expansion
Themodel contains an investment planning module, which is executed once a year
within the chosen time horizon. Thereby, different investment options of flexible
power plants are compared according to a certain economic criterion, e.g., the net
present value. Potential revenues for power plants can be generated from selling
electricity in energy spot markets as well as from participating in different CRMs,
¹ For further details, for example, the mathematical formulation of the market clearing problem,
refer to Ringler et al. (2017).
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e.g., a central capacity market or a SR, depending on the respective market area
configuration. Investment agents in all market areas evaluate different power plant
options. Data and assumptions on which the prediction is based are future electricity
demand as well as fuel and emission price developments in the following years. Based
on the data, a price forecast is firstly made for future prices in the respective market
areas. Each agent a from all market areas calculates the NPV for each available
investment option j according to Equation (9.1).
NPV j,a = −I0, j + n j∑
t=1
−cfixt, j +∑8760h=1 max{pprogh,t,a − cvarh,t, j, 0}(1 + i)t ∀ j, a (9.1)
Calculation of theNPV is based on the investment payment I0, the economic lifetime
n, interest rate i, fixed costs cfix price forecast pprog and variable costs cvar.
Investment options are predetermined exogenously based on the scenario (Ta-
ble 9.2) and represent a specific flexible power plant type, such as a gas turbine. The
options include all economic—e.g., investment I0 or investment horizon n—and
technological parameters—e.g., efficiency or net capacity—that vary over the simula-
tion period. In addition, future technological developments such as carbon capture
systems are taken into account in various investment options.
For calculation of the expected annual revenues of the spot market, an hourly
electricity price forecast pprog is used. The price forecast for the NPV calculations
works analogously to the determination of the spot market price by applying a welfare
maximizing market coupling. The variable costs cvar for each hour h of the year t are
deducted from pprog. As a power plant only produces if at least the variable costs are
covered, all negative cash flows are excluded neglecting must-run conditions, start-up
costs, and minimum downtimes. For calculation of the variable costs, fuel prices and
carbon certificate prices are assumed to be the same in all market areas.
A list with the NPV values of all power plant options is created for all agents A
from all market areas. From this, the option j∗ is selected that reaches the highest
positive NPV∗ of all agents:
9.2. the agent-based modeling approach 263
j∗ =maxNPV j,a ∀ j ∶ NPV j > 0 and a ∈ A (9.2)
Each investment increases the totally installed capacity and thus influences prices.
Consequently, no investor would make an investment with an initial positive NPV, if
it affects prices to such an extent that the own new investment becomes unprofitable.
Therefore, a new price forecast is calculated after each investment decision for option
j∗. Subsequently, j∗ is revaluated with the new price forecast. If the NPV∗ of j∗ is
still positive, the agent invests in option j∗. If the NPV∗ of j∗ is not positive, a new
price forecast is calculated with the option with the second highest NPV and so on
until an investment is made. If no investment with a positive NPV is available, the
algorithm terminates, and no further investments are made in the simulation year.
The investment process is repeated every year of the model horizon.
9.2.4 Modeling capacity remuneration mechanisms
In recent years, some countries have introduced CRMs, thus making it necessary to
extend the model with this very feature. The model is able to consider SR and other
types of CRMs (Bublitz et al., 2015a; Keles et al., 2016a). For this analysis, only the SR
for Belgium and Germany as well as a decentralized capacity market for France and
a central capacity market for Italy are applied (see Figure 9.3). The payments of the
modeled mechanisms are also taken into account for the NPV calculation described
in Section 9.2.3.
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Not regarded No CRM
Central buyer De-central obligation Strategic reserve
Figure 9.3 | Market areas. In the model, the following countries are included with
the already implemented and planned capacity remuneration mechanisms: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
9.2. the agent-based modeling approach 265
Strategic reserve
Every year, the national transmission system operators in Belgium and Germany
organize an auction to procure the necessary capacity for the SR. In order to participate,
a generation unit must be available within a certain time, i.e., after a cold start time
of less than 10 hours. The selection of generation capacity is determined by the
submitted capacity price without considering electricity generation costs. Generators
offer their capacities based on their respective annual fixed and opportunity costs. The
opportunity costs correspond to the expected lost profits from the other markets, as
contracted entities are prohibited from participating in other markets. This restriction
remains in effect even after expiry of the contract term and hence obeys the no-way-
back rule. Once a power plant is part of the SR, its operational control is carried out
by the transmission system operator. The reserve is used only in extreme situations
when no balance between supply and demand can be achieved. In this case, the
operator offers the reserve in the day-ahead market at the maximum allowed price.
The generation units are activated in the order of their variable costs: First, the unit
with the lowest variable costs is dispatched, then the more expensive ones. The owner
receives a recompensation for the costs additionally incurred during the operation
time, e.g., fuel and carbon costs. For further details regarding the implementation of
the SR refer to Bublitz et al. (2015a).
Capacity markets
The implementation of the French capacity market (Réseau de transport d’électricité
[RTE], 2017), which was particularly developed for this investigation, is described
in detail in Zimmermann et al. (2017) or Kraft (2017). Firstly, the reference capacity
demand (based on the future annual peak demand) including an exogenously de-
fined security factor is calculated. Depending on the reference capacity, the capacity
obligations of the obligated parties, i.e., supply companies and large consumers, are
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specified depending on their shares in total peak demand, so that each obligated party
has to cover the amount corresponding to its own demand.
Secondly, the supply price of the generation capacities is determined due to the
expected income on the electricity market for each generation unit based on the yearly
difference costs. Difference costs are defined as the gap between the yearly income
on the energy market and the required income to break even a generation unit’s
profitability. Finally, annual payments are derived due to the capacity obligations and
the difference costs of the supply units.
The central capacity market with capacity options, applied, e.g., in Italy, is based on
the Forward Capacity Market, which is currently implemented in the market area of
the US system operator ISO New England (2014), and is adjusted to the Italian market
area, which is outlined in Keles et al. (2016a). In the model, with a lead time of four
years, the regulator agent determines the conventional capacity requirement which is
calculated based on the forecasted peak load in the respective year of execution minus
the contribution of RES to the generation adequacy (on the basis of predefined capacity
credits). The regulator, as the central agent, buys the whole capacity for the market
area in the model including all reserve margins based on a certain demand curve
(Cramton and Stoft, 2005). Afterward, the generation units receive this payment.
9.2.5 Output
One of the main outputs of the model are the hourly spot electricity prices for each
market area. These electricity prices reflect both the national situation, e.g., market de-
sign, demand, and generationmix, as well as developments in interconnectedmarkets,
e.g., welfare effects and cross-border flows. Therefore, determining the profitability of
existing and new generation units is also a result of this study. Given the possibility of
varying model parameters (e.g., with certain CRM activated) and input data (e.g., fuel
and carbon prices varied), the agent-based simulation model is suitable to analyze a
range of different scenarios. Several investigations have been conducted in the past
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(e.g., Keles et al., 2016b) using the selected modeling approach. In order to analyze
cross-border effects, the model has been improved with regard to the methodology
and the spatial resolution. The methodological extensions are inter alia the imple-
mentation of the French capacity market as well as the hydropower dispatch module
(Section 9.6.1), in particular for Austria and Switzerland. Furthermore, the long-term
price forecast, which is used in particular in the investment planning module, as
well as the investment planning module itself have been improved regarding the
consideration of market coupling effects. Geographical extensions include the market
areas of Switzerland, Italy, and Austria, whereas, before the extension, the model was
limited to the Central Western European (CWE) market area. (See Keles et al., 2016a;
Ringler et al., 2017)
9.3 Case study: Switzerland
In this section, a scenario framework will be defined in accordance with the modeling
approach (Section 9.2). Therefore, assumptions are made for the development of
electricity demand, fuel and carbon certificate prices, and the costs of generation
technologies.
This requires the selection and processing of large amounts of data (Table 9.1)
to be used in the scenario runs (Table 9.2). The EU Reference Scenario (European
Commission, 2016c) was used to derive fuel and carbon prices. All of the flexible
fossil power plants in the modeled areas are based on the S&P Global Platts (2016)
power plant database. Regarding the market coupling, the trading capacities between
the market areas are derived from 50Hertz Transmission et al. (2018) and ENTSO-E
(2018a). Investments in new flexible power plants as well as assumptions of fixed and
additional variable costs (in addition to the costs of fuel and carbon certificates) for
the power plants are based on Schröder et al. (2012). Due to the high resolution of
the model, hourly RES feed-in and electricity demand profiles (year 2015) are used as
initial data taken from ENTSO-E (2018b) and Swissgrid (2015). The yearly development
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Table 9.1 | Input data. In this table, an overview is provided over the main
data used in all scenarios. Due to the large amount of different data required,
many different sources are used.
Input data
type
Resolution Switzerland Other countries
Conventional
power plants
Plant/unit
level
Based on S&P Global Platts
(2016), extended with own
assumptions
Fuel and
carbon prices
Yearly European Commission (2016c)
Investment
options
Yearly Schröder et al. (2012)
Transmission
capacity
Yearly ENTSO-E (2018a), 50Hertz
Transmission et al. (2018)
Electricity
demand and
RES feed-in
Hourly
aggregated
per market
area
Prognos (2012)
(Scenario C&E),
ENTSO-E
(2018b),
Swissgrid (2015)
European
Commission
(2016c),
ENTSO-E
(2018b)
of the demand and the RES feed-in volume is taken from European Commission
(2016c) for the EU countries and from Prognos (2012) (Scenario C&E) for Switzerland.
All profiles are scaled according to the underlying development in the modeled years.
Hydropower plants play a crucial role in the Swiss electricity market. The aggregated
capacities of run-of-river, seasonal hydro storage, and pumped storage power plants
kept constant at 16.6GW in total and are taken from Swiss Federal Office of Energy
(2018d).
In order to examine the effects of the CRMs in detail, various scenarios and sensi-
tivities are calculated using the agent-based model for a time horizon from 2015 to
2050 to evaluate the individual market designs for the simulated market areas. These
are shown in Table 9.2.
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Table 9.2 | Scenarios. The applied market designs for the
different scenarios for each country are described. Whereas
CRM Policies represents a scenario with currently imple-
mented policies, the counterfactual EOM scenario and DE
Strategic sensitivity are used to analyze the effects of CRMs.
EOM CRM Policies DE Strategic
reserve sensitivity
Austria EOM EOM EOM
Belgium EOM SR SR
France EOM DCM† DCM†
Germany EOM SR (5GW) SR (2GW)
Italy CB* CB* CB*
Netherlands EOM EOM EOM
Switzerland EOM EOM EOM
*Central buyer.
† Decentralized capacity market.
9.3.1 Wholesale price development
The EOM scenario is characterized by the fact that only EOMs are implemented in
all of the modeled markets. This means that all income from flexible power plants is
generated by the sale of electrical energy on the wholesale electricity market. The CRM
Policies scenario describes the currently implemented and decided market designs
in the modeled market areas/countries. It is a close-to-reality representation of the
circumstances prevailing at the time this investigation was being processed.
Looking at the simulated wholesale prices in the EOM (Figure 9.4) and in the CRM
Policies scenario (Figure 9.5), it is immediately visible that the prices in France are
clearly below the prices for all other market areas until approximately 2035. The reason
for this is the high proportion of nuclear power plants in France, which are not affected
by rising carbon certificate prices and set the prices at a lower level in France due to
their low marginal costs. Due to the limited trading capacities between the countries,
the other market areas can only partly profit from these low prices. Moreover, the
price-increasing effects of exchange trades with Spain and Great Britain (which are
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Figure 9.4 | Price development in the EOM scenario. The simulated wholesale prices
in the EOM scenario show a strong increase. With the decommissioning of nuclear
power plants, French prices rise to a similar level as in other market areas.
connected to the French grid and tend to have a higher price level) are missing in the
model due to the chosen system boundaries. This leads to large deviations between
the French prices and the other market prices until trading capacities between the
modeled countries are substantially increased. In addition, few new nuclear power
plants are built in France during the time horizon of the analysis (only towards the
end of the simulation period), but rather gas-fired power plants, which in terms of
prices align with the other market areas. This can be observed in both scenarios.
Therefore, from 2035 onwards, prices in the EOM scenario rise significantly due to
scarcity prices within several hours caused by less installed capacity and increasing
carbon certificate prices. The average prices in the model in the years 2041 and 2043
are thus over 120 EUR/MWh in the EOM scenario. In the following years, however,
the average price is observed to fall again, because these prices again incentivize new
investments.
In all modeled market areas, prices are developing in a similar way. Only Italy has
average prices slightly below the other areas considered from 2035 onwards. These
differences are due to the still limited exchange capacities to neighboring countries
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Figure 9.5 | Price development in Switzerland. The simulated prices in the CRM Poli-
cies scenario also show a strong increase, although the overall level is lower than in
the EOM scenario.
together with high RES production in Italy, so that it is no longer possible to export
more electricity in the corresponding hours. E.g., in the year 2043, Italy on the average
generates 39GW from RES in the hours with fully used export capacities. This RES
production lowers the average wholesale price. From 2035, the picture is similar for
the CRM Policies scenario as in the EOM scenario, with the difference that the average
prices are significantly lower. The absolute price deviations of the wholesale market
prices of the different scenarios are at the beginning (until 2023) only caused by the
introduction of the SR in Germany because the power plants will be taken out of
the market. Until 2035, the prices of both scenarios are almost the same; the EOM
average prices are even slightly below the average prices of the CRM Policies scenarios.
From 2035 onwards, however, prices deviate significantly due to the occurrence of
scarcity caused by an insufficient supply in various market areas in the EOM scenario
(Figure 9.6). The prices remain lower (see Figure 9.5) due to sufficient capacities in
the CRM Policies scenario.
For Switzerland, this deviation of the average prices is shown in Figure 9.6. The
maximum difference between the yearly average prices of the EOM scenario and
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Figure 9.6 | Swiss wholesale prices. In the long term, the simulated prices for the CRM
Policies scenario are substantially lower than in the EOM scenario as Swiss consumers
benefit from increased abroad generation capacities.
the CRM Policies scenario is more than 27 EUR/MWh in some years after 2035. This
high price difference is, of course, due to the higher flexible capacities in France and
Italy, which are available at any time. The neighboring countries also profit from the
high installed capacity that is signaled by fewer hours in which the market cannot be
cleared (Section 9.3.3).
Regarding the prices and the capacity development, the picture is ambivalent for
Switzerland. On the one hand, less will be invested in theCRM Policies scenario, prices
are lower than in the EOM scenario, and Swiss hydropower offers enough capacity
at all hours to ensure that the wholesale market can always be cleared. However,
on the other hand, compared to the neighboring countries, the EOM scenario does
not have many hours in which the market does not provide sufficient supply, but
at significantly higher prices. However, CRMs also causes costs (and could lead to
inefficient investments), but this is not relevant to Switzerland because these costs for
CRMs are normally allocated within the countries.
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Figure 9.7 | Cumulated conventional capacity. The main differences between the
EOM and in the CRM Policies scenario can be seen in France and Italy. There, the
introduction of capacity markets leads to higher capacities from 2025 onwards and to
a more constant conventional capacity development than in the EOM scenario.
9.3.2 Generation capacities
As CRMs had already been established in some markets at the time of the preparation
of this study, the EOM scenario serves as a benchmark. In the EOM scenario, the
total installed conventional capacity across all countries decreases, with the exception
of Austria. This can be explained by overcapacities, especially in Germany, and by
better counterbalancing effects across the various market areas. For instance, market
coupling and expansion of trading capacities allow larger volumes of energy exchanges
across countries. However, there is a short-term increase in capacity in 2030 and 2035
in the model runs (Figure 9.7). This can essentially be explained by the closure of
large nuclear capacities in France, so that with a (purely hypothetical) assumption
of the maximum operating life of nuclear power plants being 50 years, starting in
2027, their total capacity shrinks from over 60GW to less than 10GW within 15 years
excluding new investments (Zimmermann et al., 2017). This leads to raised prices in
the forecast module in consecutive years and in some cases to anticipated investments
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Figure 9.8 | Swiss capacity in the EOM and CRM Policies scenario. The most sig-
nificant developments are the complete decommissioning of nuclear power plants by
2035, which are being replaced by new investments in gas-fired combined cycle power
plants and the expansion of renewable energies, especially photovoltaics.
in new power plants. However, after 2035, the capacity falls back below the level of
before 2030 both in France and in all countries considered. After 2035, the reason
for the reduction of the installed conventional capacities is the growth of RES in all
countries.
However, Austria is an exception, because of the newly introduced market splitting
between Austria and Germany (since October 2018) and the merely static exchange
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia without price effects. The latter issue
could distort prices to such an extent that investments in Austria appear profitable
in the model because of high price forecasts due to low installed capacity. For better
illustration, Figure 9.7 shows the conventional capacity development without RES.
Figure 9.8 shows capacity development in Switzerland, including all RES capacities,
broken down by the respective generation technologies. Whereas the nuclear power
plants will be completely phased out by 2035 due to the assumed maximum lifetime
of 50 years, the capacity will be replaced by new investments in gas-fired combined
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Table 9.3 | Investments in conventional capacity. The invest-
ments are similar in both scenarios, thus showing only a small
influence of CRMs in Switzerland’s neighboring countries. In
the EOM scenario, the total investment is slightly higher, al-
though the first investments are made later.
Gas Combined Open Cycle
Cycle [MW] Gas Turbine [MW]
Years EOM CRM Policies EOM CRM Policies
2020-2024 – – – 800
2025-2029 1200 – – –
2030-2034 800 1200 – –
2035-2039 400 – – –
cycle power plants up to a total capacity of 2.4GW (see Table 9.3). However, if the
nuclear power plants are operated for a longer period, this picture may change.
The increase in installed RES capacity in Switzerland is mainly caused by the growth
in solar power plants, due to the input data. The installed wind capacity increases
from 367MW in 2020 to 2367MW in 2050 and for solar from 650MW in 2020 to
13 900MW in 2050. As a result, the total generation capacity rises from over 21GW
in 2020 to over 36GW in 2050 in the EOM scenario.
CRM Policies scenario
For the study of CRMmarket designs, availability factors of 6% for wind and 1% for
PV were assumed at all hours. In particular in Italy, conventional power plants are
considered with a 90% availability in the CRM, and for the capacity market auction,
an additional reserve of 3% of the peak load is implemented. For France defined
by Réseau de transport d’électricité [RTE] (2017), a security factor of 1.03 as well
as capacity credits for wind (20%) and solar (5%) are applied for the first years.
For Germany, the SR (‘Kapazitätsreserve’) allocates 5GW. In all market areas, DSM
(interruptible load) capacities in the amount of 2% of the maximal peak load for a
price of 700 EUR/MWh are assumed.
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In the CRM Policies scenario, all model results are generated considering already
implemented or proposed CRMs. Therefore, the introduction of the capacity markets
in France and Italy leads to significantly higher capacities and to a more constant
conventional capacity development in these countries compared to the EOM scenario
(see Figure 9.7). In the scenario with CRMs, the increasing demand for flexible
generation capacity is driven by the peak demand plus potential security margins,
e.g., defined by the regulatory authority.
RES can have a mitigating effect on the rise of the conventional capacity demand
caused by the CRMs. However, due to the fluctuating behavior of RES, they may only
participate to a certain extent in the capacity market (or by reducing peak residual
demand). This also depends on the respective design or parameterization of the CRMs.
However, as a result of the capacity credits, the sum of the required and installed
conventional capacity corresponds to almost peak demand in the overall market area
due to the CRM configuration.
For illustration, Figure 9.7 shows the capacity development in Switzerland and in
the neighboring countries. In Table 9.3, the investments in new power plants are listed.
Investments are made purely in gas-fired power plants (2GW). However, investments
not only in CCGTs but also in OCGTs are part of the results. The OCGTs outperform
CCGTs in terms of capital costs. Therefore, the agents choose the OCGTs if the power
plant is mainly built to provide reserve or if the power plant is dispatched only for a
small number of hours in the spot market with low average market prices.
9.3.3 Generation adequacy
The generation adequacy is illustrated here in the form of hours and expected volumes
where the electricity spot market cannot be cleared normally. Section 9.3.3 summa-
rizes and aggregates the number of hours in which the spot market in the model
cannot generate a feasible market result with usual generation capacities. Hence,
either immediately-switchable capacity is necessary for market clearing or the market
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Table 9.4 | Usage of demand side management. Whereas in the EOM scenario
all countries considered are dependent on DSM applications, their use is signif-
icantly reduced by the introduction of CRMs; in the case of Italy and France,
DSM is no longer activated.
Unit CH DE FR IT AT
EOM scenario
DSM usage [h] 846 988 982 725 834
No market clearing [h] 0 492 541 308 2
Expected load not served [MWh] 0 5337 5470 3992 1127
CRM Policies scenario
DSM usage [h] 14 165 0 0 88
No market clearing [h] 0 42 0 0 17
Expected load not served [MWh] 0 1936 0 0 1042
DE 2GW SR sensitivity scenario
DSM usage [h] 16 144 2 0 81
No market clearing [h] 0 29 0 0 16
Expected load not served [MW] 0 1855 0 0 1097
cannot be cleared due to insufficient supply (“No market clearing, therefore price is
3000 EUR/MWh (EPEX SPOT, 2018b)). However, this does not necessarily indicate
black- or brownouts, because there is, for instance, still the available control reserve
capacity. The availability of DSM potential is assumed to be 2% of the peak demand
in all market areas. Section 9.3.3 indicates the accumulated number of hours with the
use of DSM or with no market clearing for both scenarios. Furthermore, the expected
energy not covered in the case of a non-feasible market result in the spot market is
specified in the same table.
In Switzerland, the lower installed generation capacity in the CRM Policies scenario
does not increase the number of hours in which the market cannot be cleared or
the hours when DSM is needed to clear the market successfully. On the contrary,
the number of hours with DSM dispatch even falls due to higher flexible capacity in
the neighboring countries compared to the EOM scenario. In the EOM scenario, the
market can be cleared at all hours, which is caused by the use of DSM and the high
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Figure 9.9 | DE strategic reserve sensitivity. Only marginal differences are identifiable
between both price curves. In the years 2020 to 2022 in particular, a deviation in the
prices is discernible, as the SR in Germany starts in 2020 and capacities are taken out
of the market. Moreover, some years later (around 2044), there will be further slight
differences in prices.
hydropower capacity. In the CRM Policies scenario, only Austria has many hours in
which the market cannot be cleared.
Figure 9.8 shows the flexible capacities in Switzerland in the two scenarios. Due
to the slightly lower market prices and the higher flexible capacities (stimulated by
CRMs) in the neighboring countries France and Italy, the total installed capacity in
Switzerland is lower in the CRM Policies scenario by 400MW from 2030. However,
this does not increase the number of hours, in which the market cannot be cleared,
or the hours when DSM is needed to successfully clear the market, as more capacities
from the neighboring market areas are available also for the Swiss market.
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9.3.4 Sensitivity analysis for the size of the strategic reserve in Germany
In order to consider other possible developments, an additional scenario is added and
the results are briefly presented in this chapter. In this scenario, the strategic reserve
in Germany is reduced to 2GW (instead of 5GW), as the current regulation allocates
a maximum of 2GW until 2025, however, maximal 5GW are legally permissible.
In the scenario, there is hardly any difference in the development of prices and
capacities in Switzerland. It is necessary to compare the results of the model simula-
tions with 2GW SR in Germany (DE strategic reserve sensitivity) with those of the
CRM Policies scenario, as no strategic reserve is used in the pure EOM scenario.
With regard to the prices shown in Figure 9.9, only marginal differences are identifi-
able. In the years 2020 to 2022 in particular, a deviation in the prices is discernible, as
the SR in Germany starts in 2020 and capacities are taken out of the market. Moreover,
some years later (around 2044), there will be further slight differences in prices.
These minor differences in prices do not affect capacities and incentivize invest-
ments in the scenario. At the beginning, compared to the CRM Policies scenario
higher capacity in Germany, this does not lower the capacity in Switzerland, as rather
old power plants are allocated to the SR, and old power plants leave the market sooner.
In 2021, the increase in prices in the DE Strategic reserve sensitivity scenario is
caused by the fact that in the scenario with 5GW SR (CRM Policies), investments
are made promptly due to the higher capacity taken out of the market and thus the
market price falls. In the DE Strategic reserve scenario, initially no investments are
made, but therefore shortages occur in the market and the prices rise.
Section 9.3.3 shows the number of hours in which DSM is used and the number of
hours in which the wholesale market cannot be cleared. According to these figures,
no massive differences to the CRM Policies scenario arise. Thus, the number of hours
in which Switzerland has to use DSM for market clearing increased by 2 to 16 as
well as the hours in France also increased by 2, whereas the hours in Germany and
Austria decreased. The increase in France and Switzerland is due to scarcity in the
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neighboring countries and therefore, more electricity had to be exported. The number
of hours without market clearing in Switzerland, France, and Italy remains at 0. In
Germany, the number drops to 29 (from 42 in the CRM Policies scenario). In Austria,
the number of hours declines by 1 to 16. The decrease in the number of hours of DSM
usage and no market clearing in Germany and Austria is mainly due to the fact that
more capacity will be available in the years after 2020 and the market can therefore
be cleared more often without any help of DSM. The expected energy not served is
also declining slightly in Germany but rises slightly in Austria. In summary, this
sensitivity confirms the results of the CRM Policies scenario.
9.4 Critical reflection
The scenario analyses presented in this chapter are carried out formulating own
assumptions or using best available studies for the uncertain input parameters, such
as the development of the electricity demand, prices for carbon certificates, and fuel
prices for gas or coal. No market data are accessible for a time horizon up to 2050.
This is why the EU Reference scenario (European Commission, 2016c) is taken as an
input source for the investigation. However, this input data are only available in steps
of 5 years, so that the intermediate years had to be linearly interpolated. Data about
technological developments and trends in energy technologies (both conventional
and RES) can only be found to a limited extent.
Further simplifications have been made with regard to the electrical grid. The
domestic grid is not modeled, neither the transmission nor the distribution grid level,
only the interconnector capacities are considered by using net transfer capacity (NTC)
values. This means that no grid congestions within a country or other disturbances
in the grid are taken into account, but they may play an important role in reality.
However, as the study focuses on the balance between supply capacity and demand
at the market area scale, the inner-market area bottlenecks play a minor role. In
contrast, storage expansion, especially large-scale diffusion of battery storage, can
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significantly improve generation adequacy but has not been considered in this study.
The selected approach follows the study by Prognos (2012) for Switzerland, which
does not envisage any expansion of hydro storage facilities in Switzerland.
Furthermore, some own assumptions had to be made in the CRM modules, as
not all market design details are available for all market areas. For instance, in the
French capacity market, the used agent-based simulation model does not differentiate
between the obligated parties regarding different demand curve patterns, e.g., for
sectors or consumers. Beyond that, the participation of foreign power plants in CRMs
is only considered by taking neighboring capacity shares into account in the security
margin parameter. Therefore, future research should also focus on further design
parameter variations and possible cross-border impacts of alternative designs.
9.5 Conclusions and policy implications
As generation adequacy is strongly dependent on investments in flexible generation
capacity, it is monitored continuously with great scrutiny by regulators. Cross-border
effects can strongly influence the investments in neighboring countries and thereby
increase or decrease the level of domestic generation adequacy. Thus, it is essential to
assess and anticipate these effects.
In this paper, changes in the market design of neighboring countries and, in par-
ticular, their effects on a small market area (asymmetric market constellation) are
investigated taking the Swiss electricity market as an illustrative example. Switzerland
is largely influenced by surrounding electricity markets and needs to analyze the
political decisions regarding market design changes and to react to developments in
the neighboring countries. The strength of this influence is studied with the help of
an agent-based simulation model that is applied to two different scenarios describing
possible developments with a time horizon until 2050. The long-term time horizon
allows to analyze the generation adequacy not only for the current energy system
with a comparably low share of intermittent renewables but also for a time period
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with very large shares of intermittent sources in the energy system that may not be
available when they are needed in peak demand hours. The first scenario assumes
energy-only markets (EOMs) in all regarded countries, whereas the second one con-
siders implemented capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) in the neighboring
countries, but not in the Swiss market.
In general, the model results indicate a strong price increase in the Central West-
ern European electricity markets, mainly due to rising carbon certificate prices and
increasing demand. However, the price increase in the CRM Policies scenario is about
27 EUR/MWh higher in the long term. This is caused by the introduction of national
CRMs with high targets for domestic generation adequacy, which lead to overall
higher installed capacities in the entire coupled market area. Contrary, in the EOMs
scenario the capacities are scarce resulting in price peaks.
Regarding the cross-border effects on the country without a CRM, in this case
Switzerland, it is shown that higher capacities in the neighboring countries lead to less
domestic investments. Therefore, in the CRM Policies scenario, the Swiss market can
rely on higher imports from the neighboring countries. Hence, Switzerland remains
dependent on neighboring countries, although it has a very limited influence on
their market design. However, it also turned out that sufficient capacity is available
to serve the electricity demand in each time step in both scenarios. The reasons for
that are large interconnector capacities and high hydropower capacity in Switzerland.
This means that although there is an influence on prices, the generation adequacy
in Switzerland is not adversely affected by market design changes in neighboring
countries.
Regarding the operational revenues of hydropower plants in the Swissmarket, it can
be concluded that, as this mainly depends on the development of wholesale electricity
prices, the situation is more favorable in the EOMs scenario than in the CRMs Policies
scenario. The EOMs scenario produces higher wholesale prices reaching an average
annual price of 120 EUR/MWh in the long term. However, with low operating costs
for hydropower and increasing wholesale electricity prices, it is very likely that the
9.6. additional results and model details 283
hydropower plants can be operated profitable independently from the CRM policies
in the neighboring countries in the future. For this reason and due to the fact that
generation adequacy is ensured, a change of the Swiss market design is currently not
required in any of the investigated scenarios.
9.6 Additional results and model details
In the following, additional details to the information already presented in Section 9.2
are provided.
9.6.1 Bidding strategies for hydro storage power plants
In Switzerland, hydropower accounts for the largest share of electricity generation
(Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018b). Analyses of the Swiss electricity market
require an adequate representation of hydropower plants in an electricity market
model. Approximately 16.1GW of hydropower generation capacity (with a peak
demand in 2017 of 10.9GW (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018c)) and a total
storage capacity of 8.8 TWh (with 62.9 TWh total electricity consumption in 2017
(Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018c), see Figure 9.10) are available. The hydropower
generation capacity (including power plants under construction) is divided into
4.6GW of run-of-river, 3.1GW of pumped storage plants and 8.3GW of seasonal
hydro storage plants (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018d).
To determine a schedule that maximizes the revenue of seasonal hydropower
storages is a complex problem for which different approaches with varying degrees
of detail exist (Hongling et al., 2008). In contrast to the operation of a thermal
power plant that is based on its variable costs, arising mainly from the use of fossil
fuels and emission allowances, for storage power plants, the operation depends on
opportunity costs, which have to be determined first. As these costs depend on the
future development of several uncertain factors, such as weather-dependent inflows,
but also on demand and fuel costs (Yakowitz, 1982), both a short-term (days to
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Figure 9.10 | Historical and simulated storage volumes. In contrast to the storage
level, which has a clear annual profile, the generation of hydropower does not exhibit
a pronounced recurrent pattern. This suggests that the monthly generation through
water turbines excluding pumped storage lies within certain limits, but reacts dynam-
ically to market developments.
months) and a medium-term time (one to five years) horizon must be considered
(Steeger et al., 2014).
Thus, it can be assumed that hydropower does not act as a pure price-taker, but
actively influences market prices, which further complicates the determination of
an optimal schedule. The combination of the long considered periods of time, the
multitude of influencing variables, as well as the fact that the optimal schedule must
be determined for every simulated day, lead to the fact that an implementation
would exorbitantly increase the computing time of the model. Therefore, different
approaches to include the hydropower technologies have been applied.
The run-of-river power plants were integrated into the model based on a static
generation profile (Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2017) data used from the year
2015) due to the more or less regular values for monthly generation and inflexible
production over the years. Meanwhile, the pumped storage plants are modeled as
described by (Fraunholz et al., 2017) for an available storage volume of 10% of the
total volume according to Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018c).
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Due to its transparency, a linear regression approach is chosen in order to model
the seasonal hydropower in Switzerland. This custom heuristic, in which an optimal
use cannot be guaranteed, but which resembles the historical generation, takes into
account the simulated developments, and at the same time only marginally extends
the computing time. For this purpose, the hourly historical production time series of
seasonal hydro storage power plants from ENTSO-E (2018b) for the years 2015 to 2017
are used for this regression. The regression was applied for each season of the year
t ↦ s ∈ S:
hydroGent =β0s +∑m (βloadm,s loadm,t + βRESm,sRESm,t)+∑m≠CH βNEm,snetExchangeCH→m,t+∑23i=1 β ishourt+ βStorageCH,s V+ єt
∀t (9.3)
with
Parameters
loadm,t : Normalized physical load
RESm,t : Normalized renewable feed-in
netExchangeCH→m,t : Net electricity exchange between
Switzerland and market m
hourt : Dummy for the hour of the day
dayt : Dummy for the type of day
V : Storage volume in Switzerland
Sets
s ⊂ S : Season of the year
m ∈ {AT ,CH,DE, FR, IT} : Markets
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Figure 9.11 | Historical and fitted generation of seasonal hydro storages. The values
for January 2016 show a similar pattern, although the positive peaks in the historical
values appear more pronounced and, vice versa, the negative peaks in the simulated
values.
The following influencing factors are examined with the assessment of the regres-
sion: Demand, RES feed-in, weekday or weekend, exchange flows with neighboring
market areas, storage level and hour of the day. Coefficients for these factors are
individually estimated for each season. To account for the increasing capacity of RES,
normalized feed-in values (normalized to the total annual production) are used for
the variable RES feed-in. Equation (9.3) describes the regression model. Table 9.6
documents the individual regression coefficients for each season.
The developed regression model and its coefficients are integrated into the agent-
based model. Based on the regression model, the hourly operation of the seasonal
hydropower plants is calculated. In addition, the storage levels are tracked at any time
and in the event of overflow or underrun, the operation is adjusted accordingly. Taken
from the model results, Figure 9.11 shows the hourly operation in winter simulated
with the regression model compared with the real operation. As the values of the
regression can also become negative or exceed the possible use, two more limits are
introduced:
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Table 9.5 | Validation of the agent-based model. The
compared day-ahead wholesale historical and simu-
lated prices are similar in both regarded scenarios; thus
showing the suitability of the applied model. Source:
EPEX SPOT (2018b).
[EUR/MWh] 2015 2016
hist. sim. hist. sim.
Switzerland 40.30 43.41 37.88 38.29
Germany/Austria 31.63 43.51 28.98 38.48
France 38.48 39.07 36.75 34.17
Italy-North* 52.71 42.64 42.67 38.01
* The national average price (PUN) in Italy was
52.31 EUR/MWh in 2015 and 42.78 EUR/MWh in
2016.
hydroGent =min{hydroGenmax{0, hydroGent}} (9.4)
In addition, further bids will be made to ensure that all the required capacity is
available when needed. These are offered at a high price in the market (above the
most expensive thermal power plant) so that they are only used in particularly scarce
situations and at the same time to ensure that annual generation does not become
too high.
9.6.2 Validation
To verify the results, a short validation based on historical prices is carried out in
advance. Table 9.5 shows the comparison of real electricity wholesale prices, of the
years 2015 and 2016 (EPEX SPOT, 2018b), and the prices that are calculated in the
simulation. In some cases, there are larger deviations. Concerning the German price
deviation, it has to be mentioned that several market areas around Germany, e.g.,
Denmark, Poland, have not yet explicitly been modeled. Although the exchange
flows with these markets are considered via static exchange, only the hourly volume
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effects, but not price effects of these flows are taken into account. Calculations with
all neighboring market areas of Germany show that the mean value of deviations was
below 2 EUR/MWh for Germany and Austria in the years 2015 and 2016. Furthermore,
the carbon certificate prices in this study are derived from the EU Reference Scenario
(European Commission, 2016c), but in reality, the carbon certificate prices were
lower in these years, which also explains some of the higher electricity prices in the
simulation. The error between simulated and historical series is quite small for the
Swiss and French electricity prices. In general, the price validation delivers sufficiently
good results except for Italy. The main reason for the deviation in Italy is that there is
no internal splitting of Italy into different price zones in the model as it is the case
in reality. Therefore, no domestic grid restrictions in Italy are taken into account
that would shorten the market in the different zones and lead to higher prices in the
model. Higher prices in the different zones in Italy lead to a higher average than in
the case of considering Italy as a unique market zone.
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Table 9.6 | Regression coefficients. A significant factor for the operation of seasonal
storage is the demand in neighboring countries, besides there is a daily pattern with
a peak at noon. Results for the different seasons, however, can differ considerably.
Spring Summer Autumn Winter
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
ß0 −3055 0.00 −2590 0.00 −5492 0.00 −4414 0.00
ßStorageCH 0 0.12 0 0.81 0 0.00 0 0.00
ßloadCH −167 0.52 804 0.02 −1277 0.00 1215 0.00
ßloadIT 1791 0.00 1008 0.00 4910 0.00 3698 0.00
ßloadAT −50 0.87 1524 0.00 −911 0.00 −1883 0.00
ßloadFR 287 0.18 2646 0.00 3117 0.00 2426 0.00
ßloadCH 4499 0.00 1991 0.00 2292 0.00 2668 0.00
ßRESDE −117 0.00 −1022 0.00 −247 0.00 63 0.05
ßRESIT 404 0.00 98 0.09 113 0.03 −95 0.19
ßRESAT −116 0.10 16 0.79 −360 0.00 −403 0.00
ßRESFR −648 0.00 1084 0.00 −349 0.00 −396 0.00
ßRESCH 165 0.10 −1276 0.00 417 0.00 −637 0.02
ßday −138 0.00 −169 0.00 −133 0.00 −33 0.40
ß1 −4 0.96 96 0.23 91 0.24 −48 0.58
ß2 −35 0.64 70 0.39 146 0.06 −6 0.94
ß3 −74 0.32 −66 0.43 57 0.46 −1 1.00
ß4 −177 0.02 −361 0.00 −292 0.00 −152 0.09
ß5 −230 0.01 −442 0.00 −503 0.00 −530 0.00
ß6 −7 0.94 168 0.12 −404 0.00 −617 0.00
ß7 −10 0.92 496 0.00 −285 0.00 −489 0.00
ß8 −226 0.03 302 0.01 −368 0.00 −442 0.00
ß9 −546 0.00 −19 0.88 −506 0.00 −433 0.00
ß10 −679 0.00 −105 0.39 −466 0.00 −623 0.00
ß11 −744 0.00 −261 0.03 −500 0.00 −619 0.00
ß12 −871 0.00 −433 0.00 −715 0.00 −784 0.00
ß13 −898 0.00 −521 0.00 −791 0.00 −877 0.00
ß14 −885 0.00 −646 0.00 −849 0.00 −711 0.00
ß15 −822 0.00 −762 0.00 −862 0.00 −667 0.00
ß16s −669 0.00 −632 0.00 −993 0.00 −794 0.00
ß17s −466 0.00 −138 0.18 −685 0.00 −607 0.00
ß18s −31 0.73 399 0.00 −60 0.55 −382 0.00
ß19s 201 0.02 417 0.00 −23 0.80 −303 0.00
ß20s 102 0.21 180 0.05 −370 0.00 −490 0.00
ß21s −27 0.73 226 0.01 −339 0.00 −495 0.00
ß22s −11 0.89 −51 0.54 −243 0.00 −368 0.00
ß23s −2 0.97 17 0.83 −98 0.20 −197 0.03
ßNEDE,s −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00
ßNEAT,s −1 0.00 −0 0.23 −1 0.00 −0 0.00
ßNEFR,s −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00
ßNEIT,s −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00 −0 0.00

Chapter¹0Conclusions and outlook
The research carried out in this dissertation provides several scientific contributions.On the one hand, the current knowledge of capacity remuneration mechanisms
is structured, summarized, and expanded in different areas. On the other hand, a
methodological approach is developed that enables the analysis of electricity markets
taking into account real-world conditions via a detailed agent-based model.
Initially, capacity remuneration mechanisms were primarily used in the US. In
recent years their use has also been increasingly discussed in Europe, where some coun-
tries, e.g., France and the UK, have already introduced them, and in other countries,
for instance, Germany and Italy, the implementation is still in process. In academia,
capacity remuneration mechanisms for electricity markets have been studied since
the first decade of the 20th century (e.g., Cramton and Stoft, 2005; Joskow and Tirole,
2007; Oren, 2000; Vázquez et al., 2002). While interest in capacity remuneration
mechanisms has remained largely constant for some time, recent developments have
led to increased research activities. Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered
or only partially answered, for example: How do the different capacity remuneration
mechanisms perform in terms of efficiency and effectiveness? How does the increased
penetration of renewable energies affect the necessity and the design of capacity remu-
neration mechanisms? What are the cross-border effects between different national
market designs and what complications arise from uncoordinated national policies
in real-world markets?
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In their search for answers to the aforementioned questions, researchers could draw
on a large pool of existingwork that examined the long-termdevelopment of electricity
systems by applying various model types but did not explicitly consider capacity
remuneration mechanisms (Bazmi and Zahedi, 2011; Connolly et al., 2010; Foley et al.,
2010; Guerci et al., 2010; Möst and Keles, 2010; Ventosa et al., 2005; Weidlich and
Veit, 2008). Therefore, existing approaches had to be extended for the evaluation of
capacity remuneration mechanisms¹; however, simplifications regarding the techno-
economic characteristics of electricity system were frequently made limiting the
explanatory power andmaking it difficult to transfer results to real-world applications.
For instance, analytical models require strong simplifications to obtain a feasible
solution. In Briggs and Kleit (2013) as well as Joskow and Tirole (2007), only two
different power plant types were regarded without start-up costs or start-up times. In
addition, system dynamics models were applied (e.g., Ochoa and Gore, 2015; Petitet et
al., 2017), but typically only a simplified presentation of techno-economic restrictions
was implemented, and interactions between the individual market participants were
neglected. Optimization models, as for example used by Levin and Botterud (2015)
or Neuhoff et al. (2016), represent the most widespread approach. On the one hand,
these models are able to take into account a multitude of technical constraints. On the
other hand, optimizationmodels are limited in the representation of different capacity
remuneration mechanisms and typically adopt a pre-liberalization perspective in
which all decisions are taken by a central authority.
In this regard, agent-based models present a flexible and capable approach that
allows to model markets and economies as complex adaptive systems taking into
account interactions of market participants as well as human learning (Farmer and
Foley, 2009). Nevertheless, with the exception of Bhagwat (2016), the agent-based
modeling approach is not yet widely used for research of capacity remuneration
mechanisms. To date, there are still no studies of real-world electricity markets that
¹ A detailed survey of the current research is presented in Chapter 5.
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adequately reflect the various interconnected markets, e.g., balancing and day-ahead
markets, take into account the essential techno-economic details of power plants
and implement the perspective of market participants confronted with investment
decisions under uncertainty. Thus, this dissertation aims to broaden the current
knowledge of capacity remuneration mechanisms by applying an agent-based model
to investigate the development of the electricity market under imperfect conditions
and uncertainties taking into account the expansion of intermittent renewable ener-
gies. In this way, both the fundamental economic and technical aspects of electricity
markets can be adequately addressed.
10.1 Conclusions
The objective of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of the need, design,
and effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms for electricity markets in transition.
To this end, the first chapters shed light on the peculiar characteristics of electricity
markets and examine the fundamental interrelationships by applying different models
in a coherent assessment. Themain analyses carried out can be summarized in answers
to the following central research questions:
What are the principal drivers for the price decline in European wholesale electric-
ity markets and does their influence necessitate additional investment incentives in
thermal capacities? Based ondifferent numericalmodels, the obtained results demon-
strate that fuel and carbon prices still have a dominating impact on wholesale elec-
tricity prices and the widespread opinion that the merit order effect of renewables is
the sole reason for the low prices faced today at wholesale markets has to be at least
partly rejected. In a ceteris paribus analysis, the total price effect² of photovoltaics
² It should be noted at this point that although the ceteris paribus analysis offers a good breakdown
of the individual factors, their absolute value offers room for misinterpretations. One of the reasons is
that only one factor is changed at a time. For example, if the overall price effect of renewable energies
is determined, it is assumed that no renewable energies would exist and no further thermal capacities
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and wind since their market introduction in Germany equals 14 to 15 EUR/MWh and
is indeed a substantial effect. However, the additional price effect between 2011 and
2015 is contributing only in the range of 5.40 to 6.80 EUR/MWh to the price decrease
of almost 20 EUR/MWh, which roughly equals the sole effect of the coal price decline.
This suggests that recent price developments on the electricity market are strongly
influenced by other markets, and new dynamics could lead to a partial recovery of
electricity prices. For example, a scenario analysis for 2020 shows that a modern
gas-fired power plant can generate enough revenue to cover variable and operational
fixed costs if coal and carbon prices recover to 2011 levels, partly due to its lower costs
for emission certificates. In this situation, the prices are high enough to achieve a
slightly positive annual return. Even though this could prove to be sufficient to keep
existing gas-based capacity in the market, no new investments would be incentivized.
Nevertheless, the development of other parameters, such as surplus capacities in the
electricity market, also plays a key role in the recovery of electricity prices and has a
significant influence on investors’ decisions. Therefore, the necessity of additional
investment incentives for thermal capacities in the short term is currently not clearly
evident.
What are the associated benefits and challenges in implementing a capacity remuner-
ation mechanism? The major advantage of capacity remuneration mechanisms is
that they are able to effectively reduce or even to solve different problems of existing
markets and thereby improve generation adequacy. For example, fluctuations caused
by investment cycles can be dampened and, thereby, extreme scarcity events can
be prevented. In addition, market developments are more predictable by avoiding
deviations from the long-term optimum caused by risk-averse decision-makers. Also,
the adverse effects of the abuse of market power can be mitigated, and some mecha-
nisms, for example, a forward capacity market, are able to solve the missing money
problem caused by regulatory price limits. However, determining the optimal market
would be added as replacements, even if they were urgently needed.
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design remains a complex challenge. The adequate design for a market depends on
a variety of factors such as the existing capacity mix and demand characteristics.
Thus, no general advantageousness of single mechanisms could be determined yet.
Furthermore, extreme diligence must be exercised when adapting the market design,
as the implementation of a capacity remuneration mechanism can lead to market
distortions, e.g., through cross-border effects. Even though the cross-border impacts
are complex and sometimes conflicting, there seems to be a consensus that a one-
sided implementation leads to negative spillover effects on a neighboring market
without any capacity remuneration mechanism. Thereby the pressure increases to
either introduce an ownmechanism or to rely on a coordinated approach. In addition,
the value of flexible resources, which is closely related to volatile prices, is reduced in
the presence of a capacity remuneration mechanism, and as a result, their expansion
is largely left in the hands of the regulator.
Is the currentmarket design inGermany sufficient to guarantee generation adequacy
andare the proposed capacity remunerationmechanisms both effective and efficient?
The quantitative analysis with an agent-based model shows that the existing German
market design leads to a market equilibrium in the short and medium term as gen-
eration adequacy is ensured, i.e., the supply side can deliver the required capacity
to meet the electricity demand at all times. However, this can be mainly attributed
to the growing coupling of European electricity markets and existing surplus capac-
ities, which mainly stem from the period before liberalization. Furthermore, it is
worth mentioning that these results also rely on the condition that at least a moderate
level of 2GW of sheddable loads can be activated during peak load situations. In the
long term beyond 2030, the results indicate that generation adequacy cannot be fully
guaranteed without additional capacity remuneration mechanisms. The electricity
demand cannot be completely met in several situations by the available capacity in
the day-ahead market, and at least spinning and non-spinning reserve power have to
be dispatched to avoid brownouts. Due to uncertain cash flows and difficult to predict
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and seldom occurring extreme price peaks, only insufficient investments are made.
The functionality of the EOM can be improved, if the available capacity of sheddable
loads is increased to about 8GW or if the at time envisaged capacity reserve of 5GW³
were to be implemented. Such a national capacity reserve is able to provide long-term
generation adequacy and would mainly consist of existing lignite, gas and oil-fired
power plants, but rarely of newly built capacities.
Which cross-border effects arise from capacity remuneration mechanisms and is the
introduction of a national mechanism required in order to mitigate severe adverse
consequences, for example in case of the Swiss market? In the case of a smaller
country neighbored by large markets (asymmetrical market areas), the impact of
cross-border effects from capacity remuneration mechanisms is more clearly evi-
dent. Therefore, the Swiss electricity market, which is tightly connected to its larger
neighboring markets of France, Italy, and Germany, serves as a useful example to
analyze possible cross-border effects. In a case study, two scenarios are regarded: In
one scenario, all market designs are represented according to the current legislation.
In a second scenario, a so-called energy-only market is assumed in countries sur-
rounding Switzerland. The results show a clear cross-border impact, as wholesale
electricity prices are highly dependent on the chosen market design. Although the
introduction of capacity mechanisms is a disadvantage for foreign generators, as they
cannot participate in the same way as local ones, the planned market design changes
in Switzerland’s neighboring countries do not necessarily have a negative impact on
national investments and a local capacity remuneration mechanism does not seem
to be required to secure generation adequacy. However, this result is strongly influ-
enced by the level of available storage capacities, in the case of Switzerland, ample
hydropower storage facilities, which are used to cover peak national demand when
foreign generation capacity is unavailable or used domestically.
³ After initially envisaging the implementation of a capacity reserve of up to 5GW, the volume was
reduced to 2GW, as additional lignite capacities in standby mode amounting to 2.7GW are available,
which can also be dispatched in scarcity situations (European Commission, 2017b).
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10.2 Limitations
At this part, the existing limitations of the analyses carried out are addressed on a
general level and specific restrictions are dealt with afterward. In this work, different
modeling approaches are used for a variety of topics demonstrating the wide range
of current electricity market models. Although a large number of improvements
and extensions to economic models have been achieved in recent years, it should be
noted that there are still some limitations that, without claiming completeness, can be
categorized as follows: First, the inability to represent real word systems. Second, the
dependence on valid input data. Third, the role of critical assumptions and structural
distortions.
Inability to fully represent real-world systems
“All models are wrong,” claims the well-known statistician George Box (1976), “but
some are useful.” The main intention of this aphorism is to point out that a model
always includes simplifications and approximations and never reflects all of reality
(Burnham and Anderson, 2002). In the context of this work, different model bound-
aries are drawn in terms of both the spatial resolution and the market elements under
consideration. While the assumptions and aspects considered are of decisive impor-
tance for the results, real-world aspects, which have been neglected in the analysis,
can be of equal importance. The model is also limited to certain countries of the
European market and, for example, the Northern Europe region has been neglected.
Dynamic external reactions in scarcity situations can therefore not be taken into
account, leading to a possible underestimation of foreign capacities. In addition, the
results of the analysis are each based on a representative weather year, which could
have a significant influence on the question of generation adequacy. In addition, the
EU-ETS, which has a considerable influence on the development of the electricity
market, was not implemented endogenously, so that no interdependencies can be ana-
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lyzed. However, as it can only be hypothesized in what way the disregarded elements
influence the results with diverging effects on the scenarios considered, all results
must be interpreted in the context of the applied model. Furthermore, technological
disruptions, possibly the effect of the blockchain technology, are difficult to predict
and can only be modeled within certain limits, but may have a decisive influence on
future developments (Qudrat-Ullah, 2015).
Dependence on valid data
“Garbage in, garbage out” is a principle in computer science, which refers to the fact
that computers cannot think for themselves, and that incorrect entries inevitably lead
to incorrect results (Schneider and Gersting, 2018). Also for the analyses carried out
in this dissertation, in particular when trying to replicate and analyze historical results,
valid data is essential. Although extensive data sets from reliable sources, which have
already proven useful in previous analyses, could be used, important parameters
remain subject to uncertainty. For example, the techno-economic parameters, i.e., the
efficiency, minimum load, start-up and downtimes, of hundreds of power plant units
in the market areas under consideration are required for the models, but for the vast
majority of the units, these values can only be estimated. Even if this uncertainty has
been addressed by analyzing a broad range of different values, not every parameter
combination could be tested and, furthermore, the future development of these values
can only be estimated. Hence, there exists no definitive certainty about the correct
input data.
Another essential aspect is the behavior of the agents considered in the model.
However, especially for investment decisions but also for strategic bidding in scarcity
situations, which form the basis for the investigation of generation adequacy and the
effectiveness of capacity measures, the behavior of agents is exceptionally difficult to
validate. Whereas it is assumed that all agents are homogeneous and act risk neutral,
in reality, different types of investors exists, such as utilities, banks or renewable
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energy cooperatives, with partly deviating risk profiles (Gross et al., 2010; Herbes
et al., 2017). If the majority of investors continues to behave risk-averse in the future,
the investment volumes in the case-study may have been overestimated.
Assumptions and scenarios
Although scenarios are not intended to make predictions about the future, they pro-
vide guidance by quantifying possible developments under alternative circumstances.
For example, part of the results on the analysis of generation adequacy achieved
depend heavily on the availability of interruptible loads. Although the consumption
of households is still considered generally inelastic, this situation could change more
drastically than in the scenarios considered. Public appeals, such as the tweet by
the French Interior Minister during a cold period in February 2018 (Ministère de
l’Intérieur, 2017), could offer additional flexibility in extreme situations. However,
such measures have not been regarded in this work. In addition, the more stringent
climate targets and the imminent phase-out of coal in Germany can have a major
impact on the results of the case studies carried out. However, this was not taken
into account due to the different framework conditions at the time the case studies
were carried out. As a result, in Germany, an earlier introduction of a capacity market
could be favorable.
10.3 Recommendations
In the following sections, first, the recommendations for action for political decision-
makers are presented followed by different suggestions for researchers to address
unresolved research questions.
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10.3.1 Recommendations for policy makers
While economists continue to discuss the question of the optimal market design for
the electricity sector, policy makers must already position themselves in the face of
remaining uncertainties regarding future market and technological developments.
The following paragraphs are intended to contribute to making an informed decision
and at the same time help to further improve electricity market design.
The necessity and effects of capacity renumeration mechanisms
One major advantage of capacity remuneration mechanisms is that they are able to
effectively reduce or even to solve different problems of existing energy-only markets.
For example, as shown in the case studies carried out, fluctuations caused by invest-
ment cycles can be dampened—even though usually not fully abolished—and, thereby,
extreme scarcity events can be prevented. However, the implementation of a capacity
remuneration mechanism can lead to market distortions, e.g., through cross-border
effects. This confirms the importance of coordinating national mechanisms. Results
from the literature show that a one-sided implementation of a capacity remuneration
mechanism can lead to negative spillover effects on a neighboring market without
a capacity remuneration mechanism. However, the example of Switzerland shows
that these effects can be mitigated by expanded interconnection capacities and high
storage capacities.
Determining the optimal market design, however, remains an ongoing challenge.
As the adequate design depends on a variety of factors such as the existing capacity
mix and demand characteristics, no general advantageousness of single mechanisms
could be determined so far. For example, in order to increase generation adequacy
in the short term, a strategic reserve is well suited, but it also leads to inefficiencies.
Thus, in case of persistent concerns about generation adequacy, other mechanisms
are advantageous.
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Increasing demand response
In order to avoid inefficiencies in the energy-only market due to the exercise of
market power, price caps have been introduced, in the knowledge that these can lead
to underinvestment and reduce welfare (Fabra, 2018). To counteract and mitigate
the consequences of price caps, capacity remuneration mechanisms aim to stimulate
new investments. However, the underlying problem—namely the inelastic demand,
which is a prerequisite for the exercise of market power—could also be addressed
in an alternative way, i.e., by increasing demand flexibility. While the widespread
equipping of all consumers with smart meters involves high costs and brings about
new challenges, e.g., establish a reliable and secure operation, this seems to be without
a viable alternative in view of the increasingly fluctuating generation (Zhou and Brown,
2017). Even if a capacity remuneration mechanism is introduced, as the results in
the case studies carried out in this dissertation show, demand response is able to
significantly reduce the amount of the required conventional capacity.
Determining a reliability target
In the energy trilemma of sustainability, affordability, and reliability, politicians attach
overriding importance to reliability (Newbery, 2016a). In view of its prominent role,
reliability should be determined and evaluated according to transparent criteria. For
many European electricity systems, the LOLE is applied, for which a target value
of 1 day in 10 years—corresponding to a value of 3 hours per year—should not be
exceeded. However, this standard, which dates back to the 1950s, has been criticized
as arbitrary and too strict to be economically optimal (Cramton and Stoft, 2006). In
addition, there apparently exists a difference between the controlled shutdown for a
modest number of consumers and the loss of load for all the connected appliances
across the industrial, commercial, as well as private sector. Thus, applying a different
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measure, for example, the unserved energy measured inMWh/year, seems to be more
reasonable (Lueken et al., 2016).
Reducing regulatory uncertainty
Whenever the future state of regulation is uncertain, the complexity for affected
decision makers increases. This is particularly relevant for the possible introduction
of a capacity remunerationmechanism, as, on the one hand, there is uncertainty about
the possible design of themechanism, and on the other hand, incremental adjustments
are oftenmade—for example, in the capacity market in the United Kingdom (Bhagwat
et al., 2016b)—that can affect the profitability of investments. In the energy-only
market, however, the question arises whether a regulator canwithstand public pressure
if very high prices occur over an extended period or whether strict price limits are
introduced. For example, on January 5, 2018, the German Federal Network Agency
(BNetzA) capped the energy price for balancing energy at 9999 EUR/MWh motivated
by the one-off occurrence of an energy price peak of 77 777 EUR/MWh, on October
17, 2017 (BNetzA, 2018a). However, regulatory uncertainty can be detrimental to
investments, as decision-makers tend to postpone decisions and make few changes to
the status quo (Fleten et al., 2017).
10.3.2 Recommendations for future research
Based on the research conducted and in particular on the research not conducted
in this dissertation, several research proposals are presented. The following four
paragraphs are intended to further refine the understanding of capacity remuneration
mechanisms, whereas the last two paragraphs aim at improving the capability of
agent-based electricity market models.
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Firm capacity of intermittent renewable energy
When analyzing the long-term generation adequacy and the need for capacity re-
muneration mechanisms under the increasing influence of the weather-dependent
renewable energy sources, it becomes increasingly important to assess the effects
of the stochastic nature of weather adequately. In order to determine the need for
thermal capacity of an electricity system, first, it is necessary to assess the firm capacity
each renewable technology can provide and, depending on the spatial distribution,
what intertemporal dependencies exist. For example, Patlakas et al. (2017) find that
low wind speed events of 3meters/second can last up to 4 to 5 days in the open waters
of the North Sea and up to 10 days nearshore—in specific cases even longer periods
are possible. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the future electricity generation
of wind power is distributed, e.g., in Germany, low wind speeds are more frequent
in summer when the electricity demand is typically lower. In summer, however, the
feed-in from photovoltaics tends to be higher but lower when the peak load occurs
on cold days in winter. Therefore, an integrated approach is indispensable to answer
the open question to what extent these extreme weather events can be compensated
in the national as well as the European context and what level of storage capacities is
required (Grams et al., 2017).
Impact and value of flexibility options
Electrical energy storages, such as battery or compressed air energy storages, make
it possible to store energy in a certain state and convert it into electrical energy
when required. Therefore, storage technologies have enormous potential to meet the
challenges of intermittent renewable energies, which are characterized by significant
daily and seasonal variations, as these intermittent electricity sources can be backed up,
stabilized or smoothed (Luo et al., 2015). In addition, demand response offers a wide
range of potential benefits for system operation and market efficiency by promoting
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the interaction and responsiveness of the customers, i.e., residential households or the
energy-intensive industry (Siano, 2014). These advances shape the development of the
current energy system, and, in the short term, more attention needs to be paid to how
these resources can be efficiently integrated into capacity remuneration mechanisms
(Byers et al., 2018). Furthermore, in the long term, the need for thermal power
plants to ensure generation adequacy could be reduced as demand response further
increases and energy storage capacities further grow. In this process, also the need for
capacity remuneration mechanisms could diminish. First tentative results indicate
that demand response and energy storages may achieve an equal improvement of
generation adequacy as capacity remuneration mechanisms but do so at lower costs
(Khan et al., 2018). However, there is still a need for research on the interaction of
flexibility options and capacity remuneration mechanisms in different, ideally more
general settings and on whether flexibility options can eliminate the need for capacity
mechanisms.
Prosumer era and smart grids
The so-called prosumer, with the ability to generate and store electricity as well as to in-
teract with other prosumers, is gradually superseding the traditional power consumer
(Grijalva and Tariq, 2011). With the increase in the number of prosumers, today’s
electricity sector will change dramatically in the coming decades. This, on the one
hand, offers opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but, on the other hand,
brings forth risks that need to be identified and addressed. For example, prosumers
can participate in peer-to-peer energy trading in a microgrid, which has already
been the subject of a number of pilot studies (Zhang et al., 2018), and is facilitated by
the fact that local authorities are striving for energy self-sufficiency (Engelken et al.,
2016). However, these partial disruptive developments are not sufficiently addressed
in current models as the existing analyses of capacity remuneration mechanisms
and generation adequacy typically either neglect the actors’ perspective or limit it by
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regarding only a few central actors. The implementation of large-scale, decentralized
markets still requires a great effort on the part of researchers, suppliers, and policy
makers if they are to be implemented further (Parag and Sovacool, 2016). Especially
for modelers, this presents the great challenge of coping with the growing complexity
of models, which results from the increased number of actors and the more detailed
presentation of human behavior (Pfenninger et al., 2014). Yet, these challenges need
to be addressed to examine how prosumers and decentralized markets may influ-
ence the need for capacity remuneration mechanisms and whether major regulatory
intervention may even become superfluous.
Coupling of agent-based simulation with optimization techniques
The complexity of energy systems continues to grow as they become more decentral-
ized, rely on multiple diverse energy sources and are more tightly interconnected.
This entails several risks and the realization that some of the current models might not
be capable of dealing with the emerging challenges (Pfenninger et al., 2014). Agent-
based models have proven their ability to capture the interactions between agents and
simulate the emergent behavior resulting from these interactions (Tesfatsion, 2006).
However, it is an increasing challenge to model the multifaceted decisions of market
participants with plain algorithms and at the same time fulfill all relevant constraints.
A promising approach is to rely on optimization tools where these problems can be
elegantly expressed, however, often only be resolved with brute computation power
(Papavasiliou et al., 2015). However, the growing computing resources should facilitate
the transition from algorithms to optimization methods. For this dissertation, for
example, the cross-border exchange has been formulated as an optimization problem
to maximize economic welfare. For the use of daily and seasonal storage systems, it is
also increasingly relevant to develop optimal bidding strategies considering the bids
impact on the market price (Steeger et al., 2014). A more in-depth model coupling on
further levels would also allow comparing wholesale market prices with system costs.
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Efficiency of capacity remuneration mechanisms
While there is still a debate about whether capacity remuneration mechanisms are
even required (Keppler, 2017), the discussion and the sequential implementation of
different mechanisms often already creates a fait accompli. While different problems
require different solutions, which may partly explain the vast number of customized
solutions (Doorman et al., 2016), it is largely unclear how these numerousmechanisms
are to be evaluated in terms of their economic efficiency. As the primary focus is
often on the effectiveness of the individual mechanisms and their contribution to
generation adequacy, the efficiency tends to be neglected (e.g., Bhagwat et al., 2017a).
In some studies, efficiency is addressed, but an overarching comparison is hampered
by the fact that no uniform criteria are applied between the studies or comparable
assumptions are made (cf. Hach et al., 2016; Traber, 2017). A further complicating
factor is that in practice many problems, such as incorrect parameterization or market
power of individual participants can occur (Bhagwat et al., 2016b), which further
complicate the transfer of theoretical results to practical applications. Therefore, it
still is necessary to investigate whether some mechanisms are more cost-efficient and
which factors of real-world markets could possibly influence this outcome.
Impact of investment strategies and degree of risk-aversion
The characteristics of investors such as their risk profile and investment strategy is
one aspect that plays a significant role for the development of the electricity market,
however, is often neglected in modeling and rarely verified by studies or experiments.
Nonetheless, the explicit consideration of risk is of immense importance. As shown
by Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011), a deterministic analysis might overlook changes
in the future capacity structure induced by the various risks to which investors are
exposed. Thus, an electricity model that provides agents with different investment
10.3. recommendations 307
strategies, for example, based on concepts such as the conditional value at risk (CVaR),
can yield intriguing new insights (e.g., Abani et al., 2018).
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